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Opening Pandora's Box? Theorising the Commercialisation of Military Force in the post-Cold War World.

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Opening Pandora's Box?

Theorising the Commercialisation of Military Force in the post-Cold War World.

Daniel Street

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy

University of Bath

Department of Politics, Languages and International
Studies

February 2016

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Signed on behalf of the Department of Politics, Languages and International Studies

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Abstract

The commercialisation of military services has increased in importance since the end of the Cold War. Commercial Military Service Providers (CMSPs) have found increased respectability and worked in states on every continent. Writing on CMSPs has similarly increased. Several high profile incidents have come under intense scrutiny, and has led to some portions of the literature demonising their use. However, there are still conceptual and theoretical issues which have been under explored.

This thesis contributes to the literature which has sought to address this theoretical lacuna. Historical Sociology and comparative analysis are employed to analyse the implications of CMSP use on the state. A modified version of the Ideological, Economic, Military and Political (IEMP) model developed by Michael Mann, is used to theorise the impact of commercial security providers on existing sources of power within the state, and the relationship between them. The thesis uses two case studies which are representative of the use of CMSPs during this time period. The Sierra Leone Civil War and the invasion and reconstruction of Iraq since 2003.

It will be argued that CMSPs alter the balance between power structures within the state, positively and negatively affecting the power of the state. The short term use of CMSPs has proven to be useful and of increasing importance; especially when military weakness is an urgent problem. However, although there has been no example of CMSPs intentionally threatening state stability, they can also subvert the power of the state. CMSPs, particularly when used for an extended period, have undermined the relationship between the sources of power, undermining political stability. Most significantly they weakened the state by undermining the strength it gains from its embeddedness in society.

Abbreviations

AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
APC	All People's Congress
CDF	Civil Defence Force
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CMSPs	Commercial Military Service Providers
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Rehabilitation
DoD	Department of Defence
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EO	Executive Outcomes
GSG	Ghurkha Security Group
IEMP	Ideological Economic Military and Political
IGO	Inter-Governmental Organisations
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPOA	International Peace Operations Association
MEJA	Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
MNC	Multi-national Corporation
MPRI	Military Professional Resources Incorporated
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PMC	Private Military Company
PMF	Private Military Firm
PSC	Private Security Company
R2P	Responsibility to Protect

RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SADF	South African Defence Force
SIGIR	Special Investigator General for Iraq Reconstruction
SLA	Sierra Leone Army
SLPP	Sierra Leone People's Party
UAVs	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
WMDs	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Chapter 1

Introduction

*“Earlier, human tribes lived on this earth
without suffering and toilsome hardship
and without painful illnesses that bring death to men-
a wretched life ages men before their time-
but the woman with her hands removed the great lid of the jar
and scattered its contents, bringing grief and cares to men.
Only hope stayed under the rim of the jar
and did not fly away from her secure stronghold,
for in compliance with the wishes of cloud-gathering Zeus
Pandora put the lid on the jar before she could come out.
The rest wander among men as numberless sorrows”*

Hesiod¹

1.1 Introduction

In Hesiod’s poem *Works and Days*, Zeus orders the creation of Pandora in order to take revenge on men. Pandora opens a jar² which brings ‘grief and cares’, withholding only hope. Many of those who comment on the outsourcing of force by the state have portrayed the process in the same way - by opening the jar and using commercial actors to carry out core functions, the state is committing an act that can only bring evil onto the world, a world which has never seen such strife before.

¹ Hesiod, *Hesiod: Theogony, Works and Days, Shield*, trans. by Apostolos N. Athanassakis (London: John Hopkins University Press, 1983), p.69.

² As the jar is referred to as a box in common usage, the term box is used in the title.

This thesis will engage with the outsourcing of military functions by the state to Commercial Military Service Providers (CMSPs) by adopting an objective stance which is not under the illusion that the state exists in an idealized form or that CMSPs are essentially negative; in most cases where CMSPs have become involved, the state is under considerable internal pressure, external pressure, or both. Although the use of a neutral approach to the subject is not unique among those writing on CMSPs, the use of a strong framework to theorise their role is an approach which has been underexplored.³

This thesis will theorise the implications for CMSPs on the relationship between state and society to argue that the short-term use of CMSPs offers an alternative to weakened, unreliable or even non-existent state institutions. Their use can be problematic and requires careful consideration by the state as to exactly how CMSPs are employed, funded and controlled. However, CMSPs are not a long-term panacea. Their prolonged use can interfere with the relationship between the power structures around which the state is centred; threatening the stability of the state and impeding the development of social, military and political institutions.

A Historical Sociological approach to security theory is utilised, which employs a modified version of Michael Mann's Ideological, Economic, Military and Political (IEMP) model. This also draws upon Barry Buzan's sectoral approach to security, which looks at political, military, economic, environmental and societal security. Mann's, economic, military and political sources of power are supplemented by Buzan's definitions. While Mann's ideological sources of power are replaced by Buzan's societal security.

This thesis is concerned with the implications for the states in which

³ See Deborah Avant, *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Deborah Avant, 'Private Security', in *Security Studies: An Introduction*, ed. by Paul D. Williams (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), pp. 438-452; David Shearer, *Private Armies and Military Intervention*, Adelphi Paper, 316 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Peter W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry* (London: Cornell, 2003) for good objective overviews of the industry.

CMSPs operate. Where their services either supplement or replace existing sources of military power,⁴ in particular those states which fall within Cooper's typology of 'pre-modern states'.⁵ These are states which lack the most fundamental attribute associated with modern states, the monopoly over the legitimate use of force. According to Cooper these states have lost either: (1) their legitimacy over the use of force, as the result of abuse; or (2) the monopoly over the control of the use of force, to other actors within the state. He compares the use of force to holding a bird; too loose a grip and the bird escapes, too tight and it is crushed. It is possible to go further and argue that the state can lose its monopoly by (1) and (2) occurring simultaneously. The state loses a monopoly over the use of force to other actors within the state, the remaining ability to exert force is then used in such a way that the state is further de-legitimised.

The focus on pre-modern states has implications for the generalisability of the conclusions reached in this thesis. Further research would be necessary to consider the impact on what Cooper terms 'modern' and 'post-modern' states. However such a focus is necessary because of the direct importance to the security of populations within pre-modern states, and often the existential threat to the state itself. Modern states possess a monopoly over the legitimate use of force, and post-modern states have voluntarily ceded some authority to other actors.⁶ Pre-modern states are therefore most in need of the services provided by CMSPs, exacerbated by the lack of interest that states in the west have in intervening in failing states.⁷ As a consequence of the loss of the legitimate use

⁴ IEMP stands for Ideology, Economy, Military and Political. This is an approach which Mann makes extensive use of in his analysis of the sources of social power: Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760*, 1st edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp.1-21, pp.44-91.

⁵ Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century* (London: Atlantic Books, 2004), pp.16-18.

⁶ Ibid. pp.21-31.

⁷ Ibid. p.17.

of force by pre-modern states, CMSPs take their largest role and have therefore have a significant impact on security. It is therefore important to consider their role in restoring both the monopoly and legitimacy over the use of force. The latter does raise some important questions, but as can be seen in the literature review below theorising has already been undertaken.

The theoretical model will be applied to two states; Sierra Leone and Iraq, and will be considered in the context of the historical use of commercial military actors. The use of this model to examine the use of CMSPs in Iraq and Sierra Leone will open up new avenues of understanding. The use of this model is a unique approach in an undeveloped area. By undertaking a new approach to the constantly evolving nature of the industry also means that existing studies become dated, as new empirical data allows this thesis to build on the current literature, challenging some of the projections and assumptions which have been made.

1.1.1 Context

The growth of the private security sector since the end of the Cold War has been rapid and far-reaching. The past two decades have witnessed the evolution of CMSPs into sophisticated enterprises, with contracts across the globe providing a variety of services to both state and non-state actors.⁸ Although CMSPs operated during the Cold War, the uncertain security situation which emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union established them as important international actors. The release of military equipment and personnel provided the means to intervene, while continuing and reigniting conflicts in regions such as Africa provided the demand for military services.⁹ The reluctance of Western states to intervene in minor conflicts following incidents such as the 1993 US led operation in Somalia, alongside the failure of the UN and regional organisations,

⁸ Madeline Drohan, *Making A Killing: How Corporations use Armed Force to do Business* (Connecticut: The Lyons Press, 2003); Singer, *Corporate Warriors*.

⁹ Shearer, *Private Armies and Military Intervention*, pp.23-37.

increased the demand for CMSP services.¹⁰ 2001 proved to be a second watershed as a more assertive US foreign policy placed demands upon its military that they could not meet.¹¹ Thus CMSPs have become a way for western militaries to bolster their capabilities; or, in the case of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), new, sophisticated weapons systems require specialised civilian support.¹² CMSPs have even become closely involved with intelligence agencies.¹³ The logistical support services offered by Brown Root Services BRS, a subsidiary of Halliburton, means they have become an important part of the US military infrastructure during operations since 1992.¹⁴

The use of private force is of great consequence as functions previously thought to be intrinsic to the functioning of the modern state have now shifted from the public to private domain. Companies such as Blackwater, Halliburton and ArmorGroup have become synonymous with the invasion and rebuilding of Iraq and Afghanistan.¹⁵ This is a trend that seems set to continue, with the South African company Saracen rumoured to be offering its services to the failing government in Somalia¹⁶ and various CMSPs linked to efforts to combat piracy.¹⁷ The cuts in defence budgets by many developed states since 2008

¹⁰ Peter W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*, 2nd edn (London: Cornell, 2008), pp.58-60.

¹¹ Singer, *Corporate Warriors* (2003), p.58.

¹² Carlos Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security: A Guide to the Issues* (Oxford: Praeger, 2010), p.128.

¹³ BBC, 'CIA Cancels Blackwater Drone-Missile-Loading Contract,' 12 December 2009 <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8409358.stm>> [accessed 13 December 2013].

¹⁴ Singer, *Corporate Warriors* (2003), p.136.

¹⁵ Blackwater has undergone a change of ownership and two name changes. ArmorGroup is now owned by G4S.

¹⁶ Mazzetti, Mark and Eric Schmitt, 'Blackwater Founder Said to Back Mercenaries,' *New York Times*, 20 January 2011 <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/21/world/africa/21intel.html?_r=2&hp> [accessed 21 January 2011].

¹⁷ Sengupta, Kim, 'Blackwater Gunboats Will Protect Ships,' *The Independent*, 10 May 2011 <<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/blackwater-gunboats-will-protect-ships-1024582.html>> [accessed 11 May 2011].

have led to an increase in the use of commercial service providers.¹⁸ Thus outsourcing security raises important theoretical questions about the role of the state.¹⁹ Are we moving towards Bobbitt's Market State in which devolution and privatisation includes security?²⁰

The trend in re-privatization provides new perspectives and importance for renewed analysis of the state and how it deals both with other states and with non-state actors, via the execution and regulation of force. The challenges offered by CMSPs pose a different set of dilemmas compared to other non-state actors. They utilise force, but within the legal framework established by the state they are working in or for. State actors often sanction CMSPs as they seek to prop up their capabilities, where their 'challenge' to the state's monopoly of the legitimate use of force is in fact intended to enhance the long term security of the state. However, the capacity to purchase military capabilities off the shelf is an important dynamic impacting on how groups interact within the state. While the demand for private security displays no sign of waning; CMSPs will remain important actors in contemporary international security, requiring academic analysis and theoretical explanation.

1.1.2 Problems with Current Research

Activity by the US and UK in Afghanistan and Iraq has increased awareness of the private security industry as the market for private force rapidly expanded. Several high profile incidents have raised awareness of the role of private contractors in these theatres with a wide audience; as a result companies like

¹⁸ Kirkup, James, 'British Army Forced to Rely on Foreigners and Contractors', *The Telegraph*, 7 June 2012 <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9315166/British-Army-forced-to-rely-on-foreigners-and-contractors.html>> [accessed 3 March 2013].

¹⁹ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*.

²⁰ Phillip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History* (London: Penguin, 2002), p.237.

Blackwater (renamed to Xe, then Academi) have gained widespread notoriety.²¹ The importance of CMSPs has come to be recognized by a number of writers from journalists to academics to those with a general interest in current affairs. Literature has focused specifically on CMSPs or included them in more general studies of security issues and elements within conflicts. Initial writing on the role played by CMSPs sought to draw attention to their existence and introduce some of issues which had arisen as well as highlighting potential problems for the future. Much of this writing however was journalistic or descriptive. While these sources have their own merit, drawing attention to the activities of the companies, and providing rich empirical data from which draw, they do not deepen our understanding of how the privatisation of force impacts on our current understanding of security.

Recent literature has widened the scope of analysis to include further developments and address some of the theoretical and conceptual ramifications of the privatisation of force. However, as can be seen in the literature review below, there are several significant lacunae which remain. Importantly, while there have been attempts to address the initial dearth of theoretical engagement with the subject, understanding of the implications on security and the state remains incomplete. When addressing the impact of CMSPs on the state, little has been done to move beyond the basic assumption of the Weberian state 'claiming a monopoly of the legitimate use of force over a given territory'. This is an issue identified by both Singer²² and Avant,²³ who view the impact of CMSPs on the state as a problem in need of investigation. Avant in particular is critical of the 'rush for normative judgement' at the expense of analysis of the effect of privatisation.²⁴

²¹ BBC, 'Iraq 'Expels Blackwater Security Employees,' 10 February 2010 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/8509475.stm edn> [accessed 13 February 2010.]

²² Singer, *Corporate Warriors* (2003), p.170.

²³ Avant, *Private Security*, p.451.

²⁴ Ibid..

1.1.3 Research Objective

This thesis will contribute to the body of work which has sought to move beyond the descriptive writing that formed the basis of much writing on CMSPs; contributing towards the move to tackle the theoretical lacunae that surround the subject. The focus will be on those companies which play a significant role in state security, either directly employed by the state or their use as a proxy, by providing military services. Their impact on the state in which they are operating will be analysed. The theoretical gap will be addressed by breaking down the state using Michael Mann's sources of social power. Mann's IEMP model will be used, in a modified form, to provide a theoretical framework that will allow a deeper understanding of how the sources of power operate within the state and the implications of introducing an external source of power.

Although Mann is sceptical about the potential of his model as a comparative tool, in Volume I of his *Sources of Social Power* he argues that as his rejection of society as unitary discounts the effectiveness of comparative sociology²⁵, it can be used to provide an effective analytical framework. The IEMP model facilitates the deconstruction of the state, and the analysis of the relationship between the sources; allowing cases to be compared. Indeed, this thesis would argue that Mann himself tacitly acknowledges this usefulness by engaging in comparative discussion over both geography and time in his discussions with John Hall.²⁶ This thesis will also employ and therefore contribute to literature on the failure of the state in each of the case studies covered by integrating the impact of CMSPs into work on the failure of the state in the countries covered.

The use of Mann's IEMP model will contribute to a deeper understanding of CMSPs by theorising the impact of the use of CMSPs on power structures

²⁵ Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1*, p.30.

²⁶ Michael Mann and John A. Hall, *Power in the 21st Century: Conversations with John A. Hall*, 1st edn (Cambridge: Polity, 2011).

within the state - the role of the companies in providing security and the state in controlling them. By looking specifically at the power structures within the state it will be possible to see how CMSPs affect the dynamic between political elites, military elites and the society. Significantly - how the state interacts within society and the implications for the long and short-term stability of the state. This is an important area of research as the relationship between these three groups is often the source of instability within developing states.

The remaining sections of this chapter will consider: the existing literature on CMSPs, in order to place the contribution that this thesis will make to current understanding; the research questions which will be addressed; and outline the methodology which will be used.

1.2 Current Literature

Interest in CMSP activity at both an academic and more general level has contributed to a rapidly growing body of literature. However, as mentioned above, the work that has been undertaken is far from comprehensive. A significant portion of the initial literature was anecdotal and descriptive. While important analytical work has been carried out on the structure of the companies, the roles they have played and could undertake in the future; there is however a dearth of analysis on the theoretical impact of CMSPs.²⁷ Existing literature has rapidly become outdated as companies have changed and new cases have revealed more about their impact.²⁸ This is complicated by the constantly changing nature of politics since the end of the Cold War and the evolution of the security industry. Current scholarship can be divided into four

²⁷ Percy also notes the reluctance of writers on CMSPs to apply their work to a theoretical frame, particularly the failure to engage with wider IR theory. Sarah Percy, *Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) over the last few years the situation has only just begun to change.

²⁸ Singer has responded to such changes by updating his work. His book *Corporate Warriors* was initially published in 2004, but an updated edition was released in 2008 to recognise the developments in Iraq.

main categories: (1) first person accounts; (2) descriptive/narrative; (3) analytical and conceptual classification and finally; (4) wider theorising. These categories can be subdivided according to the age of the research: (A) earlier writing dealing purely with CMSP activity during the 1990; and (B) more recent work on CMSPs since 2001 focusing on their role in the so-called 'war on terror'. These categories are not entirely discrete: for example Spicer splits 'An Orthodox Soldier' between a first person account of his time in the army and Sandline, and an analysis of the private security industry. Many of the conceptual works also make use of narrative.²⁹

In the first category CMSP operators have made their own contribution to the literature. This includes books such as Spicer's autobiographical account of his time in the military and a history of Sandline; though he also includes a section on CMSPs and the possibility of regulation. His account culminates with his explanation of the 'Arms-to-Africa Affair', following Sandline's involvement in the Sierra Leone civil war.³⁰ Eeben Barlow has also written his version of Executive Outcomes's (EO) activity in the 1990s.³¹ The 'boy's own' style of account has also become popular; a majority of these books are by current or ex-employees, who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ashcroft, Geddes and Lowe are good examples of this genre.³² They offer street level accounts of their experiences. These are useful for understanding the conditions that contractors work under and their attitudes towards the job, each other, and other actors, including civilians and other military forces. The experiences they relay will always be open to question, as with any source of this nature, particularly as the

²⁹ Lt. Col. Tim Spicer, *An Unorthodox Soldier, Peace War and the Sandline Affair* (London: Mainstream Publishing, 1999).

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Eeben Barlow, *Executive Outcomes: Against all Odds* (Alberton: Galago, 2008).

³² Capt. James Ashcroft, *Making a Killing: The Explosive Story of a Hired Gun in Iraq* (London: Virgin Books Ltd, 2005); John Geddes, *Highway to Hell: An Ex-SAS Soldier's Account of the Extraordinary Private Army Hired to Fight in Iraq* (London: Century, 2006) and Simon Low, *The Boys from Baghdad: From the Foreign Legion to the Killing Fields of Iraq* (London: Mainstream Publishing, 2007).

intention is to appeal to a broad readership. Despite this, contractors such as Ashcroft are prepared to offer a critical account of themselves and the way they operate.³³ The focused nature of each account, in terms of geography, chronology and the companies involved mean they are of limited use when considered individually; but can contribute towards a wider understanding. While popular interest in Iraq and Afghanistan have been the catalyst for many of the books, edited volumes of contractor's accounts include experiences from before 2001.³⁴

The second category of writing on CMSPs is descriptive or narrative, these often tend to be historical. A significant proportion of writing uses historical narrative as an introduction to the issue being addressed, usually to establish the historical relationship between CMSPs and other forms of private force; a few authors have provided purely historical narratives. Thomson's book is one of the main historical studies to establish the long-term relationship between private force and the state.³⁵ Although the bulk of the book is historical, CMSPs make a brief appearance in the final chapter. Her work has proved an influential source, being cited by many other writers on CMSPs as they also seek to explain the rise of the companies. She has faced criticism for failing to develop a strong enough theoretical framework to her analysis,³⁶ which is why I have classified her work within this category. Lanning also considers the evolution of private force, focusing on how CMSPs evolved; this is a much less ambitious work, the focus on narrative resulting in a weaker overall thesis.³⁷ CMSPs do

³³ Capt. James Ashcroft, *Making a Killing: The Explosive Story of a Hired Gun in Iraq*.

³⁴ Jim Hooper, *Bloodsong!: First-Hand Accounts of a Modern Private Army in Action*, 2nd edn (London: HarperCollins, 2003).

³⁵ Janice Thomson, *Mercenaries, Pirates & Sovereigns: State Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

³⁶ Sarah Percy, "Weak States, Sovereignty and the Provision of Public Security: Sierra Leone and Executive Outcomes 1995-1997" (unpublished PhD, University of Oxford, Balliol College, 2001).

³⁷ Michael Lee Lanning, *Mercenaries: Soldiers of Fortune, from Ancient Greece to Today's Private Military Companies* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2005).

appear in number of works on general mercenary activity, though these accounts do not go into sufficient detail on CMSPs. Rogers looks at the modern mercenary, including CMSP activity, this is in the context of more conventional mercenary activity which persisted in the 20th century.³⁸

Journalists have made a significant contribution towards the understanding of CMSPs, tending to fall again within the bracket of description. This includes generating a large amount of data on the activity of the companies, and revealing a number of incidents. Arguably the journalistic style of writing has been one of the main ways that the part played by CMSPs has been recorded, analysed and disseminated to a wider audience. Sources range from news articles to NGO reports and books. Recent books have proved popular, proving to be easy to read and offering an accessible way into the subject. Schumacher and Pelton-Young have both spent periods of time with contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan,³⁹ both can claim previous military experience, and are embedded with their subject, not surprising seeing as journalists generally need to use security contractors when they are operating in these areas, with reports on the use of convoys. The relationship between the writer and subject needs to be questioned: Brabazon offers an insight into the planning behind the failed attempt to overthrow the government of Equatorial Guinea in 2004, but is openly aware of how his relationship with Nick du Toit compromises his position as a spectator.⁴⁰

Journalistic literature on CMSPs also tends to focus on the activities of particular CMSPs, or be restricted to specific areas or narrowly defined criteria. These accounts, while investigating the various elements of case studies in detail, do not attempt to place them in a wider theoretical framework. Chatterjee

³⁸ Anthony Rogers, *Someone Else's War: Mercenaries from 1960 to the Present* (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1998).

³⁹ Robert Young Pelton, *Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2006); Col. Gerald Schumacher, *A Bloody Business: America's War Zone Contractors and the Occupation of Iraq* (St Paul: Zenith Press, 2006).

⁴⁰ James Brabazon, *My Friend the Mercenary* (London: Canongate, 2010).

has released books on Iraq⁴¹ and Halliburton,⁴² Scahill on Blackwater,⁴³ while on the wider subject of mercenaries, Roberts has tackled the attempted coup in Equatorial Guinea.⁴⁴ The significant omission of this source of writing on CMSPS is the failure to consider the impact of CMSPs in the context of wider IR, or security theory.⁴⁵ This is meant to be an observation and an indication of where further research possibilities lay, rather than a criticism of the value of this source of writing on CMSPs. Neither does this mean that further descriptive writing on the subject is no longer required, further research will continue to be useful as long as CMSPs are active, by generating empirical data.

The third category of literature, the analysis and classification of CMSPs and their relationship to other forms of private force formed the core of initial academic CMSP analysis. From earlier scholars such as Shearer, attempts have been made to understand the new private military industry, through to more recent scholarship such as Singer,⁴⁶ Kinsey⁴⁷ and Avant.⁴⁸ The classification chosen by the various writers generally reflects the position they have adopted on the issue. Those who wish to take a critical view of CMSP operators tend to label them as mercenaries; the normative baggage associated

⁴¹ Pratap Chatterjee, *Iraq, Inc.: A Profitable Occupation* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2004).

⁴² Pratap Chatterjee, *Halliburton's Army: How a Well Connected Texas Oil Company Revolutionized the Way America Makes War* (New York: Nation Books, 2009).

⁴³ Jeremy Scahill, *Blackwater: The Rise of the World's most Powerful Mercenary Army*. (London: Serpents Tail, 2007).

⁴⁴ Adam Roberts, *The Wonga Coup: The British Mercenary Plot to Seize Oil Billions in Africa* (London: Profile Books Ltd, 2006).

⁴⁵ Percy similarly notes the failure of writers to engage in wider theory in her analysis of CMSP literature. Sarah Percy, 'Weak States, Sovereignty and the Provision of Public Security: Sierra Leone and Executive Outcomes 1995-1997.'

⁴⁶ Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*.

⁴⁷ Christopher Kinsey, *Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies* (London: Routledge, 2006).

⁴⁸ Deborah Avant, *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security*.

with the term makes a good starting point for their arguments.⁴⁹ Others, who take a positive or neutral attitude, tend to use terms such as Private Military Firm (PMF), Private Military Company (PMC)⁵⁰ Private Security Company (PSC), or the compound of CMSP.⁵¹ CMSP literature has sought to explore the roles that CMSPs may be able to fulfil in the future. Popular themes include the relationship between CMSPs and the United Nations. The idea has been mooted on various occasions that private contractors fulfil peacekeeping commitments.⁵² The option of peacekeeping is a popular one, as CMSPs are quite often compared in favourable terms as a solution to reluctant and/or ineffective state sponsored operations.⁵³

CMSP regulation is a long running theme amongst writers and an area of current debate. Concern over the conduct of CMSP operatives and the ability to hold transgressors responsible for their actions has driven a great deal of the literature, in particular questions over which laws they are accountable to and how effectively these are enforced.⁵⁴ This has become an increasingly popular subject for debate as CMSPs have become embroiled in several incidents in

⁴⁹ Guy Arnold, *Mercenaries: The Scourge of the Third World* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1999); Abdel-Fatau Musah and Kayode J. Fayemi, *Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma* (London: Pluto Press, 2000). 'Mercenary' is used to set the tone of their arguments.

⁵⁰ Ian D. Jefferies, 'Private Military Companies - A Positive Role to Play in Today's International System', *Connections: The Quarterly Journal*, 1 (4) (2002), pp.103-125.

⁵¹ This debate will be explored in more detail in chapter 2

⁵² Steven Brayton, 'Outsourcing War: Mercenaries and the Privatization of Peacekeeping', *Journal of International Affairs*, 55 (2) (2002), pp.303-329; William Shawcross, *Deliver Us from Evil: Warlords and Peacekeepers in a World of Endless Conflict* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc., 2000).

⁵³ David Shearer, *Private Armies and Military Intervention*.

⁵⁴ Christopher Kinsey, 'Regulation and Control of Private Military Companies: The Legislative Dimension', *Contemporary Security Policy*, 26 (1) (2005), pp.84-102; Elke Krahmann, 'Regulating Private Military Companies: What Role for the EU?', *Contemporary Security Policy*, 26 (1) (2005), pp.103-125; Sarah Percy, *Regulating the Private Security Industry*, Adelphi Paper, 384 vols (Oxon: Routledge, 2006); Peter W. Singer, 'War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatised Military Firms and International Law', *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*, 42 (2) (2004), pp.521-550.

Afghanistan⁵⁵ and Iraq.⁵⁶

The analysis carried out within this section of the literature has provided some useful insights into the structure of the industry, such as Singer's influential typology.⁵⁷ As with narrative descriptions of the industry some of the literature takes a focused analysis, such as concentrating on how CMSPs have impacted on particular conflicts.⁵⁸ From the point of this thesis, the main weakness of this category of literature is the failure to address the issue of wider theorising by engaging with more general international relations or security theory.

1.3 Theory Guided CMSP Research

The fourth category of literature, wider theoretical work, is of most interest for this thesis. This is an area that for a long time remained underexplored, as most literature was descriptive and/or analytical. However, researchers are increasingly seeing the importance of considering CMSPs within international relations and security theory. This area has begun to address some of the issues surrounding the state and the use of force. It is this area of research to which this thesis contributes - which will be considered in more detail below.

Avant embarks upon one of the most conceptually interesting research on CMSPs among the current literature. She was one of the first to address the impact of the increasing use of CMSPs on the use of force both as a subject, and from a strong theoretical position. Avant uses 'New Institutionalism', a combination of sociological and economic theory.⁵⁹ She analyses three different relationships; CMSPs and state clients, CMSPs and their 'home' states and

⁵⁵ The mistreatment of prisoners in Abu Gharib involved privately contracted workers.

⁵⁶ The shooting of civilians by Blackwater employees has sent out shockwaves.

⁵⁷ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, pp.88-100.

⁵⁸ Chris Dietrich, 'The Commercialisation of Military Deployment in Africa', *African Security Review*, 9 (1) (2000), pp.3-17; D. J. Francis, 'Mercenary Intervention in Sierra Leone: Providing National Security Or International Exploitation', *Third World Quarterly*, 20 (2) (2010), pp. 319-338.

⁵⁹ Avant, *The Market for Force*.

finally CMSPs and other private companies; looking at levels of control; functional, political.⁶⁰ Avant is interested in the question of how the different dimensions of control fit together.

This is an important area of research and overlaps with this thesis. Avant argues how the consideration of functional benefits and the sociological ramifications of CMSP use has become lost in the normative debate between whether CMSPs are good or bad. This thesis goes beyond her work by using historical sociology to understand the implications of the use of CMSPs on the relationship between state and society. Doing so will increase understanding of the implications of employing CMSPs on the control of force. The rapidly changing nature of events in Iraq has opened up new lines of questions and allows ideas to more effectively be challenged; Avant was writing only two years after the invasion of Iraq.

Several writers have addressed the issue of morality and the use of CMSPs. The issues they discuss have ramifications for the regulation and the possible use of CMSPs by organizations such as the UN.⁶¹ This is a significant area, and one that is becoming increasingly popular. By understanding the reasons why terms such as mercenary have a pariah status, an insight can be gained into some of the problems with regulation or how employing CMSP operatives may undermine an operation. Percy was one of the first authors to tackle the issue of norms and mercenaries.⁶² She argues that the ethical objections against the historical use of mercenaries are crucial in understanding the composition of military forces, and thus why CMSP use is seen to be so problematic. The outcome is to limit both the way states have been able to use CMSPs, and the employment opportunities for the companies themselves.⁶³ The ramifications for the composition of state forces is of interest here, as it

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Percy, *Regulating the Private Security Industry*.

⁶² Percy, *Mercenaries*

⁶³ Ibid, pp.1-2.

feeds into the debate over whether CMSPs can offer, even a temporary, alternative to regular state forces. However, this thesis is less interested in the normative implications of CMSP use, than their empirical impact on the role of power within the state.

The ethical implications of CMSP usage has proved to be a popular area of discussion. Scholars such as Pattison have sought to explore the ethical and normative implications of outsourcing force, in relation to more general international relations theory, including the impact on Just War Theory and Responsibility to Protect (R2P).⁶⁴

Ortiz offers one of the most up to date approaches to the subject. While still offering to generate debate as much as he answers questions, the arguments he makes move on from earlier writing. Engaging with security theory he argues that what he terms as CMSPs should be seen as part of the reality of the security situation which has emerged. CMSPs should not be seen as ideal, nor fundamentally problematic.⁶⁵ A problem with Ortiz's approach is that his book is as much a survey of the use of CMSPs as a consideration of their implications on theory. His major contribution to theory is on "security partnerships" using public management theory, but ultimately concludes that the civil-military-private relationship is one which requires further research.⁶⁶

Krahmann's edited volume on new threats and actors in international security attempts to place CMSPs within a wider framework of how security has changed in the 21st century, combining analysis of non-state actors and the state. The focus is on the widening of security to include a greater range of actors, the general framework of the volume is interesting. CMSPs are covered in a chapter by Spearin; however the focus is restricted to their use by Non-

⁶⁴ James Pattison, 'Just War Theory and the Privatization of Military Force', *Ethics and International Affairs*, 22 (2) (2008), pp.143-162.

⁶⁵ Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security*, p.8.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

Governmental Organisations (NGOs).⁶⁷ There have also been attempts to consider the implication of the growth of private force since the end of the Cold War on Human Security. Though in this case Shannon's article goes beyond CMSPs to look at the various private forces which emerged in Columbia and Sierra Leone.⁶⁸

Krahmann also looks at the democratic implications of the use of force on the state. She focuses on post-modern states - the US, UK and Germany and asks what the implications are for the democratic control over the use of force in these states. She compares Liberal and Republican models of military-civil relations and argues that both are equally problematic. For Krahmann the solution lies in moving from military to civilianisation of conflict resolution.⁶⁹

Abrahamsen and Williams argue that they are moving the debate beyond the focus on firms which provide military services to include wider security services. They focus on globalisation and security, and again cite the importance of social factors in understanding the implications of outsourcing security functions. They argue that the embeddness social forces, with and between states, in different forms of governance. The consequence is a reconfiguration of state power. Their research focuses on the relationship between the globalisation of security and four African states. They recognise that as a consequence there are limitations to their findings.⁷⁰ Although one of these states is Sierra Leone, it leaves room for wider geographical analysis.

Some attempt has been made in incorporate the commercialisation of force into theories of the state. Bobbitt draws on the work of Martin van Creveld

⁶⁷ Christopher Spearin, 'Humanitarians and Mercenaries: Partners in Security Governance?', in *New Threats and Actors in International Security*, ed. by Elke Krahmann (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 45-68.

⁶⁸ Ulric Shannon, 'Human Security and the Rise of Private Armies', *New Political Science*, 22 (1) (2000), pp.103-115.

⁶⁹ Elke Krahman, *States, Citizens and the Privatization of Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp.283-85.

⁷⁰ Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, *Security Beyond the State: Private Security in International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp.1-14.

to argue that privatisation of security functions is part of a shift to a market state.⁷¹ Thus the focus is on states which Cooper classifies as 'post-modern', rather than the pre-modern states which are of interest in this thesis.

The literature within each of these categories can also be broken down by date published. Writing before 2001/2 tended to focus on the impact of CMSPs in Africa, the Balkans and Latin America, with most of the literature falling into the descriptive/narrative and occasionally conceptual categories. The focus on events which have followed 9/11, as CMSPs have become an important part of the US 'War on Terror', has opened up a large amount of empirical data to challenge the assumptions made in the initial literature. For example Carafano focuses on the impact of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, while turning his attention to their future use.⁷² The title, 'Private Sector, Public Wars' suggests the possibility of wider theorising, but the overall thesis does not engage with the topic theoretically. In 'One Nation Under Contract' Stanger makes only a limited mention of theory in her critique of the way in which American foreign policy has come to rely on the private sector.⁷³ Although the profit motive behind the companies is important, these works still suffer from the tendency to make normative judgments – such as 'Betraying our Troops'⁷⁴ and 'War on terror inc.: Corporate profiteering from the politics of fear'.⁷⁵

The literature recognises the importance of CMSPs activity on the state. Although the literature has begun to contribute to theory based research, gaps

⁷¹ Phillip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History*, p.237 which is drawn from Martin van Creveld's argument that the state will transfer security to private firms Martin Van Creveld, *The Rise and Decline of the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

⁷² James Jay Carafano, *Private Sector, Public Wars: Contractors in Combat - Afghanistan, Iraq and Future Conflicts* (London: Praeger Security International, 2008).

⁷³ Susan Stanger, *One Nation Under Contract* (London: Yale University Press, 2009).

⁷⁴ Dina Rasor and Robert Bauman, *Betraying our Troops: The Destructive Results of Privatising War* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

⁷⁵ Solomon Hughes, *War on Terror, Inc.: Corporate Profiteering from the Politics of Fear* (London: Verso, 2007).

remain. Particularly on the implications of CMSP use for power structures within the state and how they affect the relationship between state and society. Further research will also allow more recent events to be incorporated. Finally, some of the more recent research has specified more general forms of security and looked at particular regions.

1.4 Research Questions

This thesis will seek to address the lacunae in the literature identified above by providing a conceptual and theoretical analysis of CMSPs, analyzing the relationship between the state and the commercialisation of force at unit and system level, contributing to and expanding upon existing knowledge in two ways. It will engage with wider international relations and security theory by utilizing historical sociology to construct a suitable theoretical framework and theory of the state. This will then be used to explore the ramifications of the increasing use of CMSPs on the agency of the state at the domestic and international level, avoiding normative judgements on the use of private use of force. The cases studies will need to balance in depth analysis that focuses on military firms operating in failed states, but at the same time allowing for some wider conclusions to be drawn.

While a number of different actors over the last century have been heralded as eroding the state, CMSPs are the focus of this thesis as they pose the most conceptually interesting 'challenge' to state sovereignty. Governments of weak and failing states have sought the use of private force to reinforce their position and developed states are seeking to transfer the risks involved away from media-sensitive traditional forces as they become increasingly aware of the risks involved of intervention abroad.⁷⁶ It has been well established that although both internal and external factors are influencing the state, to argue they signal

⁷⁶ Martin Shaw, *The New Western Way of War: Risk-Transfer War and its Crisis in Iraq* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005).

the end is to underestimate the resilience of the state and the nature of the institution.⁷⁷ This thesis will therefore engage in a more sophisticated analysis of the possible challenge posed by CMSPs to the state:

- What is the impact of CMSP use on the relationship between the sources of social power in the different networks?
- Do CMSPs undermine the power and/or the legitimacy of the institutions that comprise the state?
- Does the existence of a body, possessing the quasi-legal ability to exercise force, compromise the relationship of the state with other actors within and outside the state?
- Therefore, how effective are CMSPs in building a sustainable security environment within the state?

The answers to the first three questions will contribute to the final, and most important question. By answering these questions it will be possible to understand the significance of the use of CMSPs in the case studies. They are also relevant to understanding their continuing role; such as the intervention in Somalia by CMSP operators⁷⁸ and the protection of resource extraction infrastructure by G4S.⁷⁹ This thesis will provide an informed answer by balancing empirical data with a strong theoretical base.

⁷⁷ Michael Mann, 'Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State?', *Review of International Political Economy*, 4(3) (1997), pp.472-496.

⁷⁸ David Brunnstrom and Giles Elgood, 'Libya "Mercenary" Claim Turns Spotlight on Special Ops,' 20 September 2011 <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/20/us-libya-mercenaries-idUSTRE78J2ER20110920>> [accessed 20 September 2011].

⁷⁹ Neil Maidment 'G4S Eyes Africa as Resources Sector Booms,' 3 May 2012 <<http://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFJOE84207720120503?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0>> [accessed 4 May 2012].

1.5 Methodology

1.5.1 Historical Sociology

This thesis does not seek to refute the importance of realism, particularly as historical sociology's status as a method of research means its practitioners can still utilise other theories, including realism.⁸⁰ Historical sociology does however offer a way to augment some of the assumptions made by realism which are viewed as weaknesses when dealing with non-state actors and institutions within a state. Although realism is a diverse school, there are general criticisms which can be made. Most importantly that realism, in particular structural realism, has three inbuilt inadequacies which result from the preference for parsimony: 1) oversimplification, which limits the understanding of power and marginalises role of non-state actors; 2) as a result of which actors are not granted sufficient agency; and 3) the failure to account for historical change.⁸¹ Thus historical sociology allows for a more nuanced understanding of how these elements impact on each other. While doing this some of the dangers identified by realists need to be acknowledged, such as being too reductionist. These omissions are a fundamental characteristic of realist scholars; who focus on what they view to be the most important actors and their motivations, allowing events to be abstracted and placed in a wider context. Mearsheimer emphasises the explanatory power offered by parsimony, warning of the dangers of reductionism and the subsequent loss of the explanatory power of theory.⁸² This is a debate which continues to incite supporters from both sides

⁸⁰ Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, 'Alternative Approaches to International Theory', in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, ed. by John Baylis and Steve Smith, 4th edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.180.

⁸¹ *Historical Sociology of International Relations*, ed. by Stephen Hobden and John Hobson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp.5-19.

⁸² John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, Norton Series in World Politics (London: W. W. Norton & Co., 2001), pp.1-27; Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).

with realists such as Drezner favouring the explanatory power offered over more recent theories, which he argues are still yet to be proved.⁸³

However, historical sociology is an approach which is becoming increasingly popular and influential within international relations.⁸⁴ A diverse set of scholars including Charles Tilly,⁸⁵ Theda Skocpol,⁸⁶ Martin Shaw,⁸⁷ Immanuel Wallenstein and John Hobson,⁸⁸ have all contributed to this trend. The edited volume 'Historical Sociology of International Relations' is indicative of the interest in the approach, with international theorists including Buzan, Smith, Halliday and Linklater offering contributions on the impact of the various forms of historical sociology, each offering an alternative way to deal with the issues in the identified failings of other theories, though the main recipients are realism and liberalism.⁸⁹ Despite this the use of historical sociology within international relations has been fragmented. Within the CMSP literature there is on occasion reference to works by historical sociologists, but none of them make explicit reference to the theory or make a sustained attempt to understand it within their

⁸³ Drezner, Daniel, 'Yes, Anne-Marie, there is a Subtle Realist,' *Foreign Policy*, 13 August 2011 <http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/13/yes_anne_marie_there_is_such_a_thing_as_as_subtle_realist> [accessed 14 August 2011].

⁸⁴ Stephen Hobden and John Hobson, *Historical Sociology of International Relations*, p.4

⁸⁵ Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992).

⁸⁶ Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

⁸⁷ Martin Shaw, *Post-Military Society: Militarism, Demilitarization and War at the End of the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991); Martin Shaw, *Global Society and International Relations: Sociological Concepts and Political Perspectives* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994); Martin Shaw, *Theory of the Global State: Globality as an Unfinished Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Martin Shaw, *The New Western Way of War: Risk-Transfer War and its Crisis in Iraq*.

⁸⁸ Stephen Hobden and John Hobson, *Historical Sociology of International Relations*; John Hobson, 'Debate: The 'Second Wave' of Weberian Historical Sociology. The Historical Sociology of the State and the State of Historical Sociology in International Relations,' *Review of International Political Economy*, 5(2) (1998), pp.284-320; John Hobson, *The State and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

⁸⁹ Hobden and Hobson, *Historical Sociology of International Relations*.

framework. As such they tend to be intellectually pillaged piecemeal.⁹⁰

This thesis will draw on the analytical models developed by Michael Mann. His work is widely influential, leading to his inclusion in volumes on key thinkers in international relations,⁹¹ and other scholars to critique his work in edited volumes.⁹² While the recent subjects he has covered include genocide⁹³ it is the analytical model he develops through the three volumes of his 'Sources of Social Power' which are of most interest,⁹⁴ along with his contributions on globalisation⁹⁵ and the foreign policy of the USA.⁹⁶ He also offers an explanation of the sources of social power and their relevance to power in the 21st century in an edited conversation with John Hall.⁹⁷

While chapter two will go into more details as to the way in which Mann's model will be employed, there are two elements of his writing which are a focus of the theoretical framework to be employed here. The first is the IEMP model Mann has developed which analyses the relationship between the four different power structures within the state: ideological, economic, military and political.⁹⁸ They offer a coherent and effective way of breaking down the state to analyse how the various sources of power interact with the institutions of the state. The second is the levels of analysis Mann employs in his work on globalisation, which plot the interaction of the state with other actors and threats across

⁹⁰ John Hobson, 'Debate: The 'Second Wave' of Weberian Historical Sociology,' pp.284-320.

⁹¹ Martin Griffiths, Steven Roach and Scott Solomon, *Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations*, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 2009).

⁹² *An Anatomy of Power: The Social Theory of Michael Mann*, ed. by John A. Hall and Ralph Schroeder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

⁹³ Michael Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

⁹⁴ Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760*; Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

⁹⁵ Mann, *Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State?* pp. 472-496.

⁹⁶ Michael Mann, *Incoherent Empire* (London: Verso, 2005).

⁹⁷ Mann and Hall, *Power in the 21st Century: Conversations with John A. Hall*.

⁹⁸ Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1*, pp.1-32; Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 2*, pp.1-21.

different networks. These networks run through the local, national, international, transnational and global.⁹⁹

Mann's approach is not without critics. He has been called a realist who has not gone far enough to bring the state back in, Hobden arguing that that the way Mann addresses the international is inadequate, and that he is merely a realist.¹⁰⁰ These are charges that Mann strongly refutes.¹⁰¹ A fairer criticism would be the approach taken to the analysis of the various aspects of the sources of power. In particular the way that ideological factors are considered, this is a criticism that is made in several places and one that he accepts in certain places,¹⁰² particularly in relation to the Second Volume of the Sources of Social Power.¹⁰³ As such wider security theory will be employed to refine the way in which Mann uses Ideology. In particular borrowing from Buzan's approach to security he develops in *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*.¹⁰⁴

The most important part of Mann's theory is his understanding of how different power sources interact within the state. This 'crystallisation' of the sources of the powers enables us to understand more about the functioning of the state; in particular how power is concentrated.¹⁰⁵ While the idea of dividing up various aspects of the state for analytical purposes is not unique to Mann's historical sociology (see for example such as Buzan's levels of analysis),¹⁰⁶

⁹⁹ Mann, *Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State?* p.475.

¹⁰⁰ John Hobson, 'Mann, the State and War', in *An Anatomy of Power: The Social Theory of Michael Mann*, ed. by John A. Hall and Ralph Schroeder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp.150-166.

¹⁰¹ Michael Mann, 'The Sources of Social Power Revisited: A Response to Criticism', in *An Anatomy of Power: The Social Theory of Michael Mann*, ed. by John A. Hall and Ralph Schroeder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp.343-396.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Hall and Schroeder, *An Anatomy of Power*, p.68.

¹⁰⁴ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), pp.119-140.

¹⁰⁵ Hall and Schroeder, *An Anatomy of Power*, p.4; Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume I*.

¹⁰⁶ Barry Buzan, *People, States & Fear*; Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*.

Mann's emphasis is on the *relationship* between the sources of power and how they interact. He argues that the four sources of power are not like billiard balls, rather they entwine with the result that they impact on each other's structure, not just their direction.¹⁰⁷ The analysis of power is further elaborated by his drawing on sociological theory and the organisation of power between Authoritative and Diffused, Intensive and Extensive.¹⁰⁸

The final appeal of Mann's theory is his decision to balance theory and empirical data equally. His preference is of avoiding theory for its own sake, but at the same time recognising the requirement to form some kind of logic around the empirical data.¹⁰⁹ This approach is not without criticism. He is charged with tacking between historical empiricism and sociological analysis, the danger of which is being overwhelmed by empirical data.¹¹⁰ However, this thesis views such criticism as a strength; such an approach not only addresses the identified gaps in the literature appropriately, but retains an empirical narrative.

1.5.2 Comparative Research

The employment of Mann's model means this thesis will utilize a form of comparative politics in order to compare the impact of CMSPs on the power structures within the state. Although this thesis is not specifically a comparative study there is no way of escaping Dogan and Pelassy's assertion that all political analysis is in some way comparative.¹¹¹ Therefore, an understanding of comparative methodology, particularly its strengths and the problems that can arise, is necessary. This will assist in selecting the appropriate form of

¹⁰⁷ Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume I*, p.2.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, pp.6-10.

¹⁰⁹ Joseph Bryant, 'Grand, Yet Grounded: Ontology, Theory, and Method in Michael Mann's Historical Sociology', in *An Anatomy of Power: The Social Theory of Michael Mann*, ed. by John A. Hall and Ralph Schroeder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp.71-95.

¹¹⁰ Ibid. p.79, pp.86-87.

¹¹¹ Dogan, Mattei and Pelassy, Dominique, *How to Compare Nations: Strategies in comparative politics* (Chatham; Chatham House Publishers 1984) cited in Peter Calvert, *Comparative Politics: An Introduction* (Harlow: Longman imprint of Pearson Education, 2002), p.9.

comparison to take, and allow potential drawbacks to be mitigated. There is however, no doubting the overall strength of this approach in the testing and generation of hypotheses.¹¹²

Comparative studies take a variety of forms: drawing on small 'n' or large 'N' numbers of case studies; using either qualitative or quantitative analysis; and looking for either differences or similarities between cases. Each of these approaches has a specific function, carrying different drawbacks and advantages which lend themselves to the study of particular phenomenon. Large number quantitative analysis allows a large dataset to be used to test a complex independent variable,¹¹³ while small number case studies using qualitative analysis facilitate detailed interpretive analysis.¹¹⁴

The use of comparative research has several important functions; as such it is unsurprising that it forms such a key part of political analysis. The primary advantage of comparative analysis is one identified by Hopkins, addressing the difficulty of testing political science in a complex world. He argues that as it is not possible to set up experiments on demand to test hypotheses, so political scientists must make the best use of the data accessible to them.¹¹⁵ This approach allows the testing of hypotheses and the potential for prediction and control.¹¹⁶ Such an approach is relevant to the study of CMSPs, where analysis is immediately dependent on cases where they have been used, thus being able to make use of a limited, albeit growing, number of studies where they are involved.

There are two options as to the type of comparison to be carried out.

¹¹² Gabriel A. Almond and others, *Comparative Politics Today: A World View*, 8th edn (London: Pearson Longman, 2004), p.34.

¹¹³ Jonathan Hopkin, 'Comparative Methods', in *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, ed. by David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p.251.

¹¹⁴ Almond and others, *Comparative Politics Today*, p.33.

¹¹⁵ Hopkin, *Comparative Methods*, p.251

¹¹⁶ Bob Hague and Martin Harrop, *Comparative Government & Politics*, 7th edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p.84.

The first is most similar, where the cases picked are as similar as possible in order to compare a phenomenon. The problem of this approach is that often factors remain which are different. This undermines the analytical value of the approach as intervening factors cannot be accounted for. Harrop argues that the value of the analysis 'is in the journey rather than the destination'.¹¹⁷ The next approach is most different; this is where a relationship is tested by using a phenomenon, such as the state, which has different attributes. This is the approach that will be adopted for the thesis. The relationship between CMSPs and the research questions will be tested between states which differ widely from each other.

While the use of comparative analysis can be an effective method of testing out a hypothesis, there are still several disadvantages associated with the use of comparative analysis through case studies.¹¹⁸ The main danger is dealing with either too many variables, or too few countries; as a result of which there may not be enough data to draw reliable conclusions as to the impact of a phenomenon, or its cause. This requires taking into account the number of states where CMSPs have become involved and balancing this with the availability of data to adequately analyse their impact.

The number of cases selected can be problematic. The more cases that are selected place demands on the researcher as they are faced with trying to understand several different political systems. Harrop questions the positive relationship between the number of cases and the knowledge obtained, arguing that the researcher needs to develop the skill to use specialist knowledge to develop observations which are both new and general.¹¹⁹ Therefore there needs to be *balance*. The researcher is therefore faced by the choice between selecting a number of cases which allows the desired variable or variables to be tested, avoiding the danger of selecting cases that end up being from a limited

¹¹⁷ Ibid. pp.92-3.

¹¹⁸ Ibid, p.97.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

area. But, at the same time avoiding talking on too many cases, which could undermine the ability to tackle each in enough detail to reach suitable or valid conclusions.

The selection of cases is potentially subject to bias, such as restricting those chosen to English speaking examples.¹²⁰ As such, the selection of cases in the thesis, while constrained by the number where enough data can be obtained to allow significant analysis, has attempted to ensure that diverse range of backgrounds have been included. The availability of secondary sources and English language media sources means that cases can be drawn from a larger pool allowed by the language knowledge of the author - cases come from Africa, and the Middle East. This does mean relying upon another person's interpretation of events, an issue that Mann also dealt with on a much larger scale, but which can be mitigated by appropriate cross referencing.¹²¹

As the thesis is dealing with cases with a diverse range of variables, the only common factor being the use of CMSPs, a possible problem is the difficulty of making effective analysis between detailed cases. Each case will therefore utilise the same framework of analysis, based on Mann's four sources of social power: Economy, Military, Political and Ideological to overcome this potential problem. This framework and how it will be implemented will be established in chapter two. Comparative research is a method that has been employed by others who have used historical sociology, including Skocpol, who employed comparative analysis of the revolutions in France, China and the Soviet Union.¹²²

Calvert identifies three possible strategies for comparison. The first is the whole unit approach, where all relevant structures within a state are

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1*; Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 2*.

¹²² Stephen Hobden, *International Relations and Historical Sociology: Breaking Down Boundaries* (London: Routledge, 1998).

compared; this is done with two or more states. He argues that the danger of this approach is the researcher becoming overcome by the amount of information generated. The second approach is to compare centres of political power within given societies. The third approach is to compare communities; this can be done across states.¹²³ This thesis will adopt the use Mann's IEMP model to break down the power structures within the state, operating between the first two strategies it will test the impact on centres of power on the relevant structures within the states included. CMSPs tend to be employed to operate within states which do not have full control over their structures, where different groups are competing with each other. The third approach has been rejected as the focus is on the use of power by states, not on community groups.

This thesis will draw on qualitative analysis to test the impact of CMSPs on the security of the state. The ability to explore each of the social sources in greater detail, allowing questions about why and how the relationships between the sources of power change, rather than just whether they do, is fundamental to fully utilising Mann's analytical model.¹²⁴ It does need to be recognised however that the data can often be atypical, difficult to interpret and time consuming.¹²⁵ Thus a strong analytical model is needed to provide an effective basis for comparison. Therefore this thesis will draw on a small number 'n' of cases, using qualitative analysis to offer an interpretive analysis of CMSP activity.

1.5.3 Case Study Selection

The choice of case studies therefore needs to form a representative sample, while drawing on a small number of cases. There are a number of limiting factors which help to narrow this down and explain why Sierra Leone and Iraq are the most useful case studies to understand the use of CMSPs across the

¹²³ Calvert, *Comparative Politics*, p.23.

¹²⁴ Lisa Harrison, *Political Research: An Introduction* (London: Routledge, 2001), p.79.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

period of study.

The first limiting factor is to identify those states where CMSPs have taken a role in providing military functions. The focus on the provision of military services removes a large number of states where more general security services were provided. Although the number of states who have employed some form of commercial military or security support, in only a few cases has this involved the employment of military services to provide substantive military support. This narrows down the initial selection to Sierra Leone, Angola, Croatia, Columbia, Papua New Guinea, Iraq and Afghanistan.

The second limiting factor is to focus on pre-modern states. Sierra Leone and Angola fit into these categories following the collapse of their governments. Iraq and Afghanistan both lost their monopoly over the use of force after regime change. In Columbia, even though CMSPs provided military functions, and military force was contested within the state, this was not to the extent of the other case studies.

Thirdly, there needs to be a spread of cases across the time period. The cases selected need to compare the use of CMSPs in the 1990s to their use after 2001. Sierra Leone, Angola and Papua New Guinea are part of the first group. In the second group are Iraq and Afghanistan.

The final fourth requirement is that the case studies are not limited to one region. As was seen above in the literature review, some of the existing research, such as Abrahamsen and Williams' use of Africa, focuses on a specific region. Therefore, from the remaining cases it is necessary to decide between Sierra Leone and Angola. This is particularly important made use of the same companies.

The case selection also needs to reflect two regions in which the services of CMSPs are likely to continue to be required. Thus resulting in

conclusions which are relevant for the future use of CMSPs. The continued instability and state weakness in the Middle East and Africa.

There needs to be enough material available to adequately consider the use of CMSPs within the theoretical framework. This excludes Papua New Guinea, as Sandline was kicked out of the country before the contract could be properly executed.

The selection of Sierra Leone and Iraq therefore provides two states as case studies; which fit the definition of pre-modern where CMSPs provided substantial military services. They allow for the widening of conclusions by providing a sample of cases from the first and second periods of CMSP activity, (pre and post-9/11). These cases represent the activities of CMSPs in two different regions, and reflect the use of CMSPs by the state, and an intervening state. They represent states in which a small number of resources were important, and where both, state, international and non-state actors played a role.

1.5.4 Sources

Research for this thesis has sought to use primary sources. However, issues of access mean that secondary literature is an important resource when studying CMSPs. The emphasis of this thesis on improving understanding of the CMSP's by applying theory to existing knowledge means that existing scholarship can be used to provide some of the empirical basis for analysis. In particular the thesis draws on both CMSP literature, and the country-specific writing on the various case studies which are included. It is important to recognise the expertise which has contributed to understanding conflicts in specific states and what this can bring to the theorising of a phenomenon across a range of cases. This thesis will also contribute to their work by integrating the impact of CMSPs into work on the failure of the state in the countries covered. While there are gaps in the

literature, it is important to acknowledge that important pieces of work have been published, which can help to inform the analysis being carried out here. The fast moving nature of the industry does mean that these works are becoming outdated and require careful use as some of their conclusions may have already been proved false, but the empirical data within these sources remains a rich source.

This thesis will utilize current work, particularly the more descriptive and basic analytical work and apply it within a deeper theoretical framework in order to seek a greater understanding of the issues involved in the outsourcing of state functions. There is some dispute as to the accuracy of some older work on CMSPs as using secondary resources risks repeating errors made by earlier authors. Sandline has complained that the work of Musah and Fayemi for references to information in earlier articles that had been disputed and acknowledged as incorrect.¹²⁶ Because of this problem, care has been made to cross reference information, particularly where allegations of abuse have been made. Accuracy is important as many of the companies mentioned in the thesis, particularly in cases since 2001, are still operating. Inaccurate analysis could wrongfully damage the image of the respective company; a characteristic, that as will be discussed in the next chapter, is a key aspect of the CMSP. Of course the opposite is also true; an overly favourable reading of the role played by the companies could lead to drawbacks of their use being overlooked.

There are several issues relating to access to data on CMSPs. The main obstacle is that much key information lies with the various companies involved. As this information is in the private sector there is no obligation on the companies to divulge any information.¹²⁷ Rather, as many of the companies

¹²⁶ Sandline International, 'Comment by Sandline International: 14 March 2000, Book Entitled "Mercenaries-an African Security Dilemma,"' <<http://www.sandline.com/site/>> [accessed 3 October 2006].

¹²⁷ Rolf Uessler, *Servants of War: Private Military Corporations and the Profit of Conflict* (Brooklyn: Soft Skull Press, 2008), p.20.

covered in this thesis are still operating, there is more of an incentive to withhold much possibly useful information. Such actions are understandable; few of their clients would likely want details of contracts made public, and would therefore harm the professional reputation of the companies. An often identified feature of the companies is the lack of attention they draw. This is attractive for state and non-state actors seeking to conduct their affairs discreetly, also allowing them the potential for plausible deniability if things do not go their way.¹²⁸ CMSPs, companies and individual contractors have assisted researchers; however they have been accused of shaping their replies in an attempt to undermine rival companies.¹²⁹

Although access to information is an issue that needs to be acknowledged when investigating the activities of CMSPs, it should not deter study. While there are issues with access to some data, there are plenty of data available with which to work. The growing body of literature over the last decade is testament to this. Some companies have willingly cooperated with writers, especially as the difficult issue of regulation has come to be discussed more. There is a significant amount of data available in the public domain, although much has already been used in existing studies, the nature of the thesis as a theoretical analysis, will allow the avoiding a repetition of existing arguments. This is an important subject with serious ramifications requiring rigorous academic study; the range of case studies and the amount of open source data means there is no insurmountable block to analysis.

1.5.5 Structure of the Thesis

Having introduced the phenomenon to be theorised and the framework by which this will be done, the next two chapters will cover these issues in more depth. Chapter two will show how a modified version of Mann's theory of the state is

¹²⁸ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, pp.152-154.

¹²⁹ Isenberg, David, 'Say what? You Talking about Me?' *Huffington Post*, 17 January 2012 <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg/iraq-contractors_b_1209606.html> [accessed 17 January 2012].

the most suitable alternative to Realism, and how this will be used in the thesis. Chapter three will establish the definition of CMSP which will be used in this thesis; by analysing, defining, and labelling the industry since the end of the Cold War. Chapter four will place the contemporary market for CMSPs in historical context, along with the trends which emerged. Chapter five will look at Sierra Leone and chapter six Iraq, applying empirical data to the model developed in chapters two. These cases are in chronological order, by start date; Sierra Leone, then Iraq. Finally the conclusion will reconcile the findings of each of these chapters in the context of the research questions posed in this chapter.

Chapter 2

The Commercial Use of Force: Definition & Issues

2.1 Introduction

The definition and labelling of the market for the commercial provision of security services has come to occupy a vast portion of the literature. This is in no small part due to the widely accepted difficulty of identifying what exactly the companies are, and how they can be distinguished from other actors. As a consequence a number of different categorisations and a plethora of terms have been used. Before the research questions can be answered by analysing the case studies, it is necessary to explain how Commercial Military Service Providers (CMSPs) fit into this framework. This chapter will therefore provide an overview of the current structure of the CMSP sector, identify its main features and show how it will be conceptualised in this thesis. This chapter will explain why the thesis differs from a majority of the literature by adopting a focussed approach to the services provided by concentrating on military services. A broader approach to the ownership and provision of these services however, will allow for the interaction between state and commercial enterprises that the label of 'private' disguises. From this conceptualisation it will then be explained why CMSP is the most appropriate term for this thesis, over more commonly used terms such as Private Military Company (PMC) or Private Security Company (PSC).

2.2 What are CMSPs?

A number of definitions have been used within the academic literature to delineate the private security sector. These are based on typologies which have been developed to compare the various types of companies to each other and other types of actor; using the type of activities undertaken and their impact as points of differentiation. The problem with these typologies is that the many exceptions and overlaps contained within them limit their effectiveness. To overcome this problem the approach taken here is similar to that employed by

Mandel.¹ A simple definition will be used as the basis of analysis, with the more effective typologies used to elucidate these points. However, the interpretation of the definition used and the treatment of the typologies will differ from Mandel.

The simple definition which most accurately describes the phenomenon being studied here associates three core principles. The first two are: (1) the provision of military services, with (2) a corporate structure. Uessler refers to what he calls 'Private Military Corporations' as "business providers of professional services that are linked to warfare".² The association of the provision of military services with a business structure is a good starting point, however these features raise questions over which the literature disagrees. Such as; what is the range of activities that are being provided by CMSPs? What does the corporate nature of the companies mean? This is inevitable considering that the entities which operate in the sector vary in size, history, corporate relationships, location and client base.³ Finally, the third core principle (3) states that these services would otherwise be undertaken by the state. Shearer describes CMSPs as "offer[ing] military skills that were once the preserve of governments".⁴ How does the funding and provision of services by CMSPs fit in with other types of military activity? Where the typologies have a role is in considering these questions in more depth. The core features of the definition and the questions which arise will now be considered in more detail.

2.2.1 Range of Services

The first element of the definition to be considered is the range of services provided. The armed contractors who provided close protection and guard duties in Iraq and Afghanistan have become synonymous with CMSP use, however these are just part of the range of services CMSPs have provided. In Sierra Leone, Executive Outcomes and Sandline International ran full combat missions. They utilised air support to protect the capital, Freetown, and secured key mining areas in the country.⁵ In Afghanistan and Iraq CMSPs such as Vinnel Corporation and Dyncorp have been involved in training the fledgling

¹ Robert Mandel, *Armies without States: The Privatization of Security* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p.93.

² P W Singer interview in *Shadow Company* [Film], Dir. Nick Bicanic and Jason Bourque (Canada: A Purpose Built Film, 2006).

³ Peter W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*, 2nd edn (London: Cornell, 2008), p.88.

⁴ David Shearer, *Private Armies and Military Intervention*, Adelphi Paper, 316 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.23.

⁵ Ibid.

domestic security forces.⁶ Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR), having been purchased by Halliburton, provided a range of support services in Iraq; which included building barracks, feeding troops and driving supply trucks,⁷ even providing final training for troops in Kuwait before deployment into Iraq.⁸ Typologies have attempted to categorise these services, and in doing so attempt to distinguish the companies from each other, and other forms of actors.



Figure 2.1⁹ Singer's 'Tip of Spear'

The most useful of the typologies are those which classify the services provided by the companies and group those services by function. Singer employs the analogy of a spear to classify what he calls Private Military Firms (PMFs) by the proximity of the services they provide to the 'frontline' of the 'battlespace' (see figure fig. 2.1). He identifies three different categories of 'firm': (1) military provider firms, which employ equipment and skilled personnel to directly exert force; (2) military consultation firms, which advise and train forces; and finally (3) military support firms, which provide logistical support and intelligence services.¹⁰ This typology would appear to provide a useful method of both

⁶ Rolf Uessler, *Servants of War: Private Military Corporations and the Profit of Conflict* (Brooklyn: Soft Skull Press, 2008), p.28.

⁷ Pratap Chatterjee, *Halliburton's Army: How a Well Connected Texas Oil Company Revolutionized the Way America Makes War* (New York: Nation Books, 2009).

⁸ *Shadow Company* [Film].

⁹ Peter W Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of Privatised Military Industry*, 2nd edn (London: Cornell, 2008) p.93.

¹⁰ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, pp.92-100.

grouping companies by the range of services which they provide and identifying the extent to which commercial actors are involved in military activities.

There are difficulties in trying to rigidly place companies within these categories. The actual position of companies within Singer's conceptualisation of the battlespace is more nuanced, and subject to change; in trying to maximise their profits they will often seek to expand the range of services provided. Companies will often straddle more than one category, possibly varying between contracts. Avant has argued that it is more accurate to classify the activities of companies within each contract.¹¹ However, even within a contract circumstances can affect the role taken by contractors. For example, in an environment such as Iraq with no front lines, truck drivers found themselves directly involved in contact with insurgent forces.¹² Associating companies with a particular position in the market can be useful, especially in recognising specialisations; such as KBR and logistical support. But, Avant's method of working by contract is preferable, as it recognises that the services the companies provide varies from case-to-case, and reflects how the companies change over time.




Fig 2.2¹³ Ortiz's Typological Breakdown

¹¹ Deborah Avant, *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

¹² Col. Gerald Schumacher, *A Bloody Business: America's War Zone Contractors and the Occupation of Iraq* (St Paul: Zenith Press, 2006).

¹³ Deborah Avant, *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatising Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) p.25.

The difficulty of distinguishing companies and contracts by the services provided has not stopped academic writers from attempting to refine these categories, in order to frame their analysis of the industry. Uessler identifies four areas of (1) security, (2) training, (3) intelligence and (4) logistics.¹⁴ The overlap between their approaches can be seen in the comparative framework developed by Ortiz in figure 2.2, synthesising the categories used by Shearer, Singer and Avant into: (1) Combat, (2) Training, (3) Support, (4) Security, (5) Intelligence, and (6) Reconstruction.¹⁵ These six 'units of analysis' appear to offer a more detailed breakdown than Singer's model, but they also suffer from problems. First, adding more categories exacerbates the problem of overlap. Second, the identification of 'reconstruction', is an unnecessary category which duplicates the activity of the other sectors, merely changing the client. Finally, these categories make the distinction between security and combat, military and policing, criticism of which requires detailed consideration.




Figure 2.3¹⁶ Kinsey's 'Public Private vs. Lethality Topology'

The debate as to whether it is possible to distinguish between military and

¹⁴ Uessler, *Servants of War*, pp.22-26.

¹⁵ Carlos Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security: A Guide to the Issues* (Oxford: Praeger, 2010).

¹⁶ Christopher Kinsey, *Corporate Warriors and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies* (London: Routledge, 2006) pp.10-22.

security services divides much of the literature. This is based on whether the contractors are armed or unarmed; active or passive; participate in combat or offer training and advice; fight to change the status quo or to preserve it.¹⁷ 'Military' companies are perceived as having an offensive, strategic, impact on the battlefield; for example Executive Outcomes and Sandline in Sierra Leone who lead operations to secure mining areas from RUF forces.¹⁸ In contrast 'security' companies offer a lower level of support, at a tactical, rather than strategic level. Security companies specialise in close protection work, the guarding of installations and infrastructure. Something Brooks refers to as the protection of 'nouns'.¹⁹ The lethality of actors is one of the axis used by Kinsey's typology to distinguish different types of security actor (the second axis will be considered in more detail below). In figure 2.3 the state military is placed at point A and police at point C; companies that have provided full combat services (Sandline International and Executive Outcomes) at D and E; smaller security companies at point L; whereas companies that provide support services are around H, I and J.

However, the use of these distinctions to categorise the companies at this level is problematic. The identification of military companies as aggressive and security companies as passive means the terms have become a normative judgement, thus companies tend to argue they are passive actors in a theatre, serving defensive functions.²⁰ This causes difficulty in adding a separate category of security. Avant's distinction between military and policing is equally problematic.²¹ As was argued in chapter two, the distinction of internal and external spheres of activity is increasingly questioned, especially in weak or failing states where policing and military are indistinguishable. The abstract categorisation of the companies on these grounds, while conceptually useful in theory, does little when they are so contested. Trying to distinguish between companies, or contracts, on any of these grounds is flawed.

Although these categories lack rigorous conceptual integrity there is one aspect that the breakdown of the industry by function can be used to understand: the trend of personnel working across the sector. As with modern state military forces the bulk of those in the industry provide logistical support.

¹⁷ Mandel, *Armies without States*, pp.100-106.

¹⁸ Shearer, *Private Armies and Military Intervention*, pp.23-26.

¹⁹ Doug Brooks interviewed in *Shadow Company* [film].

²⁰ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*.

²¹ Avant, *The Market for Force*.

Uessler supplements Singer's spear analogy with that of a pyramid.²² The number of companies currently in operation which are capable of fielding troops and hardware in the numbers of the 'military' companies which were prominent during the 1990s, such as EO, is very limited.²³ As such the vast majority of companies are now referred to as security companies.²⁴ Although the services they provide will often coincide with the older style of private military contractors. Here though again, the difficulty in identifying these companies also arises from the reluctance of firms to be identified with what has become a negative normative category.²⁵ It would also be presumptuous to assume that larger combat orientated companies will not emerge in the future. Kinsey acknowledges the re-appearance of such a role in the future.²⁶

The identified categories include a wide range of services, but there are a number of activities which fall outside the scope of this thesis. The focus here is on the service industry; so companies and individuals who only provide hardware, whether manufactured by themselves or another party, will not be included. This excludes major arms manufacturing firms, and weapons dealers. Here there are two important caveats to note. First, CMSPs often import military hardware into which they are operating either for their use, or for a client. When provided for a client this is part of a contract alongside other services that include training or the restructuring of a military force. Secondly, CMSPs may also be, or be owned by, arms manufacturers. But it is the supply of arms in conjunction with providing services which this thesis is interested in. The second exception is to recognise that although there is continuity to security guards seen in western states, these are not normally included in the academic literature, nor are they to be included here.

This thesis is concerned with the substantive use of military service providers in conflict zones. While writers such as Dunigan and Avant seek to use the most complex breakdown possible when looking at the role of military service providers,²⁷ the approach taken here is similar to Eckert. In her analysis of the implications of military companies on just war theory, she prefers the use

²² Uessler, *Servants of War*, pp.22-26.

²³ Avant, *The Market for Force*, pp.443-4.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p.90.

²⁶ Kinsey, *Corporate Soldiers and International Security*, p.32.

²⁷ Molly Dunigan, *Victory for Hire: Private Security Companies' Impact on Military Effectiveness* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), p.14.

of broader categories.²⁸ The specific categories used by writers like Avant do not help answer broader theoretical questions. It is better to accept that this is a range of services, each of which is being used in a military context. There is utility in recognising the broad distinction between the three main categories of service. In this thesis the distinction will be made between (1) Combat, (2) Advice and Training, (3) Logistical Support and (4) Intelligence. But these will not be treated as discrete categories, the activities undertaken even within a contract can easily overlap between categories.

2.2.2 Corporate Structure

Defining CMSPs by the services they provide can tell us a lot about what they do, however this alone is insufficient to distinguish CMSPs from other actors who provide military services. It is the combination of military services with the second and third elements of the definition which make CMSPs unique. The first of these is the corporate structure of CMSPs. Although there is a great degree of variation between companies, such as the type of corporate structure, their size, and location, they also share a number of common traits. It has been argued that the corporate identity of the companies in the current market even distinguishes them from those of the Cold War era.²⁹ Although some commentators think that the requirements are too low, there is a convincing case that the corporate structure is a significant factor that defines their structure and even affects their behaviour. The most significant implication of this corporate identity is to distinguish CMSPs from the more traditional mercenary.

CMSPs are companies with legally registered corporate entities with all of the implications that this entails. The growth of the industry means that they are viewed as legitimate; it is reputed that retirement fund managers have been encouraged to invest in the sector with the result that the portfolio of many American's retirement funds are likely to include CMSPs.³⁰ Within this they can be freelancers, limited liability companies or publically traded; the most successful of which are likely to be purchased by other companies.³¹ MPRI belongs to L-3 Communications.³² DynCorp has been bought and sold several

²⁸ Amy Eckert, 'Outsourcing War', in *'New' Problems, 'Old' Solutions: Rethinking the 21st Century*, ed. by Amy Eckert and Laura Sjoberg, 1 edn (London: Zed Books, 2009), p.140.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Uessler, *Servants of War*, p.33.

³¹ Ibid, p.32.

³² MPRI <<http://www.mpri.com/web/>> [accessed 27/1/2013].

times.³³ Kellogg, Brown and Root belonged to Halliburton between 1962 and 2007, but have since separated.³⁴ In 2008 G4S purchased ArmorGroup International Plc.³⁵ Despite these differences CMSPs all have a corporate identity which has important ramifications.

The size of the companies can vary from one-person operations to organisations which employ hundreds of thousands of people.³⁶ G4S claims 620,00 employees worldwide across the full range of services it provides.³⁷ However, the conventional practice is towards flexibility by employing the minimum number of employees possible, on short-term contracts for the duration of a job.³⁸ Contractors are drawn from databases and could be used by several different companies.³⁹ Procurement costs, which are normally part of a contract, are passed directly on to the client.⁴⁰ It is not just western ex-soldiers who are employed. In order to save money on labour CMSPs have taken employees from the local population when on site in a country, up to a ratio of twenty locals to one international employee.⁴¹ CMSPs are thus able to lower their infrastructure costs.

Another notable component of the companies is their physical location. Like other registered companies they have corporate offices. But unlike other companies they often have a number of different headquarters which include: lobbying, legal and operative headquarters.⁴² The companies often have a mixed makeup, with offices and personnel originating from different countries.⁴³ The companies tend to establish local offices which are run by a small group of expatriate employees, who then work with the local employees to fulfil the contracts.⁴⁴ However, the focus on international is not necessarily correct. Although the industry is characterised by western companies, particularly from the US, UK and South Africa, the flexibility of being able to move the location of the head office means that labelling companies as international, especially when

³³ DynCorp International, 'A Brief History of DynCorp,' <<http://www.dyn-intl.com/about-us/history.aspx>> [accessed 27/1/2013].

³⁴ <<http://www.kbr.com/About/History/>> [accessed 27/1/2013].

³⁵ G4S, 'G4S Completes Acquisition of Armor Group International plc,' 7 May 2008 <<http://www.g4s.com/en/Media%20Centre/News/2008/05/07/G4S%20Completes%20Acquisition%20of%20ArmorGroup%20International%20plc/>> [accessed 27/1/13].

³⁶ Uessler, *Servants of War*, p.33.

³⁷ G4S, 'Who We Are,' <<http://www.g4s.com/en/Who%20we%20are/>> [accessed 7/7/2013].

³⁸ Uessler, *Servants of War*, p.33.

³⁹ Avant, *The Market for Force*, p.10.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Uessler, *Servants of War*, p. 41.

⁴² Ibid, p.34.

⁴³ Avant, *The Market for Force*, p.9.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

they may even be formed for contracts in one war zone, is overly restricting.

The significance of this commercial structure is the pursuit of a long-term market presence. As such the companies have followed the norms of international statecraft, limiting what they do, such as deterring the companies from shifting sides in search of profit.⁴⁵ The commercial nature of the companies has given them a strong link to some states. The US in particular has strong links between the state and the companies, with current and former members of the government that have interests in the companies.⁴⁶

2.2.3 Funding and Delivery

The final part of the definition is that these services would otherwise be provided by the state. Much writing on CMSPs refers to a change in the relationship between 'public' and 'private' spheres, and whether this breaks the state 'monopoly' over the use of force.⁴⁷ There is a tendency to focus on the stark difference between the employment of commercial entities to provide services as part of the process of neo-liberalism which has been prevalent since the 1980s.⁴⁸ As a result it has been argued that the companies represent a movement of the provision of these services to the private sphere; in Mandel's definition the ownership and control of CMSPs is non-governmental. Abstracting the financing and delivery of force does two important things. It allows the relationship between the funding and provision of force to be considered and whether these are from the public or private sphere. It provides some measure of comparison with other actors which undertake military activities. Although the distinction is problematic it does offer some utility in understanding the place of the actors. The problem with doing this is that it is not completely correct. There is a convincing argument that the stark division between public and private which is often used mischaracterises them. Although there is still a strong link between CMSPs and the 'private' sphere, there is still a significant relationship between CMSPs and the 'public' sphere.

⁴⁵ Christopher Spearin, 'Humanitarians and Mercenaries: Partners in Security Governance?', in *New Threats and Actors in International Security*, ed. by Elke Krahmann (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp.45-68.

⁴⁶ Kinsey, *Corporate Soldiers and International Security*, p.32.

⁴⁷ P W Singer interview in *Shadow Company* [film].

⁴⁸ Naomi Klein, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*, 2nd edn (London: Penguin, 2008).




Figure 2.4⁴⁹ Avant's 'Funding vs. Provision Topology'

Avant and Kinsey have both developed typologies which differentiate CMSPs on the basis of whether certain characteristics of CMSPs are 'public' or 'private'. Referring back to figure 2.3, the second axis utilised by Kinsey distinguishes whether the object to be secured is 'public' or 'private'. This is considered to be a sliding scale, rather than a binary categorisation. CMSPs feature across the scale, from defence of the state, to protection of private property. Avant has sought to categorise CMSPs' activity by considering the place of the private sector in how intervention is funded against how it is executed. Avant recognises the problem of distinguishing between public and private, especially historically. She defines 'public' as state and 'private' as activities which occur outside the state, such as market, family and religion, but she uses private as

⁴⁹ Deborah Avant, *The Market for Force: The Consequence of Privatizing Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) p.25

shorthand for non-governmental organisations.⁵⁰ The CMSPs being considered in this thesis sit in what she categorises as 'Private (for-profit delivery)', it shows how funding comes from a number of sources.

There are difficulties in abstracting 'public' and 'private'. Avant asserts that such abstraction is necessary in order to move beyond description.⁵¹ It is useful to recognise the conceptual differences between the categories, but not to view this as a stark dichotomy. There is a second problem with distancing CMSPs too far from the interests of states. First, several countries have a stronger relationship with the firms that the 'public', 'private' divide would indicate. The US and the UK in particular pay interest to the companies.⁵² It has been argued that the way the companies are used is closer than simply assuming a 'private' entity is providing a service for a public body. Mohlin argues that there is more cooperation between CMSPs and states than is often credited.⁵³ Secondly, when the companies are used they have been employed as members of the client state's armed forces.⁵⁴

Although it is useful analytically to consider public and private spheres, it is wrong to solely identify CMSPs as 'private' entities. Recognition of the problems caused by the stark differentiation between the 'public' and 'private' spheres fits well with historical sociology, which avoids making similar differentiations between domestic and international, recognising that the two flow into each other.⁵⁵ CMSPs work for a number of different clients across these two spheres, with different levels of integration. The companies are providing services which were viewed to be the preserve of the state, but in a manner which has a much closer relationship than a binary identification of 'public' and 'private'.

2.2.4 Contractor or Mercenary?

The three elements combined contribute to address one of core conceptual

⁵⁰ Avant, *The Market for Force*, pp.22-24.

⁵¹ Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, *Security Beyond the State: Private Security in International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp.105-120.

⁵² Kinsey, *Corporate Soldiers and International Security*.

⁵³ Isenberg, David, 'From PMC to CMSP: Thinking Strategically about Private Contractors,' *Huffington Post*, 28 November 2011 <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg/from-pmc-to-cmsp-thinking_b_1111798.html> [accessed 30 November 2011].

⁵⁴ Tim Spicer Lt. Col., *An Unorthodox Soldier, Peace War and the Sandline Affair* (London: Mainstream Publishing, 1999).

⁵⁵ Martin Shaw, 'The Historical Sociology of the Future', *Review of International Political Economy*, 5 (2) (1998), p.321.

issues; whether CMSPs can be distinguished from the traditional conceptualisation of mercenary. The term mercenary is effective at communicating with a wider audience, either because it is familiar, or because it quickly establishes the tone of an article. The prevailing approach within the academic literature is to differentiate commercial providers of military services from traditional mercenaries (historic and recent variations). Their criticism of the conflation of the two often stems from the use of mercenary as a normative judgement, rather than serving any analytical purpose.⁵⁶ Several key conceptual features distinguish CMSPs from the traditional understanding of mercenary, so it is inaccurate and unhelpful to think of them as the same type of entity.

Singer has identified a number of core features which he argues distinguish PMFs from mercenaries:

“Organisation: Prior Corporate Structure

Motives: Business Profit-Driven, Rather than individual Profit-Driven

Open Market: Legal, Public Entities

Services: Wider Range, Varied Clientele

Recruitment: Public, Specialized

Linkages: Ties to Corporate Holdings and Financial Markets”⁵⁷

These features stem from the corporate structure of the industry. This is an important conceptual development from the image of the traditional mercenary, influencing the behaviour of the companies. There are of course some dangers of this being the only distinction, as the task of registering a group of mercenaries at Company House is a rather low barrier.⁵⁸ However for a legitimate company the entry into the corporate world, and the resultant liabilities, has a number of important ramifications. The corporate nature of private military companies means they have a fixed identity and resultant legal identity.

While still driven by the logic of profit motive there are important implications for how the companies pursue this. The ethics behind who the companies work for is arguably much more important, and been used to distinguish the companies from mercenaries. The owners and operatives are

⁵⁶ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p.45.

⁵⁷ Ibid, p.47.

⁵⁸ David Isenberg, *Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq* (London: Praeger Security International, 2009), pp.x-xi.

publically discerning of who they would choose to work for, claiming only to work for legitimate governments.⁵⁹ Modern commercial military enterprises recognise the importance of positive public opinion. Krahmann points to ArmorGroup, who emphasise the ethical standards they follow and work with organisations like the Red Cross. Whereas negative perceptions can have a detrimental impact on their share value, such as CACI after the abuse of inmates at Abu Ghraib implicated their employees.⁶⁰

Thus the acceptance of one lucrative contract could damage the long-term reputation of a company. This is important as the companies differ in another element from mercenaries. They are not established for one-off operations; instead retaining permanent structures, though taking on personnel as required.⁶¹ While as corporate entities they can try re-image and brand themselves, the actions and reputation of a previous incarnation can prove difficult to lose. The twice renaming of Blackwater; to Xe and then Academi has not stopped the name 'Blackwater', and thus past actions, being mentioned when the new names have been called for.⁶²

Further distinguishing between CMSPs and traditional mercenaries is that the growth of CMSPs has not brought to an end the career of more traditional mercenaries, even if these have become more sophisticated. The 'Wonga Coup' in 2004, where a group tried to overthrow the government of Equatorial Guinea, was such an undertaking. They had corporate ties, with high profile backers being identified,⁶³ and the intention was to take a role in the oil industry and a contract to rebuild the military.⁶⁴ However, the initial operation was to play out more as a 'Boy's Own' adventure, rather than the operations of a CMSP.⁶⁵ Some observers might argue over the semantics of drawing such a line, the operation used personnel who would otherwise be employed by CMSPs.⁶⁶ However, this is certainly an exception to the companies being examined here. This was a company formed for one particular operation, and

⁵⁹ Steven Brayton, 'Outsourcing War: Mercenaries and the Privatization of Peacekeeping', *Journal of International Affairs*, 55 (2) (2002), pp.303-329.

⁶⁰ *New Threats and New Actors in International Security*, ed. by Elke Krahmann (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p.7.

⁶¹ Uessler, *Servants of War*, p.43.

⁶² David Isenberg, 'Gun? Check. Radio? Check. Lawyer? Check' *Huffington Post*, 20 January 2012 <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg/gun-check-radio-check-law_b_1217129.html> [accessed 20 January 2012].

⁶³ James Brabazon, *My Friend the Mercenary* (London: Canongate, 2010), pp.366-369.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Madeline Drohan interview in *Shadow Company* [film].

has attracted criticism from those within the industry.⁶⁷

There are crossovers between the commercial military sector and more traditional mercenaries; who on occasion utilise the same pool of personnel as commercial providers.⁶⁸ The changing nature of the industry leads to further confusion; arguably early PMCs actually functioned as mercenaries, even while establishing the basis of the current industry. EO has been called the purest form of the modern mercenary.⁶⁹ Mercenary or contractor, because of the use of the same personnel between the two it is even more important to distinguish.⁷⁰

These characteristics are reflected in the definition provided by Lt Col Tim Spicer, who distinguishes the companies from mercenaries on the grounds that:

"PMCs are permanent structures, corporate entities, which are run as a business. They have a clear hierarchy, are run on military lines and operate to high disciplinary standards and within the Law of Armed Conflict, with a particular concern for human rights."⁷¹

Spicer has been clear in the link between mercenaries and 'PMCs' (Private Military Companies) in that they share a common ancestry. However, he views the latter as a distinct and positive actor that he hopes can restore the reputation of mercenarism as a profession, from the activities of mercenaries in the 1960s.⁷²

Although CMSPs provide similar services to mercenaries, there is a conceptual difference. Mercenary is used as shorthand by many, including those within the industry, but it is unhelpful to conflate the two conceptually. CMSPs are structured as legally recognised corporate entities, while their employee base may be flexible the companies themselves are permanent with identities which have implications for whom they claim to work for, how force is employed and the implications of its use. As such they work claim to work for

⁶⁷ Cobus Claassens interview in *Shadow Company* [film].

⁶⁸ Madeline Drohan interview in *Shadow Company**Shadow CompanyShadow CompanyShadow CompanyMy Friend the Mercenary. My Friend the Mercenary. [60s]My Friend the Mercenary. My Friend the Mercenary.*

⁶⁹ Corbus Claassens interview in *Shadow Company* [film].

⁷⁰ Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security*, p.57.

⁷¹ Memorandum from MA students to Defence Technology, The Royal Military College of Science, Cranfield University from House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, *Private Military Companies*, Ninth Report of Session vols (London: The Stationary Office Limited, 2001-2).

⁷² Spicer, *An Unorthodox Soldier, Peace War and the Sandline Affair*, p.40.

recognised governments.

2.2.5 Definition in the Thesis

This thesis will therefore take a focused analysis on the market for military services. It is concerned with companies that provide *services* which have *military* applications, and are linked to the support, training and/or execution of force by the state. Although the supply of military hardware may form part of their contracts the emphasis is on the *provision of services*. These *services* can be provide by entities of variable size, but they must be *legally recognised commercial entities*. Because of the close relationship with the state and the blurring of the public and private realms in which the companies operate it is not accurate to call them private. Although often characterised as international, this is not strictly true. Companies can be locally registered, they often have local head quarters and employ members of the local population.

CMSPs are distinct from a range of other actors because of their corporate identity. The use of contracts to work for a variety of companies means they are not militia. Although related, by the services provided, they are distinct from the private security guards which have become commonplace in many western countries, but also in South Africa and Pakistan. CMSPs are also different from mercenaries who work on an ad hoc basis, which became infamous in the latter part of the twentieth century, although the same personnel can work for each of these.

2.3 Labelling the commercial use of force

The selection of a label for commercial military providers requires careful consideration because of the normative connotations of many of the terms used. A strong definition requires an accurate term in order to be useful. Doing so will distinguish the thesis from less academic writing and orientate this thesis within the literature. There is a gap between the industry and those writing about it. Some members of the industry have been happy to participate in efforts to better understand the concepts involved,⁷³ writers such as Isenberg argue that the adoption of an appropriate label would be encouraged by the companies.⁷⁴ However, others have been more cynical of how useful this is, instead leaving

⁷³ *Shadow Company* [film].

⁷⁴ David Isenberg, 'From PMC to CMSP: Thinking Strategically about Private Contractors,' *Huffington Post*, 28 November 2011 <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg/from-pmc-to-cmsp-thinking_b_1111798.html> [accessed 30 November 2011].

journalists and academic writers to construct their own definitions.⁷⁵

The different approaches to the elements of the definition considered above complicates the search for an accurate definition, especially as many of the terms used are value laden. It is therefore unsurprising that the search occupies a significant portion of the academic literature and a number of terms have come into vogue; from Mercenary,⁷⁶ to Private Military Firm (PMF),⁷⁷ Private Military Company (PMC),⁷⁸ Private Military and Security Company (PMSC),⁷⁹ Military Service Provider (MSP),⁸⁰ International Security Firm (ISF),⁸¹ and now Commercial Military Service Provider (CMSP).⁸² This is alongside more sensationalist terms, such as 'Dogs of War',⁸³ from the Forsyth novel of the same name.⁸⁴ Writers within the academic literature often either establish their own term for the industry, or revise an existing term. This can lead to different terms being used to explain the same fundamental concept, such repetition is inevitable. The changing nature of the industry, and the development of the literature, has resulted in constant reappraisal of the terminology used.

Of these terms, CMSP is the most effective umbrella term to describe the commercial provision of force as understood in this thesis. CMSP is inclusive enough to cover the various forms that the commercialisation of military services has taken, recognising the features of the industry but not so general that it includes other actors. While it is impossible to find a completely neutral term CMSP reduces unwarranted normative connotations. It will still be necessary to

⁷⁵ House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, *Private Military Companies*.

⁷⁶ Abdel-Fatau Musah and Kayode J. Fayemi, *Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma* (London: Pluto Press, 2000).

⁷⁷ Peter W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry* (London: Cornell, 2003).

⁷⁸ Shearer, *Private Armies and Military Intervention*.

⁷⁹ David Isenberg, 'UN use of PMSC? it's a Reality Not a Hypothetical,' Huffington Post, 3 January 2012 <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg/united-nations-military-contractors_b_1180272.html> [accessed 3 January 2012].

⁸⁰ Doug Brooks 'Hope for a hopeless continent: mercenaries,' *Traders: Journal for the South African Region*, Issue 3, July-October 2000, cited in House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, *Private Military Companies*, p.12.

⁸¹ Thomas K. Adams, 'The New Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict', *Parameters*, Summer (1999), p.103.

⁸² Isenberg, *From PMC to CMSP*.

⁸³ Beredette Muthien and Ian Taylor, 'The Return of the Dogs of War?', in *The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance*, ed. by Rodney Hall and Thomas Biersteker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 187; Al Venter, *War Dog: Fighting Other People's Wars, the Modern Mercenary in Combat* (Philadelphia: Casemate, 2006).

⁸⁴ Frederick Forsyth, *The Dogs of War* (London: Arrow Books, 1996).

refer to either security or military companies within the thesis, however. CMSPs are one of many different forms of non-state actor utilising force, although there are aspects which CMSPs have in common with other forms of private force, they are an important and distinct actor.

2.3.1 Defining the terms

The term mercenary is the traditional label used, especially in their classic forms of an independent operator. Well known figures such as Bob Denard and Mike Hoare fall under this bracket. Although there is some blurring of the line as Simon Mann has moved from working for Sandline in Sierra Leone, to taking a more traditional mercenary role during the 'Wonga Coup'. There are occasions that operators use the term themselves, though this is likely to be more in terms of self publicity. Most guns for hire, even if they inwardly use the label avoid its usage in public as the use of mercenaries is illegal; tending to rely on euphemism,⁸⁵ even though as shown above the definition is easy enough to escape. This does not stop the some CMSP personnel from using it to describe themselves.⁸⁶

There are two main reasons for not using a mercenary: 1) important conceptual issues are raised (as covered above); and 2) the term is immediately pejorative, often used by writers wanting to connote a negative image of CMSPs. Instead, this thesis recognizes CMSPs of the last twenty years to be a distinct phenomenon. It would be incorrect to say that mercenaries in the classic sense no longer exist. Indeed the attempted coup in Equatorial Guinea is a good example of this form. Thus it is even more important to use a term that recognises this difference as continued analysis of mercenaries, even in an updated modern guise should be considered separate. Corporate Mercenary is used in some of the literature.⁸⁷ While this does recognise the new characteristics of the commercial aspect, the term mercenary still implies too many assumptions as to the way in which contractors operate; being tied to the pursuit of individual profit, rather than the role of a group.

The term PMO is used much less often and is far too ambiguous. 'Organization' could be interpreted to include, among others, paramilitary and

⁸⁵ Frances Stoner Saunders interview in *Shadow Company* [film].

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Stephen Armstrong, *War Plc: The Rise of the New Corporate Mercenary* (London: Faber & Faber Ltd, 2008); Guy Arnold, *Mercenaries: The Scourge of the Third World* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1999).

terrorist groups. While organizations such as these do have an influence on international security and the use of force, they fall beyond the scope of the questions considered here. Paramilitary and terrorist groups tend to have a much less ambiguous legal status, providing a direct threat to a particular state(s). Whereas it is the quasi-legal status 'enjoyed' by PMSCs which makes them complicated and more interesting.

PMC and PSC are two of the most commonly used terms. However, use of the term PMC or PMS implies exclusion; it is argued that PMCs differ from PSCs as their deployment has a strategic impact on the battle space; PSCs influence security at a tactical level. Some commentators have chosen to exclude one or the others; some arguing that only a couple of PSCs have ever existed and others that PSCs do both so have significant impact. This thesis will include both forms of private force. PSCs may not have the level of influence of PMCs, but their prevalence in several of the case studies in the thesis means they cannot be excluded. Their presence is affecting the ownership and deployment of force in the states they are operating. The effect of this influence being a key question. More problematic is the reliance upon the term private.

The next option is a compound of PMC and PSC, to make PMSC, although this term is slightly unwieldy it does solve the problem above. It allows the thesis to consider both PMCs and PSCs, without constantly referring to both. PMSC also excludes non 'corporate' military organizations from the discussion allowing a tighter focus on the question. Reliance upon a catch-all term, while useful for convenience covers up an important theoretical distinction. However, given the range services available, the difficulty of distinguishing between them and the adaptability of the companies to react to situations in order to market services the most sensible approach is not to directly distinguish between security and military functions to define the companies.⁸⁸ The option therefore lies with PMSC. However this leaves the issue of distinguishing between public and private.

The term military service provider is the next option, this is a term favoured by Doug Brooks.⁸⁹ The term does not catch the corporate nature of the organisations; surely other non-corporate organisations are also military

⁸⁸ Memorandum from MA students to Defence Technology, The Royal Military College of Science, Cranfield University from House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, *Private Military Companies*, p.89

⁸⁹ Doug Brooks interview in *Shadow Company* [film].

service providers. A more recent term to be used is CMSP,⁹⁰ Commercial Military Service Provider, which does engage with concept, placing emphasis the corporate nature of the companies. The reliance on the term military is arguably restricting, as the appeal of the term PMSC lies in the acceptance of a technical difference between military and security services, security sitting at the lower end of the close protection scale. However, both of these are functions which are carried out by the military. For example the close protection and guard work carried out by companies such as Blackwater, Triple Canopy was work that would otherwise have been carried out by US military forces. The difficulty of adopting another label is in moving away from what has become an established term, PMC.

Isenberg points towards the probable favourable reception of a term by the companies that takes emphasis away from the private aspect of the operations.⁹¹ The private sector basis of the industry has long been seen as the source of many negative connotations towards the use of contractors. The preference is for the public sector to become involved, when dealing with security, even if the outcome of private sector involvement is beneficial.⁹²

2.3.2 CMSP

This thesis will use the term CMSP. It offers a label that encapsulates the corporate business side of the companies; while allowing the distinction between the companies and other forms of non-state force and defence industries. It provides a term that is recognisable within the structure of the existing debate.

CMSPs are registered companies who undertake a variety of services on long or short-term contracts to fulfil military, security or law enforcement functions usually performed by the state; from training and support services, to the execution of deadly force. This can be either at a tactical or strategic level. The companies can be registered within the country they operate, or brought in from abroad. They can work on behalf of states, or non-state organisations.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the commercial provision of force is difficult to

⁹⁰ Isenberg, *From PMC to CMSP*.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Muthien, Bernedette and Taylor, Ian “The return of the dogs of war?” from *The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance*, ed. by Rodney Hall and Thomas Biersteker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.192.

precisely define, but the parameters established above allow a good understanding of how the companies which will be covered here will be understood in this thesis. CMSPs are a distinct phenomenon which share characteristics with other actors, but are distinct from them. This thesis is concerned with companies that provide military services, including the support, training and/or execution of force by the state. These *services* can be provided by entities of variable size, but they must be legally recognised commercial entities. Because of the close relationship with the state it is not accurate to call them private. Companies can be internationally or locally registered, and employ members of the local population.

CMSP is most appropriate term for the phenomenon as understood in this thesis. Although the trend within the literature has been towards the use of PSC, this privileges the activities of a small number of companies which operated at the zenith of the boom in Iraq. This thesis is concerned with a wider view of the period, as such Military better serves as an umbrella term for the overall type of activity which has been undertaken since the end of the Cold War. Similarly the term PMC has been rejected because it places too much emphasis on military services. However, considering the problems of establishing a strict public/private division within the use of the companies, particularly when they were effectively employed as agents of the state, the use of CMSP is a more accurate description of their activities.

Chapter 3

Theoretical Framework

"Theory explains some part of reality and is therefore distinct from the reality it explains"

Kenneth N. Waltz¹

"To insist that a single method constitutes the only proper approach is like saying that a hammer is the only proper tool for building a house"

Stephen Walt²

3. 1 Introduction

Stephen Walt's quote above illustrates how the diverse range of theories which international security utilises is a strength of the discipline. No universal theory of international security exists and any attempt to develop one would be counterproductive; limiting the answers offered by security studies.³ However, the theoretical approach needs to be suitable for the phenomenon being studied. Theorising the impact of CMSPs on the state, and thus addressing the research questions posed, requires an approach which can account for the role of non-state actors and problematise the state.

Realism's parsimonious approach offers a coherent and effective method of theorising international security by removing the clutter from the analysis of international politics. Waltz argues that a theoretical model is an abstraction of reality, rather than merely a scaled down model of the reality it seeks to explain.⁴ However, in eschewing reductionism⁵ theoretical lacuna are created, particularly when analysing interaction between non-state actors below state level.⁶ The research questions posed in the introduction require a more complex theoretical approach. It is not enough to consider states as billiard balls, instead "it is

¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p.7.

² Stephen Walt, 'The Renaissance of Security Studies', *International Studies Quarterly*, 35 (2) (1991), p.223.

³ Ibid, p.223.

⁴ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp.1-17.

⁵ Throughout different parts of the literature reductionism is used to refer to both (1) the scaling down of a theoretical model to consider the smallest factors, and (2) reduction of a complex process to one factor. For consistency this thesis will use the former definition.

⁶ Hendrick Spruyt, 'Historical Sociology and System Theory in International Relations Theory', *Review of International Political Economy*, 5(2) (1998), p.342.

necessary to look inside the black box of the state".⁷ Musah and Fayemi call for such a re-conceptualisation of security, beyond structural realism, in their study of 'mercenary' activity in Africa.⁸ An approach is required which grants agency to state and non-state actors, rather than reduce the motives of the state to the structure of the international system.

Historical sociology offers an alternative to both mainstream and critical approaches to security by facilitating the analysis of non-state actors and their interaction with the state at both the sub-state and systemic level in their historic context. Criticisms have been made of historical sociology as an approach to international relations: that international relations and sociology scholars have passed each other without understanding developments in each other's discipline, resulting in a retreading of old debates.⁹ However, these criticisms can be reconciled and the potential insights which its analytical tools can offer to the theorising of contemporary security in its sociological and historical context justify further engagement.¹⁰

As with other theoretical approaches, historical sociology is subject to an active internal discourse. The diversity of ideas which results is constructive, even if some debates have verged on semantic.¹¹ Of the various forms of historical sociology Mann's IEMP model is the most relevant in addressing the research questions posed in this thesis. His analysis of the sources of social power and their interaction allows the theorising of power and the state from different sources, at several levels. His model also provides a suitable framework for the comparative analysis of the case studies. Importantly, although more reductionist than structural realism, Mann still fulfils the criteria

⁷ John Hobson, 'Debate: The 'Second Wave' of Weberian Historical Sociology. The Historical Sociology of the State and the State of Historical Sociology in International Relations,' *Review of International Political Economy*, 5 (2) (1998), p.289.

⁸ Abdel-Fatau Musah and Fayemi, J. Kayode, 'Africa in Search of Security: Mercenaries and conflicts – An overview' in *Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma*, ed. by Abdel-Fatau Musah and Kayode J. Fayemi (London: Pluto Press, 2000), pp.30-34.

⁹ Daniel H. Nexon, 'Reviewed Work: Historical Sociology of International Relations by Stephen Hobden; John M. Hobson', *Contemporary Sociology*, 32 (5) (2003), p.649.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ See the debate between Hobden and Shaw in the following articles: John Hobson, 'For a 'Second Wave' Weberian Historical Sociology in International Relations: A Reply to Halperin and Shaw', *Review of International Political Economy*, 5(2) (1998), pp.354-361; John Hobson, 'Debate: The 'Second Wave' of Weberian Historical Sociology,' p. 284-320; Martin Shaw, 'The Historical Sociology of the Future', *Review of International Political Economy*, 5(2) (1998), pp.321-326. Although Hobden argues that there is substance to the debate, the argument is over degrees of how to address the same problem.

set by Waltz: separating relevant information from empirical mess.¹² Mann's model is not perfect, indeed Mann has continued to refine it in response to criticism, thus further refinements are necessary, in particular the use ideology. Therefore Buzan's sectoral approach to security will be engaged with to offer a more rounded model.

The rest of the chapter will take the following structure. Historical Sociology; from Weberian Historical Sociology, to Mann's Historical Sociology, which develops of Webers' Historical Sociology. Followed by an overview of the How Historical Sociology can address the research questions. An overview of Mann's approach. Then How Barry Buzan also addresses these areas in his sectoral approach to security. Finally this chapter will outline how a combination of Mann and Buzan's model will be operationalised and applied to the case studies.

3.2 Historical Sociology

The intention of Historical sociology is to provide a sociological historical approach to international relations, analysing historical international processes and phenomenon, problematising contemporary processes and institutions;¹³ theorising the interaction of units, and structure.¹⁴ Other approaches, in particular structural realism, are criticised for 'chronofetishism' and 'tempocentrism' - cutting the present off from the past, and extrapolating current process backwards to create an artificial history.¹⁵ There are several excellent overviews of historical sociology,¹⁶ and the role it can play in international relations,¹⁷ which outline the scope of this contribution. However, of interest here is whether this results in a more effective answer to the research questions. As such there are two issues to consider. (1) How does historical sociology's claim to improve upon structural realism address the problems in answering the research questions? and (2) whose work most effectively fulfils these criteria?

¹² Such an approach is a fundamental aim of Mann in developing his IEMP model. Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760*, 1st edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), viii.

¹³ Shaw, *The Historical Sociology of the Future*, p. 325

¹⁴ John Hobson, 'What's at Stake?', in *Historical Sociology of International Relations*, ed. by Stephen Hobden and John Hobson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp.15-20.

¹⁵ Ibid, pp.3-15.

¹⁶ *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology*, ed. by Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

¹⁷ *Historical Sociology of International Relations*, ed. by Stephen Hobden and John Hobson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

3.2.1 Historical Sociology and the Research Questions

A number of historical sociologists have outlined the contribution historical sociology can make to international relations as a critique of structural realism; one of the most comprehensive of which is by Hobson who has identified six principles.¹⁸ Shaw and Spruyt agree with Hobson's critique, though not necessarily the way he proposes fulfilling it.¹⁹ These principles also demonstrate how historical sociology can be used to answer the research questions by addressing the three concerns with structural realism. 'Multi-causality' and 'multi-spatiality' increase complexity, by incorporating more factors and increasing the number of levels of analysis. Granting 'partial autonomy' and using a 'non realist concept of state autonomy' stops the behaviour of actors being derived from structural constraints. Finally, historical sociology incorporates change by not just accounting for 'history and change', but 'complex change'. Its effectiveness in answering the research questions is therefore dependent upon how successful scholars have been in developing an approach within this framework.

Within historical sociology there is a lively debate as to whose work most effectively fulfils these principles. This is to be expected as the scholars involved originate in different academic fields, focus on different phenomenon, and utilise other approaches to international relations. A number of subfields have emerged, including Weberian historical sociology, world systems analysis, constructivist and critical approaches. The search here is for an approach which in addressing the three problems with structural realism builds upon it rather than rejects it, adds a degree of complexity without being too reductionist and retains a focus on the state as the main actor. These are not criteria to which all historical sociologists would subscribe, particularly among those who have called for a critical, constructivist or third wave of Weberian historical sociology. However, there is support for diversity within historical sociology with Skocpol arguing "it is a mistake to tie historical sociology down to any one epistemological, theoretical, or methodological orientation",²⁰ and Buzan promoting "methodological pluralism over methodological monism" in his realist

¹⁸ Hobson, 'Debate: The 'Second Wave' of Weberian Historical Sociology,' pp.286-295.

¹⁹ Shaw, 'The Historical Sociology of the Future,' p. 321-326; Spruyt, 'Historical Sociology and System Theory in International Relations Theory,' pp. 340-353.

²⁰ Theda Skocpol, 'Emerging Agendas and Recurrent Strategies', in *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology*, p.361.

take on historical sociological international relations theory.²¹

The most suitable subfield in the search for such a base is Weberian historical sociology, which is compatible with many of the common assumptions of realism. Critical approaches have proved popular with a number of theorists such as Halliday, Smith and Reus-Smit taking up the call made by Linklater for a historical sociological move beyond structural realism and Marxism.²² However, in opposing the materialist foundations of what they see as the large majority of historical writing; in particular neo-Weberian historical sociology and constructivism,²³ critical historical sociology rejects the fundamental epistemological underpinnings of realism.

Constructivism and historical sociology is a more promising partnership as there are a number of similarities between the two approaches.²⁴ That constructivists don't consider themselves to be part of the post-modern turn, which has rejected positivism, avoids the pitfalls of critical theory. The problem with constructivism as an approach to historical sociology within this thesis is that it tends to be a number of principles or tools.²⁵ As was argued above some of these are useful in individually addressing the problems with structural realism, but they lack overall coherency. The thesis would therefore be better served by using these principles to inform a more coherent analysis within Weberian historical sociology.

Weberian historical sociology forms a substantial section of historical sociological research within which a number of waves have been identified. These waves have been used to evaluate how far each work advances the pursuit of a historical sociological approach to international relations, they also serve as a method of discrediting the work of other writers. Criticism on these grounds does not necessitate irrelevance when answering the research questions as the measure of success here, the search is for a more complex approach which retains some realist characteristics, is somewhat different to Hobson who advocates a much greater move away from structural realism.²⁶

²¹ Barry Buzan and Richard Little, 'International System in World History', in *Historical Sociology of International Relations*, p.208.

²² Andrew Linklater, *Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations* (Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990), p.6.

²³ Steve Smith, 'Historical Sociology and International Relations Theory', in *Historical Sociology of International Relations*, pp.223-24.

²⁴ Michael Barnett, 'Historical Sociology and Constructivism: An Estranged Past, a Confederated Future', in *Historical Sociology of International Relations*, p.119.

²⁵ Ibid, p.101.

²⁶ John Hobson, 'Two Waves of Weberian Historical Sociology', in *Historical Sociology of International Relations*, p.65.

These waves can still be useful as they explore historical sociology within the context of structural realism.

3.2.2 Weberian Historical Sociology

The first wave of Weberian historical sociology is identified with the re-emergence of historical sociology in the context of the 'second state debate' which occurred in international relations during the 1980s. Those writing within this wave include Skocpol and Tilly.²⁷ They attempted to address the failings of structural approaches to international relations; which emphasised the centrality of the state as a unit of analysis, but treated it as a 'black box' so in fact 'kicked the state out' by refusing to problematise it. These writers sought to retain the state as an analytical category by considering the domestic and agential powers of the state.²⁸ It has been argued that they in fact failed to fulfil this ambition as early historical sociology drew too heavily on structural realism and 'kicked the state back out'.²⁹

Although Skocpol's work provides a strong analysis of the state, it is criticised for a weak account of the international system which by focusing on warfare is too deterministic.³⁰ By failing to offer a complex enough account of the international system she does not move far enough away from structural realism to offer an approach which can be used to answer the research questions. However, Skocpol's work on historical sociology as an approach does show that in principle historical sociology can be used as a method of comparative analysis of case studies over time to abstract causal factors.³¹

Tilly's explanation of the relationship between the state and warfare has been influential. In 'Coercion, Capital and European States' he explores the relationship between capital and coercion.³² Although based on the development of the state in Europe his work has been used to understand the state after decolonisation.³³ He has also considered the future of European

²⁷ John Hobson, 'Two Waves of Weberian Historical Sociology,' pp.70-73, Peter W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*, 2nd edn (London: Cornell, 2008).

²⁸ John Hobson, *The State and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.3-4.

²⁹ Smith, 'Historical Sociology and International Relations Theory,' pp.70-73.

³⁰ Stephen Hobden, *International Relations and Historical Sociology: Breaking Down Boundaries* (London: Routledge, 1998), pp.169-170.

³¹ Skocpol, 'Emerging Agendas and Recurrent Strategies,' pp. 362-385.

³² Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992).

³³ Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1995), p.22.

states following the end of the Cold War.³⁴ Tilly provides a strong account of the development of the state, but his explanation of the international is criticised as inconsistent, being partially constructivist and partially structurally deterministic. Hobden admits that the inconsistency can be explained by Tilly accounting for historical contingency, but discounts his work as a result.³⁵ This inconsistency is not of concern when an accurate reflection of historical contingency, more problematic is that the emphasis is still on warfare and economics, limiting the causal complexity of his account.

The second wave of historical sociology resolves the problem with structural realism's parsimony by increasing the number of causal factors, introducing a complex form of parsimony which include a greater number of causal factors. This is preferable to complex parsimony, which still utilises one causal factor but introduces intervening variable, and therefore does not fundamentally alter the logic.³⁶ The second improvement is the introduction of a 'fourth image' which accounts for developments at a sub-national stage.³⁷ Criticisms which have been levelled at Weberian historical sociology for not offering a substantive enough move away from structural realism.³⁸ Although this is denied by Weberian historical sociologists.³⁹ This leaves second wave historical sociological approaches to international security much better able to account for the use and implications of CMSPs on the state. and the focus on the state should not be viewed as a problem - the research questions consider the impact of CMSPs on the state, so a state based approach is required, as long as it gives the appropriate relevance to other actors. The overlap with realism is a strength rather than a weakness.

There are a number of theorists working within this second wave including, Halliday, Rosenberg and Shaw. The work of Shaw in particular is of contemporary relevance. He has adopted a sociological approach to a number of issues, including globalisation and modern methods of warfare. 'The Western Way of War' considers how the risk avoidance in modern warfare by the 'Western' militaries leads to greater civilian casualties.⁴⁰ His work demonstrates

³⁴ Charles Tilly, 'Futures of European States', *Social Research*, 59 (4) (1992), pp.705-12.

³⁵ Hobden, *International Relations and Historical Sociology*, pp.170-171.

³⁶ Hobson, *The State and International Relations*, p.10.

³⁷ Ibid, p.12.

³⁸ Sandra Halperin, 'Shadowboxing: Weberian Historical Sociology Vs State-Centric International Relations Theory', *Review of International Political Economy*, 5 (2) (1998), pp.327-28.

³⁹ Hobden, *International Relations and Historical Sociology*, p.168.

⁴⁰ Martin Shaw, *The New Western Way of War: Risk-Transfer War and its Crisis in Iraq* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), pp.1-3.

how historical sociology can be used look at smaller focused problems, not just large scale historical change at a systemic level. However, within the second wave Mann offers the most effective potential framework.

3.3 Michael Mann's Historical Sociology

Mann's IEMP and infrastructural power models offer a useful tool for the analysis of social power structures; how they interact with institutions and each other over time. He has proved to be increasingly influential, with the analytical power of the models he has developed being recognised by international relations and security theorists.⁴¹ The books he has written using this model have been identified with attempts to seek a third wave of historical sociology.⁴² Although Mann's focus was on classes and nation-states in a Weberian critique of "Marxist monocausalism",⁴³ he stress the importance of undertaking sociological analysis - even in the context of historical macro-sociology - which is relevant to contemporary issues.⁴⁴ His focus on power offers an alternative to the parsimonious realist theories of security; to generate a theory of the state and how it interacts with other actors at various levels. Thus a degree of reductionism is granted, but not ad nauseam - so losing all the benefits of parsimony. Mann's writing has attracted criticism, both from within and outside of historical sociology, some of these criticisms are unwarranted or the result of a conflicting view of how historical sociology should be developed. However, valid criticisms have been made. Mann has been receptive to critics of his work, and responded when he has believed necessary.⁴⁵

The decision to use Mann's IEMP model is based upon three of the underlying methodological assumptions behind his approach. The first is his

⁴¹ *An Anatomy of Power: The Social Theory of Michael Mann*, ed. by John A. Hall and Ralph Schroeder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), ., Hillel Solfer, 'State Infrastructural Power: Approaches to Conceptualization and Measurement', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 43 (3) (2008), p.231.

⁴² Terry Mulhall, 'The Source of Social Power. Volume II. The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914 by Michael Mann: Review', *The British Journal of Sociology*, 46 (2) (1995), p.362.

⁴³ Chris Sparks, 'Book Review: The Sources of Social Power. Volume 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 1760-1914 by Michael Mann', *American Journal of Sociology*, 100 (3) (1994), p.820.

⁴⁴ Wayne Snyder, 'The Sources of Social Power. Vol. 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation States by Michael Mann', *The Journal of Economic History*, 55 (1) (1995), p.51.

⁴⁵ See responses to Cynthia Weber in John A. Hall and Ralph Schroeder, *An Anatomy of Power: The Social Theory of Michael Mann* and his acknowledgement of deficiencies in the early conceptualisation of ideology in Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Michael Mann and John A. Hall, *Power in the 21st Century: Conversations with John A. Hall*, 1st edn (Cambridge: Polity, 2011).

position on the relationship between history and sociology. Some academics are critical of the of mixing history, a humanity, and sociology, a social science, on the basis that the methodological and epistemological foundations of each subject are so fundamentally different cooperation is not possible.⁴⁶ International security has always relied upon cross-disciplinary cooperation, an important development within the study of international security has been the improved use of history as a means of generating empirical data.⁴⁷ This is an approach which Mann adopts when he argues that "social theory cannot develop without knowledge of history...[and]...the study of history is also impoverished without sociology."⁴⁸ As has already been demonstrated in this chapter, it was be disingenuous to argue that realism is completely ahistorical. Classical and neo-classical approaches emphasise the importance of historicism and even structural realism, generally viewed as the most ahistorical of realist approaches, makes use of historical examples to justify its arguments.⁴⁹ Where Mann differs from realism is in providing a more rounded explanation of historical change, addressing the criticisms made by Hobson. Adopting such an approach will allowing the conceptualisation of commercial force within its historical context.

Mann is also supportive of the use of secondary sources as the basis of both historical macro-sociology. He argues that it is the specific theoretical tools which the sociologist can bring - or in this case security theorist - to the analysis which can bring new insights to previously used data.⁵⁰ Mann's approach therefore enables to further work to be carried out by theorists looking at the role of commercial military companies using empirical data which has already been presented. As long as the theoretical approach employed allows the research questions proposed to bring new insights. Particularly where focused work on specific periods and regions can be brought together in a wider theoretical approach.⁵¹

The second assumption is the balance between theory and empiricism. Mann adopts a realist emphasis on theory as a method of analysis in which he

⁴⁶ Franco Ferrarotti, 'History and Sociology: Synthesis Or Conflict?', *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, 10 (3) (1997), pp.544-545.

⁴⁷ Walt, 'The Renaissance of Security Studies,' p.217.

⁴⁸ Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1*, p.vii.

⁴⁹ One only need look at Mearscheimer's *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, *Norton Series in World Politics* (London: W. W. Norton & Co., 2001).

⁵⁰ Michael Mann, 'In Praise of Macro-Sociology: A Reply to Goldthorpe', *The British Journal of Sociology*, 45 (1) (1994), p.45.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, p.41; p43.

stresses the importance of 'zigzagging' between theory and empiricism. His theory is designed to deal with mess,⁵² making sense of it in a way that allows the most important factors to be identified and theorised. Mann is critical of the domination of either approach. In providing a theory which is more reductionist than realism, he acknowledges the fundamental importance of selectivity as the rationale behind the development of theoretical models, avoiding unnecessary complexity and the overuse of superfluous empirical data. Conversely he warns against the overemphasis of theoretical models. The following quote from the first volume of the Sources of Social power expresses this eloquently: "Too much scholarly attention to the facts makes one blind; too much listening to the rhythms of theory and world history make one deaf."⁵³ He concludes by warning that the match between theory and facts can never be exact. This reflects the underlying tensions which are outlined by Waltz at the beginning of this chapter - theory is an artificial abstraction. The task of the theorist is to select the approach that best abstracts the data they wish to analyse. Part of this process will always be a compromise, but some approaches will be more suitable than others. Although Mann has been criticised for the execution of his analysis - Gorski describing him as "more of historical than a "grand theorist.""⁵⁴ the balance of theory and empiricism in Mann's approach offers the most appropriate approach to address the research questions; by addressing the theoretical lacuna, while retaining practical levels of analysis as to the impact of the companies.

3.3.1 Sources of Social Power

Mann's theorising of social power is based on the identification of four sources of social power: Ideology, Economy, Military and Political. These sources are outlined by Mann in Volume I of The Sources of Social Power⁵⁵ and subsequently built upon in further volumes of his work. Volume 2 of the Sources of Social Power refines their use,⁵⁶ and their context in the use of power in the twenty first century is further explored in a discussion with John Hall which acts as a prelude to volume 3.⁵⁷ Mann demonstrates the utility of this method of

⁵² Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1*, p.viii

⁵³ Ibid, p.viii.

⁵⁴ Phillip S. Gorski, 'The Sources of Social Power: The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 1716-1914, Vol. 2 by Michael Mann: Review', *Contemporary History*, 24 (6) (1995), p.773.

⁵⁵ Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*.

⁵⁶ Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 2*.

⁵⁷ Mann and Hall, *Power in the 21st Century*.

analysing the behaviour of a state when he examined the foundations of US foreign policy in *Incoherent Empire*;⁵⁸ the interaction between the four sources of power is used to cast light on the confused, and sometimes contradictory, nature of US foreign policy.

The four sources appear at first glance to be fairly straightforward and oft used categories, but there are three important elements to note in Mann's use of these sources of power. The first is the number of sources identified. The identification of four sources builds on the work of Giddens and Weber. The conventional approach to power was to divide it between the categories of economic, political and social. Mann sought further explanation in the division of military and political, differentiating himself from this earlier work.⁵⁹ While not agreed upon by all,⁶⁰ the division between military and political is important, particularly in the context of work carried out since the end of the Cold War. The separation of military and political aspects of conflict has proved to be important in understanding the character of intra-state warfare. While the novelty of Kaldor's 'New Wars' has rightly been widely questioned,⁶¹ her highlighting of the way in which violence is often divorced from political aims vindicates the separation of military and political sources of power.⁶² The differentiation of military and political sources of power is important when considering the commercialisation of military services. It will be demonstrated in the case studies how the companies have an interest in each of these sources of social power - by their very nature they tend to become involved in the various political, military and economic constituents of the state as they are military organisations, with strong economic interests, whose employers and objectives will have political implications. In order for the impact of these sometimes contradictory interests to be fully understood the sources need to be considered separately.

The second element is the interaction between the sources of social power. The fact that they are promiscuous; rather than bouncing off one another merely affecting each other's trajectory they intertwine, changing each other's

⁵⁸ Michael Mann, *Incoherent Empire* (London: Verso, 2005).

⁵⁹ Michael Mann, 'Infrastructural Power Revisited', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 43 (3) (2008), p.358.

⁶⁰ V. G. Kiernan, 'The Sources of Social Power. Vol 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760 by Michael Mann: Review', *The English Historical Review*, 102 (404) (1987), p.648.

⁶¹ Patrick A. Mello, 'Review Article: In Search of New Wars: The Debate about the Transformation of War,' *European Journal of International Relations*, 16(2) (2010), pp.297-309.

⁶² Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004).

internal structure. As well as being able to rank these factors in order of importance it also possible to theorise how they interact with each other. The combination of the different sources of power also allows the understanding of the type of control within the state. Mann has a framework for the type of control which the institutions within the state are able to exert. He is praised in the use of these categories in *Incoherent Empire* for the emphasis on agency over structural factors.⁶³

3.3.2 Buzan and Historical Sociology

The two main problems with Mann's approach are the execution of the IEMP model and the definition of some of the sources of social power, particularly ideology. Both of these could be remedied by improving the definition of the sources of social power. There have been suggestions that Mann's approach could form an effective framework when combined with Buzan's sectoral approach. Hobden argues that such an approach would be no small undertaking, but it would address both the issues with structural realism and the problems of Mann's approach in addressing them.⁶⁴ Buzan has also used similar categories in his work on security, referring to them as sectors. His work forms a useful basis for building upon Mann as he has a similar understanding of the role of these categories. He recognises that although the analytical categories are not in themselves novel, their explicit use as an analytical framework is uncommon.⁶⁵ He also emphasises their importance not just in deconstructing issues, but in the way they need to be reconstructed afterwards.⁶⁶

'Military', 'Economic' and 'Political' are used as with Mann, but there are two differences. He refers to a 'Societal' sector rather than the 'Ideological' used by Mann. In the context of this thesis 'Societal' is a more accurate description of the type of issues which will be considered. By using 'Societal' as part of the sources of social power use of Mann's model will move away from analysing the relationship between class and modes of production which has occupied much writing on historical sociology. More relevant to the case studies is the focus on

⁶³ Bryan Mabee, 'The New Mandarins of American Power: The Bush Administration's Plans for the World by Alex Callinicos: The New Imperialism by David Harvey: *Incoherent Empire* by Michael Mann: Review,' *International Affairs*, 80 (5) (2004), p.994.

⁶⁴ Stephen Hobden, *International Relations and Historical Sociology: Breaking Down Boundaries* (London: Routledge, 1998), p.167.

⁶⁵ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p.7.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, p.8.

identity - the concepts of nationalism and identity are of greater concern to much writing on issue of new wars. The fifth category used by Buzan is 'Environmental'. This will not be included as a separate source of power as it is an issue which ties into the other sources rather than an independent source of power within itself. Where relevant environmental degradation will be considered according to its economic, political and societal implications.

3.3.3 Historical Sociology Conclusion

Historical sociology can thus offer an alternative to realism in answering the research questions where structural realism, liberal, critical and constructivist security theory founder. This thesis will instead use realist principles within a framework offered by historical sociology. These will include; the continuing importance of the state, the pursuit of power, and the impact of system on the state. But recognise the importance of other actors, the need to move beyond the international-national dichotomy, that power comes from non-political/military sources. There is also the need to incorporate historical change and contingency.

Although a number of writers such as Shaw have tackled questions of globalisation,⁶⁷ work which has been undertaken in the second wave should not be neglected as a basis for further research. Mann's framework which offers the best starting point for such an approach. His IEMP model is most relevant to theorising the impact of CMSPs on the state. The IEMP model has been used in a number of his works, from the *Sources of Social Power* Mann's in which he undertook the large scale analysis of power relationships and change, to specific questions; such as his analysis of US foreign policy in *Incoherent Empire*. However valid criticisms of his work have been made which need to be considered to improve the use of this model in answering the research questions.

3.4 Analytical Model

The final part of the chapter will elaborate how Mann's IEMP model will be adapted by drawing upon Buzan's sectoral approach to theorise the relationship between the use of CMSPs and other actors within the state. The sources of

⁶⁷ Martin Shaw, 'The State of Globalization: Towards a Theory of State Transformation', *Review of International Political Economy*, 4 (3) (1997), pp.497-513; Shaw, *The New Western Way of War: Risk-Transfer War and its Crisis in Iraq*.

social power - Societal, Ideological, Military and Political will be defined, along with the relationship between them and how as a result different forms of power structure emerge. The levels on which these sources of social power interact will then be addressed by, considering the vertical component of Mann's theory.

3.4.1 Power

As with realist approaches to international security at the heart of Mann's framework lies power. According to Mann power is "the ability to pursue and attain goals through mastery of one's environment".⁶⁸ The motivation behind the pursuit of power is human nature (as with Waltz's definition of first image theories). However, the pursuit of power is driven by the act of socialisation which is enacted through the four sources: 'Ideology', 'Economics', 'Military' and 'Political'.⁶⁹ Mann argues that power is not in itself a resource, instead power is exercised through resources.⁷⁰

Within the sources, power can take a number of forms. These are (1) 'Distributive' and 'Collective'. Distributive being the power of one actor over another, the outcome of which is a zero-sum relationship. Collective power is when two or more actors combine to use their power over another. (2) 'Extensive' and 'Intensive'. Extensive power is a level of minimum control over a wide area, compared to intensive which sees a high level of control over a restricted area. Finally (3) 'Authoritative' and 'Diffused'. 'Authoritative' power is the ability of an actor to command and obtain obedience, against 'Diffused' which is through state institutions, and spontaneous power achieved through societies and norms. He also identifies 'Bureaucratic' power, that of state over society and of state leaders over officials.⁷¹

However, at the core of Mann's theorising of the changing nature of the state lies the differentiation between 'Despotic' and 'Infrastructural' power. Despotic power is "the range of actions that the state elite is empowered to make without consultation with civil society groups"⁷². Infrastructural: "the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society and implement its actions across its territories."⁷³ This is subsequently expanded to a two way relationship

⁶⁸ Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1*, p.6.

⁶⁹ Ibid, pp.5-6.

⁷⁰ Ibid, p.6.

⁷¹ Mann, *Infrastructural Power Revisited*, p.356.

⁷² Ibid, p.355.

⁷³ Ibid, p.355.




Fig. 3.1⁷⁶ *Mann's Two Dimensions of State Power*

The various sources of power will now be considered the form which power takes within them and how this can be related to the use of CMSPs

3.4.1.1 The Role of Ideology

First it is necessary to deal with the issue of ideology, which is perceived at the most problematic of Mann's sources of social power. He has received criticism for the vague definition used, as a result other factors tending to be dumped in it. Mann acknowledges these criticisms and has sought to remedy them as subsequent volumes of the Sources of Social Power have been released. Although ill defined Mann is keen on its analytical importance. He criticises Bobbitt for concentrating on economic and military causes, and ignoring ideological and political, thus creating a dangerous determinism which is Ethnocentric, merely validating the neoconservative foreign policy of the US.⁷⁷ Mann's ultimate definition of ideological power is "the control over meaning systems", which tend to be diffuse; "transcending with ease the boundaries of states, the reach of markets and the striking range of armed forces."⁷⁸

There are two problems which have excluded the use of ideology in the form adopted by Mann. The first is the range of factors considered within

⁷⁴ Ibid, p.356.

⁷⁵ Ibid, p.358.

⁷⁶ Ibid, p.357.

⁷⁷ Michael Mann, 'Can the New Imperialism Triumph in the Age of Nation-States?: The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History by Philip Bobbitt: Review', *History and Theory*, 43 (2004), pp.235-236.

⁷⁸ Mann, *Infrastructural Power Revisited*, p.358.

ideology Kiernan argues that it can be question whether ideology should be considered as one of the sources of power when it does not contain a theory of religion.⁷⁹ More importantly Stearns argues that too little emphasis is placed on cultural influences.⁸⁰ The latter is of particular importance as ethnic fissures are a source of instability within weak states.⁸¹ While defining ideology as access to meaning systems does grant it power, it should be viewed within the context of each of the sources of social power. If considered as a separate sector then the definition granted to ideology means there is a danger it could become the primary source of power - the existence of such a source of power having already been denied by Mann. Instead the term 'Societal' should be used, the definition of which will be explored in more detail below. This will better account for the cultural, religious and national identities which Stearns and Kiernan argue that Mann misses. This is supported by the fact that Mann considers ideology to be more about social movements than theories.⁸² Buzan also mentions ideology within the context of each of the sectors, rather than identifying as a specific sector.⁸³

3.4.1.2 Societal

Thus the first source of social power to be considered is that of societal. Drawing from Buzan Societal power is taken to be ideas and practices through which individuals are identified as a member of a social group, this can be on a small or large scale. The source of identity can be national, religious or racial. For Buzan this societal identification is often referred to as national identity, but he argues that this is deeper than the notional attachment to a nation-state which has created an identity and is political in nature. The notion of society can result in a national identity which coincides with the boundaries of a state. However, there is normally a weak sense of nationalism in many weak states. This is exacerbated by the fact that the political identity of a state is spatially bounded, whereas a community with a common societal identity need not have

⁷⁹ Kiernan, 'The Sources of Social Power. Vol 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760 by Michael Mann: Review,' p. 649.

⁸⁰ Peter N. Stearns, 'Review Essay: The Sources of Social Power. Volume 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 1760-1914 by Michael Mann', *The American Historical Review*, 100 (2) (1995), p.484.

⁸¹ Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament*, p.41.

⁸² George Lawson, 'The Work of Michael Mann: A Conversation with Michael Mann', *Millennium*, 34(2) (2005), p.493.

⁸³ Taken from Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, p.119-123.

such a restriction.⁸⁴

The importance of societal issues as a contemporary form of meaning system are reflected in the focus on warfare and nationalism. The importance of ethnic identity in the conflicts which dominated the post-Cold War period is accounted for in a number of works on 'New Wars'. Buzan includes a number of regional examples to illustrate the security implications of societal security within the context of securitisation which are relevant to the case studies. In Africa tribal and ethnic identities have resulted in the majority of threats to the state originating internally. In the Middle-East national boundaries often do not coincide with state boundaries and overarching identities have conflicted with attempts by the state to engage in nation building. There are deep divisions and recurring conflicts, while at the same time a more regional identity has emerged in reaction to outside influences.⁸⁵ The distribution of power within these sectors could therefore be either intensive - in the form of small geographically close communities, or extensive when a single identity is shared over a wider area. However the form of power taken is also likely to be diffuse, with norms and ideas likely to be prevalent.

3.4.1.3 Economic

Between Buzan and Mann the more coherent conceptualisation of economics is offered by Mann; for Buzan this is a messy category which is dependent on the ideological approach taken to the economy. According to Mann "economic power derives from the satisfaction of subsistence needs through the social organisation of extraction, transformation, distribution and consumption of the resources of nature". These activities are associated with the generation of classes.⁸⁶ Economic organisation is defined as production, distribution, exchange and consumption, and have form a prominent role in social development. Mann links this to the development of class in his work.⁸⁷ This is done to define who has access to economic resources. The ruling class is the one which is able to monopolise other sources of power to dominate a state.

In terms of power, production is intensive, but markets diffuse, spreading across state boundaries.⁸⁸ This can be seen in the case studies where the first

⁸⁴ Barry Buzan, "Security, the State, the "New World Order", and Beyond", in *On Security*, ed. by Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p.195.

⁸⁵ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, pp.126-138.

⁸⁶ Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1*, p.24.

⁸⁷ Ibid, p.24.

⁸⁸ Mann, *Infrastructural Power Revisited*, p.358.

priority of CMSPs is often to secure the economic modes of production. For example in Sierra Leone and PNG mineral extraction and Iraq the rebuilding of economic infrastructure and protection of pipelines. The regaining of access resources by the state not only increases the revenue of the state but denies them to other groups - local or transnational. Again in Sierra Leone the RUF and Liberia were able to exploit the diffuse markets of the diamond trade which involved Lebanese traders and resulted in the return flow of military supplies into the country. Mann contends that Economic power is diffuse, while at a transnational and global scale this may be true, at a local, national and international strong state institutions should be able to regulate many aspects of economic power and organisation.

3.4.1.4 Military

Military power is "the social organisation of concentrated lethal force. It is authoritative, indeed arbitrary and violent."⁸⁹ Buzan and Mann both agree that the military power has two dimensions. The traditional approach is to distinguish between military power used for (1) defence and offence; and (2) to protect the state from internal and external threats. Immediately this leads to a focus on the state.⁹⁰ Adopting a position towards military force which emphasise the importance of the state often leads to the criticisms covered above in which theoretical approaches are criticised for being state centred, ignorant of historical change and therefore realist.

The relationship between the state and force will be considered in more detail in chapter 3, however it must be acknowledged that in the contemporary context the legitimate use of force is associated with the state. Buzan acknowledges that although other sources of force exist the state has greater economic power to obtain military force, and the political power to delegitimise other forms of force.⁹¹ Whether a state is able to regulate such legitimacy is depended upon the strength of the state and will form a component of analysis within the case studies, particularly how the use of CMSPs impacts on this control.

A number of power components are associated with military power, especially when concentrated, intensive authoritative power are required.

⁸⁹ Ibid, p.358.

⁹⁰ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, p.50; Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1*, pp.25-26.

⁹¹ Ibid, p.49.

Ownership confers collective and distributive power.⁹² Coercive, intensive power stems from the ability to organise and inflict force, the striking range of which has increased as technology has developed.⁹³ Military power can directly coerce labour in unskilled tasks - such as the RUF forcing civilians to participate in the extraction of alluvial diamonds - but is of limited utility when skilled work is required.⁹⁴ The extensive power of the military stems from the terroristic component of military force. Thus the brutalising effect of the use of force can be used to communicate to a wider population - the RUF using amputation to deter civilians from participating in political activity.

It is useful to separate political and military sources of power as the relationship between the two can be understood in greater detail. Particularly as the military can play a significant role in destabilising the country.⁹⁵ It also demonstrates the limits of CMSPs as a tool of the state. They are a military actor as such their direct impact is limited to the intensive use of power in certain areas.

3.4.1.5 Political

While Mann has a strong sense of political power for Buzan there is a danger political is likely to become a miscellaneous category. However, Mann applies a strict definition in which political power is judicial power, backed by coercion, but exerted by the state, administered centrally and territorially bounded.⁹⁶ This is the only source of power which he ties to geography.⁹⁷ Through political control the state elite are able to exert collective and distributive power. It is through political power that Mann distinguishes between the despotic and infrastructural power. Through political power Mann also adopts a realist approach to international relations in which he recognises the power the state over its own geographical territory, but this is rather more limited when faced with 'geopolitical diplomacy'.⁹⁸

Despite Buzan's misgivings towards the way in which political may be used he does offer some useful components. He defines political as "...about the organisational stability of states, systems of government, and the ideologies

⁹² Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1*, p.24.

⁹³ Mann, *Infrastructural Power Revisited*, p.358.

⁹⁴ Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1*, p.26.

⁹⁵ Paul Collier, *Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places* (London: The Bodley Head, 2009), p.8.

⁹⁶ Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1*, p.26.

⁹⁷ Mann, *Infrastructural Power Revisited*, p.358.

⁹⁸ Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1*, p.27.

that give governments and states their legitimacy.⁹⁹ Which can include structures, processes and institutions.¹⁰⁰ Political threats are aimed at the organisational ability of the state; either to the internal legitimacy of the state, or its external recognition, thus political security is tied to state sovereignty.¹⁰¹ While both approaches attempt to distinguish between military and political power Mann does not divorce them totally. However the use of coercion as political power is tied to its use by the state. By including Buzan's control of structures, processes and institutions a more satisfactory understanding is reached, rather than being effectively restricted to the institutional use of force. Adopting such an approach means that depending on how they are used CMSPs can be understood as political agents when used by political elites as part of the coercive capacity of the state.

3.4.2 Crystallisation

While the identification of the sources of social power is an important development by Mann, alone they do not alone offer enough to justify the use of his theory. Where Mann further distinguishes himself is how these various forms of power relate to each other. Mann is clear that his theory is not a social system divided into four subsections. Rather it is an analytical starting point for dealing with mess.¹⁰² Instead of merely providing a Realist theory of the state, in which the various forms of social power interact by bouncing off each other again like billiard balls he argues that these power sources are "impure and promiscuous, weaving in and out of one another."¹⁰³ None of the sources of social power is granted the status as the ultimate source of power.¹⁰⁴ Instead different societies are composed of different balances between the various sources of power and manner in which they intertwine.¹⁰⁵

⁹⁹ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, p.119.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, p.144.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, p.141.

¹⁰² Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 2*, p.10.

¹⁰³ Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1*, pp.17-18

¹⁰⁴ Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 2*.

¹⁰⁵ Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1*, pp.17-18.




Fig. 3.2 *Mann's Interaction*

Mann uses the following diagram to illustrate the way in which the sources of power are generated, the types of power they utilise and the way in which they with each other. As with realist approaches Mann recognises there are factors which fall outside of the scope of this model.

The relationship between the sources of power is based on Mann's reluctance to use the term 'society' to describe a single entity. He argues instead that although the four sources of power do have social elements they each have their own independent boundaries.¹⁰⁶ This is a useful distinction to make. Thus while Soifer and Matthais von Hau are right to raise the conceptual difficulties in lacking a single referential object,¹⁰⁷ Mann does allow the complexity of power relations to be recognised. And although the sources of power interact with each other they also operate separately with the potential to create their own independent networks of authority. Mann argues that each of these structures has its own "infrastructures" which are used to facilitate their power. These can be shared by different sources of power, although they can be used for different reasons by each of the sources.¹⁰⁸

This framework allows the state within each of the case studies to be broken down and the impact of CMSPs be accounted for, not just in the context of each of source of power, but how they combine and relate to each other. In Mann's model it is not just the case that an increase in the power or one source

¹⁰⁶ Mann, *Infrastructural Power Revisited*, p.358.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, p.358.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, p.358.

increases power over the others, but that it can also impact on how the other sources function.

3.4.3 Mann and the State

The outcome of the interaction between the sources of power is a definition of the state in which Mann builds upon the traditional Weberian definition normally used when discussing the relationship between the state and force. Mann identifies four features:

- The state is a differentiated set of institutions and personnel
- embodying centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate to and from a centre, to cover a
- territorially demarcated area over which it exercises
- some degree of authoritative, binding rule making, backed up by some organised political force.¹⁰⁹

The state is characterised by its institutional functionality and those which run it. Both political and military power are recognised as being linked to power centres. Territory is still recognised as being important. However, Shaw argues that this definition abandons the idea of a fixed monopoly of legitimate force.¹¹⁰ Doing so leads to a much more nuanced understanding of the state, more in line with the reality of the control of force possessed by the states in the case studies. To be effective within the context of the state authority a combination of all the sources of power is required; for Mann military power alone is insufficient to claim statehood.¹¹¹

Thus the issue of the states domestic power arises. According to Hobson Weberian historical sociology grants the state moderate agential power "...to make domestic or foreign policy as well as shape the domestic realm, free of domestic social structural requirements or the interests of non-state actors".¹¹² Where does power come from? Embeddness within the social structures, or despotic control over them? Domestic insecurity is caused by low levels of social cohesion a regime legitimacy.¹¹³

¹⁰⁹ Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 2*, p.55.

¹¹⁰ Shaw, *The State of Globalization*, p.506.

¹¹¹ Lawson, 'The Work of Michael Mann,' pp. 477-485; George Lawson, 'The Sources of Life, the Universe and Everything: A Conversation with Michael Mann', *Millennium*, 34 (2) (2005), p.502.

¹¹² Hobson, *The State and International Relations*, p. 5.

¹¹³ Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament*, p.190.

Despite this strength comes from the relationship between the ruling elite and the dominant class.¹¹⁴ Mann cites support from Hobson and Weiss who have made similar arguments. The language used here is important - Mann distinguishes between dominant and most populous. Although Mann is approaching the concept of class, to talk about social classes, this has important ramifications when looking at ethnic groups. In some states, such as Iraq minority groups have held the most power within the state. however this arguably to the detriment of the long term stability of the state as the resources become dedicated to repressing the majority group, leading to repression. These are important questions to consider with the use of commercial military service providers. Does another route to improve the fungability of economic resources into military power allow elites to separate the state from society? If this is the case, as per the assertion by Hobson is the long term stability of the state damaged as such a course is unlikely to be sustainable.

This has important ramifications for the use of private security. If the companies are bought in to support an unpopular regime, can they instead drive a further wedge between the state and the groups within in, in fact weakening the state and its ability to remain in control over the longer term. The balance between stability is debated in a number of places democracy. Is it better to build security institutions first if democracy does not necessarily mean stability?¹¹⁵ While in the short term a more powerful military built up to enhance state security can help to separate society and state, however is this sustainable, or beneficial in the long term? This thus questions the motivations and effectiveness of both the long and short term use of external sources of force for security.

3.4.4 Networks of Social Power

A common criticism of Mann is that his approach to the international system is based on structural realism. While Mann has accepted there were realist elements to his earlier work he argues that such criticism does not reflect his later work. This can be seen in his use of networks. These serve as far more than a redundant category for miscellaneous variables which do not fit easily into the rest of his work. Mann's understanding of networks feeds into his assertion that societies are not closed systems that can be bounded by

¹¹⁴ Michael Mann, 'Putting the Weberian State in its Social Geopolitical and Militaristic Context: A Reponse to Patrick O'Brien', *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 19 (4) (2006), pp.365; 368.

¹¹⁵ Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament*, p.195.

geographical or social space.

The relationship between state and society uses an approach to global sociology which moves beyond structural realism by drawing on a constructivist relationship between state and structure advocated by historical sociologists like Hobson and Halliday. Although the 'trinitarian' relationship between state-structure-state of Hobson's work is criticised by Shaw for being outdated and basic.¹¹⁶ Hobson defends the use of the spatial trinity in his approach to Weberian historical sociology by advocating Mann's approach to the relationship between structural and unit levels. He argues that although the spatial trinity may appear to be expressed in a simple way it addresses interactions in sufficient depth.¹¹⁷ The creation of analytical models will inevitably utilise categories which simplify empirical narrative; Mann's approach is a middle ground between the parsimony of structural realism and reductionism.

The sentiment behind Shaw's criticism of an overly simplistic understanding of global sociological interactions is still relevant. The complexity of the modern international system has led to proponents of globalisation to question the continuing importance of the state. A contention which has been challenged by historical sociologists like Mann, who argues that globalisation as an intensification of social relations rather than a weakening of the state,¹¹⁸ which has added more networks to the existing ones, rather than replacing them.¹¹⁹ He identifies five 'socio-spatial networks' range from local to global networks, within these international, transnational and sub-national levels are covered. The outcome is a framework with sufficient explanatory power to make conclusions as to shifting nature of power from and to the modern state. The strength of Mann's framework is such that Hobson and Shaw both see merit in it, despite reservations as to each other's approaches.

The five levels identified by Mann are:¹²⁰

1. Local networks - which means interactions at a sub-national level.
2. National networks - networks structured by the nation-state.
3. International networks - refers to the 'hard' and 'soft' political interaction

¹¹⁶ Shaw, 'The Historical Sociology of the Future,' pp.324-326.

¹¹⁷ John Hobson, 'For a 'Second Wave' Weberian Historical Sociology in International Relations: A Reply to Halperin and Shaw,' p.359.

¹¹⁸ Lawson, 'The Work of Michael Mann.' p.507.

¹¹⁹ Donald J. Puchala, 'Book Review: International Order and the Future of World Politics by T V Paul and John A Hall', *The American Political Science Review*, 94 (3) (2000), p.773.

¹²⁰ Michael Mann, 'Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State?', *Review of International Political Economy*, 4(3) (1997), p.475.

between national. Mann argues that these interactions are nationally, rather than state constituted.

4. Transnational networks - pass through national borders and are unaffected by them. These can be large or small scale. Spread of warfare between states can be a major source of security threat.¹²¹
5. Global networks - these can be universal or particularist entire world. Political legitimacy of states often comes from this level. States only exist because of the Westphalian approaches to sovereignty.¹²²

The networks will be used within each of the sources of power to theorise how the various sources of power are shaped by interactions at different levels. Of most relevance to is the way Mann has seen the sources of power interact in the twentieth and twenty first century in the form of infrastructural power and the globalisation of the nation-state.¹²³ Mann distinguishes between the history of infrastructural power in the West and North and that of the South. In the North there has been an intensification of infrastructural power and the rise of the nation-state, which has seen the integration of social life and the taking off of common citizenship.¹²⁴ The fundamental feature of states in the north has been the substantial difference between the capability of these states and how much has been utilised; which is demonstrated by how states were able to react to World War I & II. But even during these periods political power did not overwhelm any of the other sources of power, rather the growth of infrastructural power has been based in economic and ideological power.¹²⁵

In the South he considers North East Asia, South East Asia and Africa. Of most interest here is Africa. Mann misses out on Central Asia and the Middle East in this analysis, two of the areas to be considered here. Though he has offered a detailed understanding of Iraq in the context of the US invasion.(interviews). In Africa, citing the works of Jeffrey Herbst and Robert Cooper, Mann's emphasis is on the variation in the region. There is a failure by states to project force over a distance, originating from the colonial state which emphasised control of regions of economic productivity. This is important for understanding the use of CMSPs, as this is where they have been most active.

¹²¹ Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament*, pp.5-6.

¹²² Robert Jackson, 'Quasi-States, Dual Regimes and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World', *International Organisation*, 41(4) (1987), p.529.

¹²³ Mann, *Infrastructural Power Revisited*, p.361.

¹²⁴ Ibid, p.359.

¹²⁵ Ibid, pp.360-1.

The reasons for this infrastructural arrangement is down to the attempts at imperial efforts at maximising profits from the colonies, and the way in which the states were created from territory which had been divided up. Infrastructural power is developed upon particular segments. Power flows out of the country through economic power infrastructures of MNCs, via the capital. Two exceptions to this are Rwanda and Botswana, both are small states correlation between states size and the strength of their infrastructural power. Smaller states have thus tended to be more centralised.¹²⁶

African states are vulnerable to three types of military challenge: 1 - local elites in lightly governed hinterlands. 2 - elites in mineral rich zones. Challenges from these two areas result in the state becoming a method of furthering the interests of particular groups and vulnerable to being taken over. 3 - a conflict between infrastructural and despotic power - if the military seizes power then the growth of despotic power becomes centralised, undermining the growth of infrastructural power as the state becomes separated from civil society.¹²⁷ Thus the function of the state resembles its colonial antecedents, which were designed for profit maximisation, rather than the northern and western states which tie civil society to the state.

These networks interact with other so that factors external to the state can intertwine with the relationship between the elite and dominant class. For Mann the trend has been the diminishing of local networks while national, international and transnational have become 'denser. Emergence of genuine global networks. National and international are constrained by the national state. Mann asks. Are national (2) and international (3) networks declining relative to local (1) and transnational (4). To what extent are global networks emerging? How far are these affecting the balance between (1, 4) and (2,3)?¹²⁸ He concludes that globalisation impacts in four different ways. (a) there are differing impacts on different types of states in different regions, (b) some of these trends weaken the state and others reinforce it, (c) some regulation is being dispersed from national to international and transnational networks, and (d) others trends are strengthening nation-states and transnationalism.¹²⁹

Again the relationship between state and society is questioned in terms

¹²⁶ Ibid, pp.363-4.

¹²⁷ Ibid, p.364.

¹²⁸ Mann, 'Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State?' pp.475-476.

¹²⁹ Ibid, p.494; Michael Mann, 'Has Globalisation Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State?', in *International Order and the Future of World Politics*, ed. by T. V. Paul and John A. Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 237-261.

of the ability of the state to achieved its desired aims, this time at the international and global levels. Is the agential power of the state "the ability of the state to make foreign policy and shape the international realm free of international structure requirements or the interests of international non-state actors."¹³⁰ Or, does becoming embedded in a global society and increasing infrastructural power compared to the isolation of despotic power.¹³¹ Can view despotic power is a usable resource. Despotic power could be employed as a source of agential power which decreases as it is used, weakening the state. Infrastructural power serves as a more sustainable source of power.

These networks are relevant to understanding the implications of CMSP activity within each of the sources of social power. In each of the case studies the state is weak with processes occurring within local and transnational networks which undermine the authority of the state or pose a direct challenge. Can the employment of CMSPs allow the state to regain control over processes occurring within these networks which should in fact be within the scope of national and transnational networks? Conversely, does employing a commercial enterprise undermine the ability of the state to control processes which should occur within national and international networks, moving them to transnational and local networks, and thus undermining the power of the state? The impact of global networks poses the question of how feasible and effective the establishment of working practices and CMSP regulation has been. Finally, the presence of CMSPs can cast light on the interaction between 'weak' and 'strong' states at an international level as the debate over the control and accountability of CMSPs often occurs between the home or employing state of a CMSP and the state in which they are actually being used.

3.5 Conclusion

Mann's model allows the analysis of CMSP activity on the state. It can explain how the use of CMSPs impacts on the balance between the different sources of social power. How the five levels of socio-spatial networks interact with each other. And finally the relationship between state and society. These three areas allow the research questions to be addressed in a level of detail beyond that offered by structural realism, while still retaining a structured, problem solving approach to security. This is within an approach which accounts for change

¹³⁰ Hobson, *The State and International Relations*, p.7.

¹³¹ John Hobson, 'Debate: The 'Second Wave' of Weberian Historical Sociology,' p.294.

over time by accounting for the contingent nature of phenomenon being studied. Although some historical sociologists and realists will oppose the incorporation of these principles, which they view to be detrimental to each approach, there is room for such a theory. The task of the next two chapters is to set the context for the analysis of the case studies by explaining what is exactly is meant by CMSPs, outlining some of the issues which have been raised with their use and how they relate to the historical use of non-state force.

Chapter 4

The Historical Use of Commercial Force

"Mercenaries have never had a good press. At best they have been largely forgotten."

John France¹

4.1 Introduction

The employment of individuals, or groups, from outside of state structures to provide martial services is a long running trend throughout the history of warfare, albeit one that has varied over time.² It is claimed that while no one likes mercenaries, everyone has used them.³ Various political groups or individuals have sought means to improve their military capabilities, while at the same time individuals or groups have been prepared to provide these services in return for remuneration. This occurred to the extent that mercenary use became fundamental to the conduct of warfare and by the 17th Century most wars were fought by mercenaries.⁴ This chapter will provide an overview of the historical use of commercial force up to and including the contemporary market. Examining the trends behind the commercial use of force will place the current market for commercial military services in context. While this type of overview is often utilised by academic and non-academic literature, it is necessary to establish the position of this thesis as to the historical significance of the use of commercial force.

This chapter does not seek to provide a comprehensive historical overview of the commercial use of force, to do so would effectively be a history of warfare. Instead, five historically significant periods will be compared to the

¹ John France, 'Mercenaries and Paid Men. the Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages: Introduction', in *Mercenaries and Paid Men: The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages*, ed. by John France, 47 vols (Leiden: Brill, 2008), p.1.

² Ibid.

³ William Urban, *Medieval Mercenaries: The Business of War* (London: Greenhill Books, 2006), p.16.

⁴ Lt. Col. Tim Spicer, *An Unorthodox Soldier, Peace War and the Sandline Affair* (London: Mainstream Publishing, 1999), p.30.

contemporary market: Medieval Europe, the Italian City States, the Thirty Years War, the state collection of force from the 18th century to the middle of the 20th century, and the Cold War. These periods are significant for their use of organised companies, from which historical trends and parallels can be drawn with the present industry. They show how the commercial use of force has been a long running aspect of state security, which has intertwined with the formation of the state. Many of the issues which arise when examining the modern use of commercial force have historical parallels, which are valuable when considering the implication of their use in their current form. The term mercenary will be used when referring to individuals operating on an ad hoc basis, and military company when they are in an organised unit.

4.2 Trends

There are three trends which will be considered in the historical cases: (1) the degree to which commercial force has been used, (2) the reasons for its use, and (3) the consequences of doing so. Taking the first trend, although commercial force has been a constant feature of the history of warfare, the extent to which it has been used has varied. The consolidation of military functions by the state from the late 17th century, was an ad hoc and incomplete process, but served to shift the majority of the burden of warfare from commercial actors to national militaries. By the mid-20th century it was expected that modern states possessed their own militaries. This does not mean that commercial actors ceased to be employed, rather that the emphasis shifted so that states were expected to have their own armies. As such instead of viewing the use of each as absolutes, it is better to view them as coinciding with each other, but with a change in emphasis.

The arguments of Thomson and Ortiz are typical of the literature which tries to emphasise the importance of continuity. Thomson is one of the earliest writers and is often referred to in the rest of the literature and Ortiz represents the more recent literature. According to Thomson the monopolisation of force by the state was not an intentional, natural, even, or irreversible process. Rather, the state consolidated the means to prosecute warfare as it became politically expedient to do so.⁵ She challenges the popular notion that monopolisation of force by the modern state is normal, was inevitable, or is actually accurate.

⁵ Janice Thomson, *Mercenaries, Pirates & Sovereigns: State Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

Ortiz builds on this argument by offering a choice for those who are looking at the current growth of commercial military services, that we can either view the non-state use of force as a historical constant, but one that has changed over the past couple of decades. Or, that force has been collected by the state, and that the current trend is an affront to this.⁶ Ortiz emphasises the use of non-state force as far more of a constant than Thomson.

A mixture of both these arguments best represents the processes which occurred. Ortiz is correct in asking us to consider whether recent developments are more subtle than most people would think, rather than being indicative of a radical break. But the dichotomy behind the choice offered by Ortiz is intentionally too stark. The intention being to make the reader challenge their current perceptions and move away from the perception that the current market is an anomaly.⁷ Despite the claim to continuity, the degree to which commercial actors were used in the 1990s and post 9/11 reflects a reversal towards the increased use of organised commercial actors.

The answer to the second question is somewhat more complex as the exact circumstances are dependent on historical contingency. They can however be abstracted to the interplay between supply and demand factors. The importance of these push and pull factors are commonly used in analysis of the current market,⁸ but can also be seen through the historical use of force.⁹ While Urban places the emphasis on the demand side,¹⁰ either can stimulate the market, though the most dynamic growth occurs when the two coincide. The companies tend to move from strong states to areas of weakness on demobilisation. Mercenaries thrive in weak states or areas where they can exert more influence. There is quite often a link with other business in order to increase profits.¹¹

On the demand side, a number of states have viewed it to be politically expedient or necessary to buy in military services rather than develop their own

⁶ Carlos Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security: A Guide to the Issues* (Oxford: Praeger, 2010), pp.152-153.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Joakim Berndtsson, 'Security Professionals for Hire: Exploring the Many Faces of Private Security Expertise', *Millennium*, 40 (2) (2012), p.304.

⁹ William Urban, *Medieval Mercenaries: The Business of War*, (London: Greenhill Books, 2006), p.292

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Peter W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*, 2nd edn (London: Cornell, 2008), pp.38-39.

capabilities. Examples include the Italian City States¹² and a number of decolonised states in the 1960s.¹³ These trends can be viewed as self-reinforcing; for example demand leading to the formation of more companies during Renaissance Italy and the sudden availability of skills providing states with more options for their security predicaments; again the presence of the first English companies in Italy. Mercenaries tend to thrive in unstable conditions.¹⁴

On the supply side, the end of periods of conflict often results in the release of quantities of personnel who still wish to use these skills to make a living. There is a tendency for them to market this training to other employers; both state and non-state. Some examples of this are: the end of the Hundred Years War, which led to English mercenaries moving to Italy;¹⁵ the end of the WWII, which led to the formation of the first modern companies,¹⁶ and the characters which ended up in Africa,¹⁷ despite the emergent Cold War; and the end of the Cold War, which led to the release of a number of well-trained troops which marketed their skills.¹⁸ According to Spicer the demand for their services centres on two factors: efficiency and technology. Mercenaries proved to be more effective than feudal levy and brought expertise of different weapons platforms. Fundamentally, mercenaries provide their employers with an asset.¹⁹

Thus, despite the drawbacks of their use, the potential advantages they brought secured their continued employment. It was only when they ceased to perform on the battlefield that their employers looked for alternatives. In periods of instability, when smaller numbers of well-trained troops have been required, commercial actors have been employed. The link between quantity and quality is key; mercenary troops being more useful, and therefore employed more, when the latter was the most important.²⁰ This can be seen in the drop in mercenary use during the periods of mass mobilised warfare, such as the Napoleonic Wars, World War I and World War II.

¹² John France, *Mercenaries and Paid Men: The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages: Introduction*, p.4.

¹³ David Shearer, *Private Armies and Military Intervention*, Adelphi Paper, 316 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.15.

¹⁴ Ibid, p.13.

¹⁵ Urban, *Medieval Mercenaries*, p.236.

¹⁶ Michael Lee Lanning, *Mercenaries: Soldiers of Fortune, from Ancient Greece to Today's Private Military Companies* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2005).

¹⁷ Spicer, *An Unorthodox Soldier, Peace War and the Sandline Affair*, pp.35-36.

¹⁸ Shearer, *Private Armies and Military Intervention*, p.13.

¹⁹ Spicer, *An Unorthodox Soldier, Peace War and the Sandline Affair*, pp.30-31.

²⁰ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p.38.

The final trend is the impact of mercenary use. The impact of mercenary activity is rather mixed. In some cases they have provided a degree of stability, including being credited with a role in facilitating the Italian Renaissance.²¹ However, in other cases, such as after the Thirty Years War, they were seen as agents of destabilisation and a threat to the state, which led to the delegitimisation of their use. A fundamental dynamic in understanding the long-term effectiveness of mercenary activity is how embedded its use becomes in society. Mann argues that the use of mercenaries is indicative of a state which is less embedded in society.²² This is part of the compromise between political-social integration and military pragmatism; with mercenary use occurring when citizen armies have become less effective.²³ As will be seen in the examples of mercenary use below, it is possible for mercenary interaction with the state power structures to lead to a degree of embeddedness. Mercenaries are not always out of control and prone to behaving recklessly, damaging and alienating local populations; rather the problem seems to be with their employers. In most of the examples the state has been able to exert a degree of control. Some of the acts of abuse which are criticised are in fact the policy decisions of the employers. Mercenaries are most effective when they become institutionalised, paradoxically at this point they start to share the characteristics of national forces.

4.3 Medieval Mercenaries

The use of mercenaries is often associated with the medieval period. Although they operated before this time, it is from this period that many current perceptions originate. The use of mercenaries was part of a complex security environment of competing power sources, in which a number of actors made use of some form of force. Direct comparison to the modern state system is problematic, but the breakdown of states in Africa and the Balkans at the end of the Cold War has prompted claims of the emergence of a form of neo-medievalism.²⁴ In these regions, competing sources of authority appeared at

²¹ *Shadow Company* [Film], Dir. Nick Bicanic and Jason Bourque (Canada: A Purpose Built Film, 2006).

²² Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760*, 1st edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p.163.

²³ *Ibid*, p.228.

²⁴ Neil Winn, 'Introduction: New Forms of Political Organisation, Community, Sovereignty and Identity: Civil Wars, the New Diplomacy and International Relations', *Civil Wars*, 6 (2) (2003),

different levels, as the state has failed to provide the services which are expected of the modern state. This encouraged the emergence of a number of actors which either tried to take advantage by further challenging the state, or by offering an alternative to the protection of the state. Both of these outcomes further complicate the security environment.

Mercenaries existed alongside other non-state actors who also used force to generate an income. Urban calls these 'wandering bands of organised robbers' as 'pirate[s]' or 'outlaw[s]';²⁵ though the contribution of mercenary bands to security can also be questioned. There is also a difference between bodyguards and the emergence of military units. Although bodyguards had been used for centuries, during the medieval period more organised units began to appear.²⁶ The trend was to employ units of troops, rather than individuals; on the grounds that the former offered far more combat effectiveness than a collection of individuals.²⁷

As with the current market there is some difficulty in defining the concept of mercenary during this period. DeVries identifies two elements as being present through many of the traditional definitions of the medieval mercenary; being "paid", and a sense of "foreign".²⁸ France also looks at the relationship between terms of service (politically determined to economically determined) and embeddedness in the society being served, citing a typology created by Stephen Morillo between these two axis.²⁹ However, DeVries believes both of these qualifications to be highly problematic; classing particular groups as mercenaries merely undermines attempts to understand the motivation behind their actions, particularly associating modern conceptions of identity.³⁰ DeVries concludes that good soldiers were always needed during the period, soldiering was their occupation and that if individuals or companies could improve their pay why should they not seek employment.³¹ France concludes that the complexity of relationships between troops and their commanders means the term has little

pp.1-7; Neil Winn, 'Conclusion: Neo-Medievalism, Civil Wars and the New Diplomacy', *Civil Wars*, 6 (2) (2003), pp.138-142.

²⁵ Urban, *Medieval Mercenaries: The Business of War*, p.289.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid, p.14.

²⁸ Kelly DeVries, 'Medieval Mercenaries: Methodology, Definitions, and Problems', in *Mercenaries and Paid Men: The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages*, ed. by John France, 47 vols (Leiden: Brill, 2008), p.45.

²⁹ France, 'Introduction,' in *Mercenaries and Paid Men*, p.6.

³⁰ DeVries, 'Medieval Mercenaries: Methodology, Definitions, and Problems,' p.46.

³¹ Ibid, p.56.

contemporary reality.³² Though in the latter part of the period, “as armies became more professional, the mercenary appears as a distinct and identifiable figure.”³³

During this period mercenaries were employed because feudal oaths and local militias were insufficient.³⁴ Feudal levies provided poorly trained troops, who were reluctant to join and leave. Companies of troops therefore provided a way for political elites to wage war without levies draining poorly trained members of the economic classes.³⁵ They therefore offered better efficiency and access to better technology than the alternatives. The use of mercenaries during the medieval period is associated with the employment of specialist weapons; such as Genoese crossbowmen, English long-bowmen, Burgundian handgunners and German or Hungarian gunners. Though it has been argued that this only occurred towards the end of the period.³⁶ There was a brief lull in the use of the mercenaries as cities became fortified and required permanent forces for defence.³⁷ However, they were used as garrison troops during the crusades; when military orders hired them to make up numbers in the garrisoning of castles.³⁸ Despite their widespread usage, they could only be employed by those who had the means to secure payment, which meant either governments or quasi governments.³⁹

The medieval use of mercenaries establishes several key trends behind the historical use of mercenaries with dislike of mercenaries often traced back to this period. They have been accused of cruelty in the execution of force; while certainly participating in this aspect of medieval warfare, their employers were often complicit in the use of these methods.⁴⁰ Urban argues that during this period mercenaries are seen as being the problem, when in fact they were a symptom; the problem lay with those who employed them.⁴¹ Fickleness is often a charge which is laid at mercenaries; although switching sides was commonplace during the period, there are examples of mercenaries displaying

³² France, 'Introduction,' in *Mercenaries and Paid Men*, p.12.

³³ Ibid, p.12.

³⁴ Urban, *Medieval Mercenaries: The Business of War*, p.13

³⁵ DeVries, 'Medieval Mercenaries: Methodology, Definitions, and Problems,' p.55.

³⁶ Ibid, p.56.

³⁷ Lanning, *Mercenaries*, p.39.

³⁸ Urban, *Medieval Mercenaries: The Business of War*, p.290

³⁹ Ibid, p.289.

⁴⁰ France, 'Introduction' in *Mercenaries and Paid Men*, p.2.

⁴¹ Urban, *Medieval Mercenaries: The Business of War*, pp.10-11.

loyalty in order to protect their reputation and future employability.⁴² Even though the distinction between duty and desire for gain was artificial it has formed the basis of modern perceptions of who is a mercenary.⁴³ Mercenary use was very much a symptom of the instability of this period. The supply and demand dynamic meant that during times of peace soldiers would sometimes become freelance operators, or form free companies, moving to areas which were at war.⁴⁴ It was often safer for citizens during times of war.⁴⁵

Attempts were made to control the use of mercenaries. The Magna Carta is an example of an attempt to remove mercenaries from a country, in this instance Britain. While the use of mercenaries in the country ceased it did not stop them being used in foreign conflicts.⁴⁶ Still, they were often employed for emergencies, during which time their employers would do their best to control them, and then dismiss them.⁴⁷ Mercenaries were a necessary part of medieval warfare, making up for the deficiencies in existing military structures. For the soldiers who hired out their skills it became a necessary form of income during times of peace.

4.4 Italian City States

Chronologically the use of mercenaries by the Italian City States overlaps with the medieval period, but it is worthy of consideration in its own right; the conditions that arose following the end of the Hundred Years War are often compared to those at the end of the Cold-War.⁴⁸ The companies (condottieri) which fought for the city states are linked with modern military companies because of the contracts (condotta) they fought under.⁴⁹ The condatto precisely outlined the terms of service and would stipulate the length of employment, the requirements of the job, the cost and how this was to be fulfilled.⁵⁰ The initial use of mercenaries in Italy was the product of two conditions: the 13th Century

⁴² France, 'Introduction' in *Mercenaries and Paid Men*, pp.2-3.

⁴³ Ibid, p.2.

⁴⁴ Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security*.

⁴⁵ Urban, *Medieval Mercenaries: The Business of War*, p.290.

⁴⁶ Lanning, *Mercenaries*, pp.38-39.

⁴⁷ Urban, *Medieval Mercenaries: The Business of War*, p.15.

⁴⁸ William McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force and Society since A.D. 1000* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p.78; Shearer, *Private Armies and Military Intervention*, p.13.

⁴⁹ Spicer, *An Unorthodox Soldier, Peace War and the Sandline Affair*, p.31

⁵⁰ Ibid.

collapse of the empire which led to competition between the city states, most notably Venice and Florence; and the arrival of English mercenaries, following the end of the Hundred Years War. Sir John Hawkwood and his Great Company stand out, though over time the market for force became domesticated. Cities like Florence, Milan and Venice made extensive use of the companies, in what can be seen as either a boom period for mercenaries, or typical of many of the problems associated with their use.

As with the rest of the medieval period, the demand for mercenaries in Italy was driven by the increasing complexity of warfare; which to be effective had come to require a level of coordination between combined forces which was beyond the capability of part-time citizen militias. The use of mercenaries was also preferable because the population could focus on what they were skilled at: economic production.⁵¹ The demand was driven by the political system within the Italian peninsula where overlapping power structures fostered competition and instability.⁵²

This demand for commercial actors was fed by the English companies that had formed after the Peace of Bretigny ended the Hundred Years War in 1360. They moved to Italy after being threatened with punishment from London for continued looting in France following the peace.⁵³ Such prohibition merely moved the companies around Europe. The English companies were not the first self-sufficient mercenary companies seen in Europe; this being the Catalan Company, which formed under Roger di Flor and ended up in Athens.⁵⁴ However, they became central in the warring between the Italian City States, as mercenary companies became the main source of military power.⁵⁵

A number of problems have been associated with the use of the condottieri. Most frequently their reliability as a fighting force. Percy argues that even at the time they were unpopular and in need of control.⁵⁶ The companies are criticised for frequently switching employers between contracts, even if this involved fighting against their previous employer. Hawkwood switched sides between Pisa and Florence several times; though he gained popularity in

⁵¹ McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power*, pp.68-73.

⁵² Ibid, p.69.

⁵³ Lanning, *Mercenaries*.

⁵⁴ Ibid, pp.41-44.

⁵⁵ Denys Hay, *Europe in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries*, 2nd edn (Harlow: Longman, 1989), p.186.

⁵⁶ Sarah Percy, *Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.86.

Florence, where a painting still sits in the corner of the Cathedral. Overreliance upon the condottieri also left cities vulnerable to being overrun by the very soldiers who had been employed to defend them.⁵⁷

Over time the condotta became longer term and the mercenary forces became more established. This suited both employer and contractor, as the interests of the companies' income became more secure and their interests became tied to that of their employer. This system led to domestic stability.⁵⁸ When under contract the condottieri were well controlled by their employers - being accompanied by political commissioners and with several notable examples of punishment being enacted for transgressions.⁵⁹ In the end few condottieri actually established their own principalities,⁶⁰ and the wars on the peninsula were primarily caused by the politicking of the cities, rather than the companies they employed.⁶¹

A second criticism which is often levelled at the companies is that they lacked conviction when fighting each other; preferring not to risk themselves on the field of battle. A number of commentators either logically extrapolate that in the pursuit of profit it was in the interest of the condottieri for wars to be as long and bloodless as possible.⁶² Machiavelli is also cited as a contemporary source for the unreliability of mercenary forces; he is critical of their performance, especially when compared to militia.⁶³ However, these contemporary criticisms are challenged by modern scholars who argue that in fact, many of the bloodiest battles of this period were between mercenary forces.⁶⁴ Neither of these criticisms can be taken at face value. The contested nature of each criticism shows that while some companies did not perform, there were also situations where the use of commercial entities functioned as intended.

Alongside these criticisms there are several interesting points to note about the use of the condottieri, particularly in the context of contemporary companies. The first is the relationship between the companies and their 'home states'. It is argued by France that Hawkwood often represented the interests of

⁵⁷ John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (London: Pimlico, 1994), p.231.

⁵⁸ McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power*, pp.77-79.

⁵⁹ Hay, *Europe in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries*, pp.186-187.

⁶⁰ Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1*.

⁶¹ Hay, *Europe in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries*, p.186.

⁶² Urban, *Medieval Mercenaries: The Business of War*, p.32.

⁶³ Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. by Peter Bondella and Mark Musa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

⁶⁴ Hay, *Europe in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries*, p.186.

the English government while he was in Italy.⁶⁵ This has similarities to the modern market and questions arise over how closely the companies would cooperate with their 'home states' when choosing clients. The second is the growth of the domestic market in Italy to supply the demand for commercial military actors. The role of foreign companies diminished over time and Italian companies came to play a more important role. Though this did not completely end the influx of foreign troops.⁶⁶ The growth of a domestic market is a trend that occurs in several of the case studies.

Of further relevance to the modern market is the economic model which developed around the use of the companies. McNeill argues that the success of the system stemmed from the way that the money spent on the companies became self sustaining, as it was returned to the cities by the spending of the soldiers.⁶⁷ Although this worked on an economic-military level, the introduction of market interests was detrimental to societal-political bonds as it broke existing social bonds forged by the use of citizen soldiers.⁶⁸

Conclusions as to the role of the condottieri are mixed. They have been associated with the creation of the conditions which led to the Renaissance.⁶⁹ However, from a security point of view mercenary armies proved ineffective long-term when facing outside threats. France invaded in 1494, and the city states moved towards the outcome of which was the development of citizen armies.⁷⁰ Though arguably the inability of the city states to work with each other was more detrimental than the use of the mercenaries themselves.⁷¹ According to McNeill, where cities were able to effectively implement sustainable continuous mercenary employment, domestic stability followed.⁷² Ultimately the companies formed a central place in the socio-political-economic development of warfare during this period. They were sought out because their use was advantageous compared to conscripted militias. However, as changes in warfare and politics occurred other methods of security became preferable.

⁶⁵ France, *Mercenaries and Paid Men*, p.12.

⁶⁶ Lanning, *Mercenaries*, p.48.

⁶⁷ McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology*, p.78.

⁶⁸ Ibid, p.67.

⁶⁹ Interview with Saunders, Frances Stonor in *Shadow Company* [Film].

⁷⁰ Lanning, *Mercenaries*, p.51.

⁷¹ Hay, *Europe in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries*, p.186.

⁷² McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power*, p.79.

4.5 The Thirty Years War

The Thirty Years War is a second significant period for the use of commercial military actors. Parallels are often drawn with the use of the condottieri by the Italian city states, though the processes which occurred in these two cases diverged.⁷³ It is therefore useful to see how the use of the companies differed under similar initial conditions. The war was a pan-European struggle for control of the Holy Roman Empire, which began as a war between Protestant House of Habsberg and Bohemia, after the installation of the Catholic, Ferdinand II in Bohemia. The war between the Habsbergs and Bohemia became an international conflict which drew in neighbouring states, including the Danish, Swedish and French. The Thirty Years War is of importance when considering the historical use of CMSPs because of the way in which troops were raised, with military entrepreneurs as the main source of troops.⁷⁴ The most well known of these entrepreneurs, Albrecht von Wallenstein, raised several armies before he was assassinated in 1634. The outcome of the war was a stalemate and the devastation of a vast tract of Europe's countryside. The consequence of this devastation was the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which is widely considered to be the birth of the modern state system.

The use of commercially raised forces was a solution to poorly trained and reluctant-to-fight conscripts.⁷⁵ They were successful to the point that it has been argued the ability of the entrepreneurs to raise the armies sustained the war.⁷⁶ Troops enlisted within these armies for a variety of reasons. Primarily the promise of pay, but also to avoid being plundered; it was generally safer to be inside an army.⁷⁷ The Thirty Years War witnessed the rise of the professional general, the link has been made to modern CMSPs and the supply of high-end expertise.⁷⁸ Two of the most famous military entrepreneurs were Wallenstein and Maurice of Nassau, they raised armies at the height of the military entrepreneurs power.⁷⁹

The problem with the armies came from a lack of control and the way in which they were sustained. The logistics of moving vast amounts of supplies

⁷³ Ibid, p.119.

⁷⁴ Percy, *Mercenaries*, p.87.

⁷⁵ Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security: A Guide to the Issues*, p.25.

⁷⁶ Percy, *Mercenaries*, p.88.

⁷⁷ Geoffrey Parker, *The Thirty Years' War* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul plc, 1984), p.194.

⁷⁸ Spicer, *An Unorthodox Soldier, Peace War and the Sandline Affair*, p.32.

⁷⁹ Percy, *Mercenaries*, p.87.

was difficult when troops moved beyond the river system. This led to looting, which was severely punished by commanders.⁸⁰ The ineffectiveness of the governments that raised the armies led a protracted war. Once raised, armies could not be paid, controlled, or organised to achieve victory, perpetuating the war.⁸¹ It is the individuals who employed these armies who should be blamed for the length and conduct of the war,⁸² as much as the companies themselves. Parker is unaware of any forces raised without commission which were subsequently offered for hire - although on occasion they did switch sides.⁸³ The reliance of the companies on living off the land meant that they were only really effective when used for offensive purposes.⁸⁴

The precise impact of the Thirty Years War on Germany is unknown. Parker argues that much of what was originally recorded as population decline or economic destruction was due to population movement as civilians sought refuge from vulnerable villages to walled cities.⁸⁵ However, he argues that the Thirty Years' War was a devastating experience for the civilian population inside Germany, the population loss being proportionally higher than World War II.⁸⁶ The impact of the entrepreneur system was short lived, especially compared to the military organisations developed by the Danish, Swedes and French. Gustav Adolphus' system of public conscription was more effectively institutionalised and therefore survived following his death,⁸⁷ whereas the forces raised by entrepreneurs were integrated into standing armies because of the threat they posed.⁸⁸ Though even Adolphus was forced to rely on mercenary companies, with 4/5 of his forces coming from this source.⁸⁹

The end of the Thirty Years War marks one of the major junctures in the collection of force by the state. The use of mercenary armies had become unsustainable and damaged the German provinces economically the outcome of the thirty years was to lead to the establishment of standing peacetime armies.⁹⁰

⁸⁰ Parker, *The Thirty Years' War*, pp.197-200.

⁸¹ Ibid, p.222.

⁸² Ibid, p.556.

⁸³ Ibid, p.196.

⁸⁴ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p.29.

⁸⁵ Parker, *The Thirty Years' War*, pp.210-215.

⁸⁶ Ibid, p.215.

⁸⁷ McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power*, pp.122-3.

⁸⁸ Christopher Kinsey, *Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies* (London: Routledge, 2006), p.41.

⁸⁹ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (London: Fontana Press, 1988), p.83.

⁹⁰ Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1*, p.489.

The independence of these armies had reached a zenith with Maurice and Wallenstein, and declined after their deaths. The use of entrepreneurs continued after this point as a method of avoiding administrative reforms,⁹¹ but the threat posed by the colonels of these commercial forces had led to their integration into the state.⁹² By living off the land, their use fulfilled a short-term need for troops, but this was unsustainable as a long-term solution. The economic base of the country was damaged and the military separated from society. This compares to Italy where the condottieri formed an effective and sustainable relationship with the city states. The successful long-term use of mercenaries therefore depends upon how they become embedded within the existing state-societal structures. In the case of the Thirty Years War they were "...an expensive and temporary solution to a permanent problem."⁹³ However, the state has a degree of control, even where the relationship is detrimental.

4.6 The State and the Collection of Force

Following the Thirty Years War the state began to exert ownership over the forces that would execute force. By the late 18th century mercenary forces were being replaced by more organised armies which were better suited to the large scale warfare which dominated Europe. This period is associated not only with changing warfare, but also the development of the modern state; "the state made war and war made the state".⁹⁴ The formation of national armies was part of a long running process led by the French in the 15th century; while full of problems they proved more effective than their opponents.⁹⁵ Even though the use of CMSPs did not completely cease during this period, the emphasis shifted away from the use of commercial sources of force. Even Ortiz acknowledges that by the 19th century it was common practice that state forces were drawn from its citizens.⁹⁶

The collection of force by the state occurred over a number of years, but the use of citizen armies had become significant by the time of the Napoleonic Wars.⁹⁷ According to Keegan, the French Revolution "effectively killed

⁹¹ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p.28.

⁹² Percy, *Mercenaries*.

⁹³ Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security*, p.25.

⁹⁴ Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992).

⁹⁵ Urban, *Medieval Mercenaries*, p.290.

⁹⁶ Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security*, p.32.

⁹⁷ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p.29.

mercenarism".⁹⁸ There were two reasons for this shift. The first was military efficiency, as warfare shifted the emphasis away from well-trained troops to weight of numbers.⁹⁹ From an infrastructural point of view it had become inefficient to keep raising and disbanding military forces.¹⁰⁰ The second reason was a change in relationship between the state and its citizens which delegitimised the use of commercial force. It came to be expected that states would take responsibility for the actions of their citizens.¹⁰¹ The destabilising impact posed by out of work soldiers was beginning to be addressed, such as dealing with the release of personnel that would occur at the end of major conflicts. The foundation of the French Foreign Legion was to deal with stateless people after the Napoleonic Wars who were thought to be a threat to the state.¹⁰² This can be compared to the end of the Hundred Years War when such persons were left to sell their services. States also began to make use of foreign troops by more effectively integrating them into their own forces, such as the use of Gurkhas by the British.¹⁰³

Despite the collection of force by the state commercial military enterprises continued to be used. Some were militaries which had become disassociated from their own states, while some states continued to hire out their forces. This was in part due to the economic liberalism of the 19th century,¹⁰⁴ but also down to necessity. The British employed Hessian mercenaries during the American War of Independence; to overcome an insufficient number of British troops. However their use proved to be unsuccessful in retaining control of the colonies, with lack of commitment to defeating the American forces being blamed.¹⁰⁵ But their use was becoming the exception, with many countries turning towards citizen armies.¹⁰⁶

Ortiz's argument relies on the significance of the continued use of commercial forces during this period. While correct that there was continuity, the shift which occurred in the relationship between state, society and the use of force is more significant. An increase in the infrastructural power of the state, and changes in the scale of warfare meant that it was more efficient for states to

⁹⁸ Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, p.357.

⁹⁹ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p.29.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, p.30.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, p.31.

¹⁰² Spicer, *An Unorthodox Soldier, Peace War and the Sandline Affair*, p.34.

¹⁰³ Ibid, p.34.

¹⁰⁴ Shearer, *Private Armies and Military Intervention*, p.14.

¹⁰⁵ Lanning, *Mercenaries*, p.85.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, p.86.

directly raise and operate their own forces. This was even to the extent that the state was trying to find institutional ways of dealing with disbanded troops at the end of large conflicts, beyond moving them on to be someone else's problem.

4.7 The Commercial Use of Force in the 20th Century

The 20th century witnessed the largest conflicts in human history, with the power of the state as a war-making structure at its peak. World War II in particular demonstrated how devastating warfare had become as entire populations were mobilised. The Cold War required the continuation of the state as a monopoliser to continue to dominate the use of force. But there are two forms of non-state force which emerged after 1945. The first is the ad hoc use of mercenaries, which goes back to the individual out of work soldier. The second, and more significant was that the genesis of the companies which have formed the commercial market since the end of the Cold War was already underway.

The first modern companies appeared after World War II. The outbreak of peace resulted in wide scale demobilisation, as a consequence a number of ex-servicemen sought further employment with the skills they had learnt. . David Sterling, who had established the SAS during WW2, was to set up one of the first modern CMSPs after the end of the war using personnel he served with. This is a familiar trend, but helps to set the tone for the end of the Cold War, if a state releases personnel they are likely to use the skills developed on a commercial basis. CMSPs are one way of doing this.

The process of decolonisation created the demand and opportunity in the 1960s for a number of Western individuals to become involved in several African conflicts, primarily what was at the time the Belgian Congo. Characters like Mike Hoare, Bob Denard and Jean Schramme became infamous as various mercenary leaders offered their services in 1960, 1964 and finally 1967. Much of the poor reputation of modern mercenaries stems from the actions of these individuals. They are seen as having acted purely for profit, and often against the interests of the populations of the states they operated in.¹⁰⁷ Spicer argues that despite the poor reputation attached to them after their activities, they did prevent the situation from worsening.¹⁰⁸

More damaging was the activity of a small group of mercenaries who became involved in the Angolan Civil War between the Marxists and the

¹⁰⁷ Spicer, *An Unorthodox Soldier*, p.35.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, p.36.

National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) which had developed after the withdrawal of the Portuguese. These were effectively a group of thugs led by Costas Georgiou, which Spicer argues did much to damage the reputation of the mercenary.¹⁰⁹ More significantly the activity of these individuals spread to the implication in the overthrowing, or attempts to overthrow, legitimate governments. This included: Hoare in the Seychelles in 1977 and 1982 and Denard in the Comoros Islands in 1975, 1978 and 1995. In 1995 Denard was removed, or just as likely rescued, by the French government.

Spicer believes that these events resulted in the belief that a small group of well-trained, white, soldiers could make a difference in African Wars. This led to the involvement of what he calls excitement-seeking thugs – different from his version of the traditional mercenary.¹¹⁰ Shearer views the negative perception of mercenaries in the context of World War I and II where the sheer scale of the destruction meant that outside of the state structure it was considered to be inappropriate, particularly in the pursuit of profit during civil wars.¹¹¹

4.8 The Growth of the Sector after the end of the Cold War

The development and role of CMSPs since the end of the Cold War is a continuation of the interaction between supply and demand dynamics. Two events are significant in shaping the commercial military sector since the end of the Cold War. First, the end of the Cold War, which radically reshaped the structure of the international system, the nature of perceived security threats and the priorities of major actors. Second, the September 11th 2001 attack on the World Trade Centre, which again shifted security priorities and led to the US led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as part of a 'War on Terror'. The end of the Cold War is the more significant of these two events and established contemporary commercial military service providers as legitimate actors, thus they were seen as a way of fulfilling the demands created by the 'War on Terror' after 2001.

The end of the Cold War precipitated the rise of companies providing military services as major actors during the 1990s. Although some of these companies had been operational since the 1970s their use has been more evident since the 1990s.¹¹² South African, British and American companies were

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, p.37.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, pp.37-38.

¹¹¹ Shearer, *Private Armies and Military Intervention*, p.14.

¹¹² Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security*, p.5.

able to benefit from a number of demand and supply factors. Executive Outcomes became one of the most (in)famous companies of this period for its role in Angola and Sierra Leone. Sandline International intervened in Sierra Leone and Papua New Guinea. Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) began training the Croatian army in 1994, although denying it played a direct role in Operation Storm, MPRI is credited with much of the Croatian forces subsequent success.¹¹³ DynCorp was involved in Colombia as the US tried to support the war against the drugs trade.¹¹⁴ The use of CMSPs was considered during the Rwandan genocide in 1994.¹¹⁵ The implications of the increase in the use of CMSPs was sufficient to cause concern among a number of states, leading the UN to appoint Enrique Ballesteros as a Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries.

The end of the Cold War increased demand for CMSPs in a number of ways. It quickly became apparent that the initial optimism of writers such as Fukuyama, who asked whether Capitalism's victory over Communism would result in the 'end of history';¹¹⁶ was simplistic. Instead, global politics had become more complicated and unstable, while the dragon was no longer a threat, a variety of poisonous snakes now posed a threat.¹¹⁷ Conflicts which had been frozen began to thaw and proxy wars were abandoned. The old security blocks weakened, domestic regimes collapsed and several states broke up. The result of these changes destabilised a number of regions including the Balkans, parts of Africa, South Asia, the Middle East and South America. The outcome was a number of potential markets for CMSPs.¹¹⁸

Not only did the end of the Cold War fail to bring widespread peace, but there were suggestions of a shift in the nature of the conflict. Instead of inter-state warfare, civil wars seemed to be the new threat to international security in which economics drove fighting.¹¹⁹ Although overemphasis on the frequency and 'newness' of these 'New Wars' has rightly been criticised, there is no doubt

¹¹³ Shearer, *Private Armies and Military Intervention*, p.59.

¹¹⁴ Use of DynCorp in Colombia.

¹¹⁵ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p.185.

¹¹⁶ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Pinguin Books, 1993).

¹¹⁷ Douglas F. Garthoff, *Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community 1946-2005*, (Washington DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005) <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/directors-of-central-intelligence-as-leaders-of-the-u-s-intelligence-community/chapter_12.htm#_ftn1> [accessed 1 March 2008]

¹¹⁸ Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*, pp.50-51.

¹¹⁹ Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004).

that a number of wars occurred within failed and failing states. These involved a range of actors, and broke down the boundary between what had become perceived as conventional warfare and criminality. Non-state actors were seen to be taking an increasing role, with the international community failing to control them.¹²⁰

The involvement of CMSPs in the chaotic security environment which emerged was increased by the mixed involvement of other actors. The major powers of the Cold War had seen its end as an opportunity to the scale back on national armies.¹²¹ Many governments reduced their commitments and were now reluctant to get involved in the distant conflicts which posed no direct threat to their security. An early enthusiasm for peacekeeping was soon derailed by an aversion to casualties; armies designed for war fighting, not policing.¹²² The circumstances surrounding the death of 13 US soldiers in Mogadishu in 1993, and the subsequent deterioration of public support are indicative of the difficulty of becoming involved in complex civil wars. The reluctance of western governments also impacted on the capabilities of the UN, which relied upon states loaning troops, and resulting in the international community's torpor during the Rwandan massacres of 1994.¹²³

The more circumspect approach to distant conflicts adopted by the major powers created an opportunity for regional responses. However, unwillingness, animosity and opportunism meant that regional organisations failed to provide an adequate resolution to failing states. These problems can be seen in several of the case studies covered in this thesis: Australia, the nearest regional power, declined to intervene in Papua New Guinea; Liberia encouraged the collapse of Sierra Leone into civil war in order to exploit natural resources; and Pakistan has received criticism for colluding with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Where intervention has been undertaken it can be of questionable quality; with developing regions suffering from decaying state armed forces caused by a lack of funding, training, disease and corruption.¹²⁴ Troop contributions are often made to UN peacekeeping operations in order to save a state money, or keep unreliable troops away from where they can cause damage. These problems have undermined a number interventions; for example Sierra Leone, where the

¹²⁰ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, pp.51-52.

¹²¹ Shearer, *Private Armies and Military Intervention*, p.27.

¹²² Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p.58.

¹²³ Shearer, *Private Armies and Military Intervention*, p.33.

¹²⁴ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, pp.56-57.

OAU proved to be ineffective, and peacekeeping troops often exacerbated the criminality which was occurring within the state.¹²⁵

The post-Cold War world thus fostered an environment in which CMSPs became a serious option for states, Multi-national Corporations (MNCs), NGOs and even Inter-Governmental Organisations (IGOs). Instability within a number of states was exacerbated by the unwillingness of major powers, who were now ill-equipped, to act. International organisations were too reliant upon these same major states, which left a patchwork of unreliable local responses. The significance of this period also lies in the supply side factors, which increased the ability of CMSPs to react to these opportunities by expanding the scale and scope of their operations.

The release of well-trained personnel at the end of the Cold War did not just weaken the major powers, it also made available a great deal of experience and expertise for anyone willing to employ them.¹²⁶ Like soldiers from generations before they found themselves with a specialised skill set, which had few comparable civilian alternatives. CMSPs were thus able to draw upon a large number of ex-soldiers who had been expensively trained with a range of specialised skills. The end of apartheid in South Africa and the collapse of white rule in Rhodesia also stimulated this trend, though on a more regional level. Ex-South African Defence Force Troops (SADF) with years of experience fighting in places like Angola formed EO and soon found themselves returning.

It was not only personnel which became available on the open market. Huge stockpiles of conventional weapons which had been built up over the previous half-century were now redundant. As the Soviet Union retreated across Eastern Europe these stockpiles were exploited - the consequence of weak states and corrupt officials was a golden age for arms dealers such as Victor Bout.¹²⁷ The sheer scale and range of hardware was staggering. While conventional weapons were rightly seen as huge threat in the developing world, fuelling instability,¹²⁸ a number of non-states groups, along with CMSPs were able to equip themselves with a range of equipment.¹²⁹ Some CMSPs were able

¹²⁵ David M. Malone and Ramesh Thakur, 'UN Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned?', *Global Governance*, 7 (2001), pp.11-17.

¹²⁶ Shearer, *Private Armies and Military Intervention*, pp.126-129.

¹²⁷ Douglas Farah and Stephen Braun, *Merchant of Death: Money, Guns, Planes, and the Man Who Makes War Possible* (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2007).

¹²⁸ William D. Hartung, 'The New Business of War: Small Arms and the Proliferation of Conflict', *Ethics and International Affairs*, 15 (1) (2006), p.90.

¹²⁹ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, pp.53-55.

to field forces with all the trappings of modern armies, including air support. For example, Executive Outcomes was able to make use of ex-Soviet Hinds in Sierra Leone.¹³⁰

Towards the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 20th century some states began to tighten control over the use of the companies. South Africa, unhappy with the reputation its citizens were gaining, enacted anti-mercenary laws which effectively shut down Executive Outcomes.¹³¹ Sandline came into conflict with the UK government over the supply of arms to Sierra Leone,¹³² and began to consider the issue of regulation with a government Green Paper.¹³³ However, a second event was to shape the CMSP sector for the next decade. The attack on the World Trade Centre on September 11th 2001 set in process an aggressive foreign policy by the US which renewed focus on security. Underpinned by a neoliberal approach to economics and state building,¹³⁴ firms such as Halliburton became a fundamental part of the events that followed.¹³⁵ This boom has been primarily demand driven, but is significant enough for it to become self-sustaining.

The invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 placed a huge strain on US and coalition forces. This was exacerbated by the limited coalition which resulted from the failure of the US to garner wider international support for the invasion of Iraq. The scale of the reliance on the commercial provision of services to support the military can be seen in the changing ratio of contractors to soldiers. During the Gulf war in 1991 there was on average 1 contractor for every 100 soldiers; following the Second Gulf War, by 2006 there was 1 contractor to every 10 soldiers.¹³⁶ Singer has drawn parallels between the private security sector after 9/11 and the 'internet boom' of the late 1990s. Economic conditions led to the decline of other industries in the US, however companies within the security sector increased in value by an average of 50%, while some doubled or even tripled.¹³⁷ For reasons covered in the introduction

¹³⁰ Shearer, *Private Armies and Military Intervention*, p.54.

¹³¹ Sarah Percy, *Regulating the Private Security Industry*, Adelphi Paper, 384 vols (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), pp.30-31.

¹³² Spicer, *An Unorthodox Soldier, Peace War and the Sandline Affair*, pp.203-223.

¹³³ House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, *Private Military Companies*, Ninth Report of Session vols (London: The Stationary Office Limited, 2001-2).

¹³⁴ Naomi Klein, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*, 2nd edn (London: Penguin, 2008), p.13.

¹³⁵ Pratap Chatterjee, *Halliburton's Army: How a Well Connected Texas Oil Company Revolutionized He Way America Makes War* (New York: Nation Books, 2009).

¹³⁶ *Shadow Company* [film].

¹³⁷ Interview with Singer in Ibid.

the statistics assembled by academics and journalists to quantify the use of CMSPs are unreliable, however they are illustrative of the scale of the sector. In 2005 it is estimated that 1.5 million people were employed by CMSPs; another 1.5 million worked in a form of the more traditional mercenary, half of those again being child soldiers. The turnover of the industry at this time estimated at \$300 billion.¹³⁸

Although Iraq and Afghanistan were the main sources of the boom, they are far from the only source of CMSP employment, by 2006 companies were operating in over 50 countries, with an annual revenue of \$100 billion per year.¹³⁹ The websites of CMSPs normally indicate head offices in multiple locations across the globe, with diverse lists of current and past operations. According to Singer the continued decline of local state governance and reversal of the growth of the state shapes the security environment in much of the developing world.¹⁴⁰ Proponents of-globalisation often overstate the impact on the state, there is a strong argument that a number of already weak states are struggling to maintain a claim to the monopoly over the legitimate use of force.

The scale of demand and the potential profits has driven the expansion of the private sector in order to fulfil security contracts, impacting on the supply side. Instead of being fed by major states slimming down their armed forces, state armed forces are losing key members of special forces outfits to companies before retirement. Special Forces units in the UK and US have struggled with shortages of recruits as extensively and expensively trained soldiers found their skills to be highly profitable when offered commercially. Leading to fear of a 'brawn drain'.¹⁴¹ This cycle is theoretically self-perpetuating as it encourages further use of CMSPs to make up the shortfall. Lower paid international and local workers also form a significant portion of the sector, though the reliability to these employees is often questioned.¹⁴²

As western involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan begins to wind down questions have been posed as to the future role of CMSPs. For the moment there appears to be several sources of continued demand to sustain them. A number of other markets have emerged, such as the protection of merchant

¹³⁸ Interview with Singer in *ibid*.

¹³⁹ Interview with Singer in *ibid*.

¹⁴⁰ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, pp.55-56.

¹⁴¹ Thomas Harding, 'British Armed Forces Staff Shortages Crisis', *The Telegraph*, 27 August 2007 <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1561419/British-Armed-Forces-staff-shortage-crisis.html>> [accessed 4 July 2013].

¹⁴² Capt. James Ashcroft, *Making a Killing: The Explosive Story of a Hired Gun in Iraq* (London: Virgin Books Ltd, 2005).

shipping from pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden.¹⁴³ Western governments have continued to rely on their services. The shrinking defence budgets of western states following the financial crash of 2008 will likely continue to stimulate demand for CMSPs by reducing the capabilities of the remaining forces and supply by releasing more personnel onto the market.¹⁴⁴ Future interventions are likely to be more reliant upon CMSPs. The UN expects that demand for private security, including CMSPs, will continue to increase.¹⁴⁵ MNCs will also have continued reason to use them. Nigeria is a lucrative source of oil for several western companies, but dangerous for its workers. Recent attacks in Algeria indicate that the revolutions of the Arab Spring have made neighbouring states more dangerous.

4.9 Conclusion

Historically, political elites have purchased military expertise, to expand the state's capabilities beyond those which could be raised from their own populations alone. The near constant warfare which afflicted Europe created both the need for military capability; and at the end of each conflict a supply of unemployed soldiers which could fulfil this role. Commercial forces were employed as long as they served this purpose. The emergence of a different style of warfare made the use of massive armies more effective and drove the centralisation of force by the state. This did not completely remove mercenaries from the battlefield, expediency kept mercenaries employed in more limited roles during the 19th and early 20th century, but at a reduced level. The end of the Cold War and the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan facilitated the increased use of CMSPs, to the point that more contractors were operating in Iraq than soldiers working for national militaries.

In some ways Ortiz is correct, there is greater continuity in the current market than is often acknowledged; commercial sources of force have been employed throughout history. But his argument is overstated, there was a clear

¹⁴³ Trevor Timpson, 'Pirate Threat 'Means More Armed Guards on UK Ships', 13 March 2012 <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-17112342>> [accessed 13 March 2012].

¹⁴⁴ James Kirkup, 'British Army Forced to Rely on Foreigners and Contractors', *The Telegraph*, 7 June 2012 <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9315166/British-Army-forced-to-rely-on-foreigners-and-contractors.html>> [accessed 3 March 2013].

¹⁴⁵ Associated Press, 'UN Mercenary Report: Private Security on Track to be a \$244 Billion Growth Business by 2016,' *The Washington Post*, 4th November 2013 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/un-mercenary-report-private-security-on-track-to-be-244-billion-growth-business-by-2016/2013/11/04/b925ef6a-4597-11e3-95a9-3f15b5618ba8_story.html> [accessed 4th November 2013].

shift in the towards states developing and running their own forces. A more pertinent question is whether this represents a long short, medium, or long-term change in the trend towards the provision of force. It seems unlikely that the burden of warfare will shift. Much as Thompson argues that the state collected force in order to suit its needs, the state can also relinquish the execution of force to other actors.

The implication of the historical use of mercenaries for the research questions is that they are indicative of a state which is less embedded in society.¹⁴⁶ In the compromise between political-social integration and military pragmatism, mercenary use has occurred when citizen armies have become less effective.¹⁴⁷ The use of mercenary forces is often associated with negative connotations; that mercenaries are out of control and prone to behaving recklessly, damaging and alienating local populations. As a consequence CMSPs have proved that historically they are not always a panacea. But, culpability also needs to be attached to their employers. Rarely are the companies completely out of control, in most of the examples the state has been able to exert at least some form of control.

Keegan argues that it is possible to make effective use of mercenaries within a well regulated market.¹⁴⁸ Militia rely upon a class that are tied to the state by property and conscription is unsuitable where arming subjects would leave the state vulnerable to being overthrown.¹⁴⁹ There are parallels here which can be drawn with the use of CMSPs in the case studies; comparing the relationships between networks which are affected by the use of commercial military service providers. Such as in Italy, when the recycling of money from the companies to the citizens within the country created a sustainable relationship. The question over the use of CMSPs in the case studies is whether they created sustainable relationships in the state's power networks. Or, whether they damaged these relationships and drain power away from the state.

¹⁴⁶ Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume I*, p.163.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, p.228.

¹⁴⁸ Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, p.231.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, p.233.

Chapter 5

The Sierra Leone Civil War

"I believe without diamonds this country couldn't have been in this state of exploitation and degradation"

Desmond Luke¹

5.1 Introduction

The Sierra Leone civil war, which ravaged the country between 1991 and 2002, is an important example of CMSP activity in the 1990s. Although CMSPs were involved in numerous conflicts during the decade, Sierra Leone is significant because of the social, political, military and economic roots to the origins and perpetuation of the war. It was part of a wider conflict in West Africa which drew in neighbouring states, regional organisations, the UN and Britain. A number of CMSPs were employed by various parties during the war. Although smaller companies were used by mining companies to protect their interests, these did not play a strategically significant role. Instead, it is the contracts directly with state actors which are of concern here, in particular the use of Executive Outcomes (EO) and Sandline International. Two companies which are widely viewed as archetypal military companies in this period.

This chapter will consider the implications of CMSP activity on the relationship between the sources of social power across the networks - how their use affected the agency of the state in relation to other actors, what the implications were for the relationship between state and society, how this affected the progression and outcome of the civil war and whether this was to the detriment of the long term development of the state. There is a dichotomy between approaches to the civil war. One approach sees a political-economic conflict in which sub-state, and regional actors sought to profit from the breakdown of the state. Alternatively, the social issues have been cited as the cause of the war, with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) representing popular dissatisfaction with the political elite. Of these scenarios the first credits

¹ Martin Meredith, *The State of Africa* (London: Free Press, 2006) pp. 566-7.

CMSPs with a more significant and positive role. It will be argued here that the war was a complex combination of both. Although the war was the immediate outcome of the political-economic breakdown of the state, some of the symptoms of which could be dealt with by purchasing military services. However, a longer lasting peace required deeper issues, which underpinned the dysfunction of the state, to begin to be addressed. CMSPs therefore have a mixed impact on the state in Sierra Leone. They gave short-term breathing room to the state, and at least acted in the interest of the government, unlike the regional actors. But, their use was still vulnerable to other, stronger actors. More problematically CMSP could not leverage the government to remedy the deeper problems of the legitimacy of the state and its degree of embeddedness within society. Although these deeper issues are yet to be addressed, a credible move towards peace was only achieved when Britain and the UN became substantially involved, addressing problems which were a legacy of the colonial experience and the process of independence.

As with each case study, to answer these questions the chapter will be divided into three sections: (1) A chronology of events; (2) Analysis of the interaction of the four sources of social power across the networks; and finally, (3) The impact of CMSPs on the state. The overview of the civil war in the first section of this chapter is split into four parts, by involvement of CMSPs. First the background and early part of the war; second, the involvement of EO; third, Sandline; and finally the ending of the war. Accounting for the root causes, progression and closure of the civil war is also important in placing the role of CMSPs in context. Otherwise, there is a danger of overstating the importance of CMSPs on the course of the war. Doing so will focus on the role CMSPs played during the war, but place them in the context of the other events and actors, allowing a full range of factors to be considered in sections two and three.

The second section of the chapter will place these events and actors in the analytical framework established in chapter three. Firstly it will examine the interaction between the various sources of social power across the networks. How local, state, regional and international actors acted as a dynamic in the conflict. The actors will be grouped into the different networks of the modified IEMP model; at local, national, trans-national, international, and global levels. And the sources of social power within them. Then the sources of social power and how they crystallised. It will be shown that CMSPs were one of the more

reliable military actors, but that the purely military focus again meant they were limited. Only the UN and Britain were able to bring in other institutions which dealt with wider aspects of the war. It will be shown how the use of CMSPs, although with some detrimental side effects, was of a short-term military benefit to the stability in Sierra Leone. Although CMSPs did not end the war, the prospects faced by the state by not outsourcing some military functions would have been far bleaker.

Finally the third section of the chapter will consider the impact on the state as per the definition in chapter three. It will be argued that there was some short-term strengthening of the state as CMSPs became involved. But this did not improve the long-term stability of the state. By fragmenting the institutions of the state it also caused weakness. An interesting hypothetical question remains as to what would have happened if Sandline and Executive Outcomes had been allowed to remain in the country and their contracts fulfilled. It is likely that the military situation would have improved in the short to medium term. But in the long-term the dysfunctional military-political, and social-political relationship would have persisted, perpetuating the societal schisms.

5.2 Chronology

The chronology of the war is split into four parts, around the involvement of Executive Outcomes and Sandline International. The first part is a brief history of Sierra Leone up to the involvement of EO, including the beginning of the civil war and its progression. This will address the root causes of the civil war which are key to understanding why it was so difficult to resolve. The CMSPs which preceded EO and Sandline will also be covered here due to their minor role in comparison to the two main companies.

Part two will deal with the progress of the civil war during the period EO was contracted by the government. This will include the events directly leading to the company's employment, through to the ramifications of the contract's cancellation. From which it will be argued that there was merit to the short-term military role of the company in providing security from the RUF, particularly when faced with a lack of other military options. However, what the contract did not do was address any of the underlying instability within the state. As such, when the military presence was removed the security situation deteriorated.




Fig 5.1² Map of Sierra Leone

² UN, 'Map of Sierra Leone,' <<http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/sierrale.pdf>>

Part three will cover the role of Sandline International. There are two elements to the story of Sandline: (1) Their involvement in the security situation in Sierra Leone; where it is debated how much of an impact Sandline was able to make in the time it was involved. (2) Their involvement and the resulting scandal that they became embroiled in back in the UK. The 'Arms-to-Africa Affair' is of interest as Sandline was operating as an extension of UK foreign policy, with disputed knowledge of those in government.

The final part of this section will deal with the final stages of the war up to the 2002 ceasefire and the subsequent reconstruction. This will involve an overview of the various actors who became involved in operations after Sandline's involvement. This will bring the war up to date with proposed elections for 2007, despite the continued presence of the UN in the country.

5.2.1 Background

Sierra Leone lies on the west coast of Africa, sharing land borders with Guinea to the north and Liberia to the south east, it is 71,750 square km in size.³ The capital, Freetown, is on the west coast. The country has a number of valuable natural resources which included rich forests, alluvial diamonds,⁴ bauxite and rutile.⁵ The key mining areas are Kono (in the East), the Tongo concessions and Zimmi fields (the south).⁶ Around the time of the war the population of 4.4 million was split between thirteen ethnic groups, the main two groups being the Mende in the south and the Temne in the North.⁷

The recent history of Sierra Leone begins with the founding of Freetown, in 1787. The city was founded for black veterans of the American War of Independence, who had supported the British. Britain began the formal colonisation of Sierra Leone in 1808 and the country became an official protectorate in 1896. Sierra Leone became an important staging post for Britain's access to other parts of the Empire.⁸ Rule through this period, apart from some antagonism between the indigenous population and the incoming

[accessed 4 April 2008]

³ CIA, 'Sierra Leone,' *The World Fact Book* <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sl.html>> [accessed 5 August 2013].

⁴ Diamonds which are found on the surface, rather than mined.

⁵ Used to make titanium

⁶ Abdel-Fatau Musah and Kayode J. Fayemi, *Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma* (London: Pluto Press, 2000), p.78.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Andrew M. Dorman, *Blair's Successful War* (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009), p.34.

Creole, is generally seen as peaceful. However, rule through informal structures outside the state established a pattern of paternalism. There began to emerge a shadow state, where the power of officials came from their control of the market. The shadow state was expanded through the colonial period, even during periods when state authority was increased.⁹

The process of independence from British rule began in the 1950s and was secured by 1961. The first government was formed under the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), and led by the Margai brothers. They were accused of corruption, favouring the Mende and attempting to establish a one party state.¹⁰ The Margai brothers continued the expansion of the shadow economy to maintain their popularity.¹¹ Elections were held in 1967 where the All People's Congress (APC) led by Shiaka Stevens was successful. A coup delayed the transfer of power and it was not until a counter coup in 1968 that Stevens could take office.

Stevens' term in office has been heavily criticised; many of the social, political, military and economic problems that have been linked to the civil war originate in this period.¹² Stevens managed a continuation of the shadow economy and ran the country as a one party state. He facilitated the exploitation of the country's natural resources by foreign companies,¹³ using a network of Lebanese dealers.¹⁴ The regime was heavily corrupt and concessions were used to secure loyalty, patrimonialism became deep rooted as a method of fostering and maintaining political control.¹⁵ State formation was designed as an instrument of repression. Stevens clamped down on opposition to his government and by 1973 Sierra Leone had become a 'de facto' one party state, five years later it was 'de jure'.¹⁶ The army was weakened and officers were vetted to ensure they supported the APC.¹⁷ This stifled opposition and alienated the military. At the beginning of his rule the diamond trade made up half of

⁹ William Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.3.

¹⁰ Dorman, *Blair's Successful War*, p.35.

¹¹ Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*, p.4.

¹² Dorman, *Blair's Successful War*, p.31.

¹³ Musah and Fayemi, *Mercenaries*, p.80.

¹⁴ Meredith, *The State of Africa*, p.562.

¹⁵ Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*.

¹⁶ Adekeye Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p.80.

¹⁷ Meredith, *The State of Africa*.

government revenue, but by 1985, after a period called the 'seventeen year plague of locusts', Sierra Leone was bankrupt.¹⁸

In 1985 Stevens stood down, and he passed control of the country over to a handpicked successor, Joseph Momoh. Momoh continued to pursue Steven's economic policies and a further \$300 million left the country. The lack of revenue led to the collapse of the education system and the creation of an alienated youth underclass, which were called 'rarray boys'. Civil servants ceased to be paid and they looted their offices. The declining economic and social conditions led to the emigration of the professional class.¹⁹ The abuses of power during this period are blamed for directly causing the civil war.²⁰

The civil war began on 23rd March 1991, when the RUF invaded Sierra Leone from Liberia. The RUF was led by Foday Sankoh, a photographer and ex-member of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who had previously been found guilty of leading an army revolt against the government over poor pay. They carried the rhetoric of revolutionary group struggling against the social failings of the government, but in reality they were trying to secure the Kono mines for themselves and Charles Taylor who had recently taken control of Liberia.²¹ By October 1992 the RUF had established bush camps and threatened the Kono mines.²² The RUF were initially popular, finding support from a population which had been alienated by the political elite over several decades. Recruits were found in the youth of the country, who felt the greatest disconnection from the government.²³

The government reacted to the invasion by tripling of the army to 14,000 troops, using 'rarray boys', prisoners and Liberian exiles to fill the ranks.²⁴ Local militias began to form and Nigeria and Guinea were approached for support. The endemic corruption continued as the military continued to be underpaid and was further alienated, while at the same time their commanders siphoned off pay and supplies.²⁵ In April 1992 the first successful coup of the civil war deposed Momoh, when Valentine Strasser led an army protest over rice rations. Strasser had not intended to seize power, but when Momoh fled in the face of

¹⁸ Ibid. p.562.

¹⁹ Ibid. p.562.

²⁰ Dorman, *Blair's Successful War*, p.36.

²¹ Meredith, *The State of Africa*, p.562.

²² Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau*.

²³ Dorman, *Blair's Successful War*, p.37.

²⁴ Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau*, p.84

²⁵ Meredith, *The State of Africa*, 564.

his protest he became president.²⁶ Strasser started with support and populist ambitions of reforming the country. But, like many of the leaders before him, soon became part of the country's corrupt political system. Income from the diamonds was channelled into his personal fortune, rather than the state.²⁷

Meanwhile, the RUF continued their advance, by 1994 they had overrun the bauxite and titanium mines, further reducing government income. The RUF to increase their resources. The displacement of Lebanese and Senegalese traders who had previously exploited the industry and Liberian facilitation of the sale of diamonds and purchase of vital supplies gave the RUF renewed impetus. By 1995 the RUF was in a position to attack Freetown.²⁸

The first CMSP to be used in Sierra Leone was by Strasser. The British company, Ghurkha Security Group (GSG) was employed between 1993 and 1995 in order to train the military. They met with little success. An RUF ambush in 1995 caused 20 casualties, including the commander whose body is alleged to have been cannibalised.²⁹ The military has been accused of tipping the RUF off. If true this is an indication of the resentment by the military of outside involvement. The ambush also illustrates the fragility of some of the companies. Avant argues that fear of conflicts of interest with British foreign policy meant that GSG limited the role it undertook, so contributed little to security in Sierra Leone.³⁰

5.2.2 Executive Outcomes

By 1995 the government was close to collapse. 1.5 million people had been displaced and over 15,000 killed.³¹ The RUF had achieved significant gains against the poor government forces. Freetown was about to fall and vital mines had been secured by the RUF. The government sought further support from the international community, but requests to the US, UN and UK were all rejected.³²

²⁶ Madeline Drohan, *Making A Killing: How Corporations use Armed Force to do Business* (Connecticut: The Lyons Press, 2003), p.218.

²⁷ Meredith, *The State of Africa*, p.565.

²⁸ Ibid. p.565.

²⁹ Peter W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*, 2nd edn (London: Cornell, 2008), p.112.

³⁰ Deborah Avant, *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.86.

³¹ Robert Mandel, *Armies without States: The Privatization of Security* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p.110.

³² Michael L. Lanning, *Mercenaries: Soldiers of Fortune, from Ancient Greece to today's Private Military Companies* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2005), p.184.

It was at this point that EO was contacted. EO was a South African CMSP, which had been formed in 1989 from members of the South African Defence Force (SADF), and by this point already been involved in the Angolan Civil War. EO has been linked with the Branch Energy, a company which had mining concessions in Sierra Leone. As a result of which it has been alleged that EO's services were paid for by mining rights.³³ It is said that payment was to be \$1.8 million per month, and a profit sharing scheme with concessions being granted to the Branch Energy (a company linked to EO).³⁴ There is still some debate as to this relationship, the complex nature of the group of companies making it difficult to verify.³⁵

EOs contract was based on 4 key objectives. It is important to remember these when evaluating the part played by EO, as this is what the government was paying it to achieve. The contract required EO to:

1. Secure Freetown.
2. To regain control of crucial resources.
3. To destroy the RUF headquarters.
4. Clear the remaining areas of RUF occupation.³⁶

EO set to work quickly, undertaking five major operations. These can be seen on the map in fig. 5.2.

Employing 170 soldiers and six aircraft EO secured its contractual objectives between May and October 1995. EO forces in the country were comparatively small, especially when considered alongside peak UN and Economic Community of West African States (ECOMOG) missions.³⁷ However they also made effective use of heavy equipment, including an MI-8 helicopter, and were supported by the kamajors.³⁸ EOs effectiveness has also been credited to their experience of low intensity warfare in Angola, and the use of

³³ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p.112.

³⁴ John L. Hirsch, *Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001). p.38-9.

³⁵ Drohan, *Making A Killing*, p.218.

³⁶ David Shearer, *Private Armies and Military Intervention, Adelphi Paper, 316 vols* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.49.

³⁷ Lanning, *Mercenaries*, p.185.

³⁸ Hirsch, *Sierra Leone*, p.39.

military intelligence.³⁹ The effect of these operations was significant. They made concerted attacks with the objective of holding ground, rather than hit and run attacks.⁴⁰ Canadian Brigadier General Ian Douglas “You have to stop violence before you start negotiations. EO did that in nine days. They literally stopped the war.”⁴¹




Fig 5.2⁴² Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone

³⁹ Shearer, *Private Armies and Military Intervention*, p. 54.

⁴⁰ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p.113.

⁴¹ Lanning, *Mercenaries*, p.185.

⁴² Shearer, *Private Armies and Military Intervention*, p.50

Pressure was placed on Strasser to hold elections to which he reluctantly agreed. But when he announced that he would stand for the presidency there was concern he would not relinquish power. A coup was staged by Gen Julius Maada Bio which removed Strasser. EO was not involved with the coup, but preferred working with Bio, over Strasser.⁴³ Despite his own ambitions for the presidency he permitted elections to go ahead.⁴⁴ Ahmed Tejan Kabbah won the election and was installed, but he was faced a bleak situation. The government had no money, few foreign states could be counted on as allies and the army was no better than the RUF.⁴⁵ EO continued to fulfil their contract and attacked the RUF, the pressure from which allowed negotiations. In talks facilitated by Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) a peace treaty was signed in Abidjan. However, part of the conditions instructed that the use EO had to cease. Further difficulties in arranging the finances to pay EO, including pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to reduce military expenditure, led to the cancellation of the contract with EO and they left the country.⁴⁶ EO, having already prevented two coup attempts, as they left made a famous prediction that Kabbah would only last 100 days.⁴⁷

Kabbah lasted 95 days before he was overthrown by a military led coup. In May 1997 Major Johnny Paul Koroma seized power. The prominence of the Kamajors as a security force was increased when they became further institutionalised by the state by their incorporation into a Civil Defence Force (CDF).⁴⁸ The army rebelled when they became aware that Kabbah's deputy defence minister was negotiating a contract with another CMSP to train the Kamajors.⁴⁹ Koroma cited grievances of the low status of the military and the preference the government had of using Kamajors over the army.⁵⁰ The coup was unpopular with ordinary citizens, who stopped work in protest.⁵¹ This did not stop Koroma, who seized Freetown and announced the formation of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the RUF was invited into Freetown. An initial deployment of Nigerian as part of an ECOMOG force, but

⁴³ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p.114.

⁴⁴ Meredith, *The State of Africa*, p.566.

⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 565

⁴⁶ Hirsch, *Sierra Leone*, p.39.

⁴⁷ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p.114.

⁴⁸ Avant, *The Market for Force*, p.92.

⁴⁹ Drohan, *Making A Killing*.

⁵⁰ Meredith, *The State of Africa*, p.569.

⁵¹ Drohan, *Making A Killing*, p.220.

this was unpopular with the now exiled Kabbah.⁵² They were attacked by the AFRC and RUF, and a peace settlement was negotiated. This led to looting and atrocities against the civilian population.⁵³ Britain and the US stepped in, but only to evacuate their own expatriates.⁵⁴ The military seized control of mining resources.⁵⁵

5.2.3 Sandline International

By 1998 the civil war had reached a low point. Freetown was now in the hands of the RUF and the military had taken over the government. ECOMOG forces, led by Nigeria, had been forced out of Freetown along with Kabbah. International pressure was placed on Koroma to allow the return of Kabbah. Britain used its position on the UN security council to draft resolution 1132, which imposed an embargo on the importation of weapons to the country and called for the restoration of Kabbah. However, Koroma resisted this pressure.⁵⁶ There were some clashes between Nigerian forces and the AFRC, RUF coalition. The peace between the AFRC and the RUF soon broke down, and the RUF began to pursue their own agenda again.

A deal was brokered between the exiled Kabbah and Sandline International to restore him to power. This involved Rakesh Saxena, a financier who wanted to invest in the growing mineral extraction industry in Africa, and Peter Penfold, the British ambassador to Sierra Leone. A number of questions have been asked about the role of Saxena, particularly his situation, motivation for restoring Kabbah, and the compensation for doing so. The course of events between these three which led to Sandline's involvement is also disputed, with each party providing their own interpretation of who approached who to broker the deal.⁵⁷ Despite these differences the arrangement seemed to suit all of the parties involved.

Kabbah appears to have agreed to the arrangement after considering the success achieved by EO.⁵⁸ There are several reasons why Sandline became involved. The company was already in the country in some form or another

⁵² Dorman, *Blair's Successful War*, p.40.

⁵³ Meredith, *The State of Africa*, p.569.

⁵⁴ Drohan, *Making A Killing*, p.221.

⁵⁵ Ibid, p.220.

⁵⁶ Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau*, p.88.

⁵⁷ Drohan, *Making A Killing*, pp.226-30.

⁵⁸ Dorman, *Blair's Successful War*, p.41.

through Lifeguard Security, Sandline also had an office in Freetown and were operating a helicopter in the north of the country.⁵⁹ It is also been alleged that Sandline was motivated to reinstall Kabbah because the government still owed EO for their final contract, with the AFRC refusing to complete the agreed upon payment plan. A number of sources argue there were close links between EO and Sandline, through the Branch Heritage Energy Group, and certain personnel such as Tony Buckingham. It must be noted that this relationship is strongly denied by Lt. Col. Tim Spicer.⁶⁰ The opportunity came at the perfect time for Spicer, after the company's last contract, with the government in Papua New Guinea, resulted in a military coup and Sandline being kicked out of the country.⁶¹

Plans were made for Sandline to support a Nigerian led ECOMOG force in restoring Kabbah, then train the Kamajors.⁶² In February 1998 there was a second battle for Freetown. This was a Nigerian led attack following the failure of talks with the military Junta, which resulted in it being abandoned by the AFRC and RUF. The significance of the role played by Sandline has been questioned. A cut in the budget of their operation from \$10 million, to \$1.5 million meant that they only had committed 12 troops and one helicopter, compared to 12,000 Nigerian troops. The supply of arms which was brokered with Kabbah only arrived in Lungi airport, which was under the control of Nigerian troops under ECOMOG, afterwards.⁶³ By March 1998 Kabbah had been returned to power and the deal with Saxena and Sandline had fallen apart.⁶⁴

Sandline International's involvement in Sierra Leone led to controversy in Britain. Problems then arose between Sandline International and the British government when a customs investigation was launched into the alleged breaking of Security Council Resolution 1132, which had been worded to prohibit the sale of arms to either side in the war. Sandline's contract involved the supply of arms which it was said was a breach of the sanctions. There was controversy over whether the arms embargo referred to all parties, or only the

⁵⁹ Lt Col. T Spicer, *An Unorthodox Soldier: Peace and war and the Sandline Affair* (Mainstream Publishing, London, 1999), pp.190-191.

⁶⁰ Spicer, *An Unorthodox Soldier, Peace War and the Sandline Affair*.

⁶¹ Drohan, *Making A Killing*, pp.231.

⁶² Hirsch, *Sierra Leone*, p.66.

⁶³ Drohan, *Making A Killing*, pp.238-9.

⁶⁴ Ibid. p.241.

RUF.⁶⁵ The customs investigation was later dropped due to poor chance of achieving prosecution. The decision to investigate has been criticised due to the ambiguity in the wording of embargo as implemented by Britain. Particularly as by supporting Kabbah, Sandline was following British policy.⁶⁶

The way in which Sandline became involved has come under much scrutiny and led to investigations by the UK government. Sandline claimed to have the approval of the British government, which was denied. However, it would appear that certain elements of the government were not only aware of what was happening, but helped to broker the deal. Peter Penfold the British High Commissioner in Sierra Leone was keen for Sandline to work with Kabbah. The Legg Report into the affair cleared the government of its role. This led to accusations of a cover up, it was argued that the government was attempting to bush the issue aside. However, a later independent investigation agreed with Legg.⁶⁷ Much of the criticism within the report was direct towards the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. though care was taken with Penfold due to high profile support by Tony Blair. The outcome of the report was that all sides have claimed this justifies their actions, except the FCO. Tony Blair was apparently pleased with the result as Kabbah had been restored. The main issue was with the failure to clear the affair by other MPs.⁶⁸

Kabbah was now back as president in Sierra Leone. However, the civil war was still ongoing and the arrangement had fallen apart between Sandline, Kabbah and Saxena. Drohan argues this was inevitable from early on as Saxena struggled to put up the finances required.⁶⁹ Spicer came away from the affair unhappy about the way Sandline was treated. A notice on the company's web site blames lack of governmental support for the closure of Sandline.⁷⁰

5.2.4 After EO and Sandline

After the return of Kabbah a UN observer mission was established (UNOSIL). Although the general population was happy to see Kabbah returned, he was still dependent upon Nigerian troops for security.⁷¹ Of more concern, so was

⁶⁵ John L. Hirsch, *Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy*, p.67

⁶⁶ Richard Connaughton, *A Brief History of Modern Warfare: The True Story of Conflict from the Falklands to Afghanistan* (London: Constable & Robinson Ltd., 2008).

⁶⁷ Drohan, *Making A Killing*.

⁶⁸ John Kampfner, *Blair's Wars* (London: Free Press, 2004).

⁶⁹ Drohan, *Making A Killing*, pp.236-41.

⁷⁰ Sandline International, <<http://www.sandline.com/>> [accessed 6 June 2007].

⁷¹ Kampfner, *Blair's Wars*, p.67-8.

UNOSIL.⁷² The RUF was still active and the country remained divided, with the Kono mines in the hands of the RUF.⁷³ The RUF attacked Freetown again in 1999, overrunning part of the city and resulting in between 5,000 and 6,000 deaths and nearly defeating the Nigerian forces. The defeat of the AFRC and RUF, along with Kabbah's return meant that it was possible to bring about a ceasefire in 1999. Sankoh was captured and stood trial for treason, where he was found guilty and sentenced to death.⁷⁴ Further talks occurred which led to the Lome Peace Accords. It has been argued that Kabbah was pushed into signing this by the international community.⁷⁵ The Lome Peace Agreement tentatively moved towards disarmament, with the RUF included in the government. Sankoh was released and given the post of vice-president. He was made minister of natural resources, which gave him control of the diamond mines over which the RUF had been fighting for control. However, this did not lead to an end of the war.

Nigeria decided to remove its contingent from the ECOMOG force in 1999, which passed the burden of security onto the UN. The UN reacted by increasing its observer mission from 300 soldiers to 6,000 in late 1999. The observer mission was replaced by UNAMSIL and a concerted effort was made at disarmament.⁷⁶ UN troops levels rose from 11,000 by 2000, then 17,500 in March 2001. Sierra Leone became the largest running UN mission and a concerted effort was made by the international community at securing peace.⁷⁷ However, the RUF was able to stage attacks, in 2000 500 peacekeepers being taken hostage. Reacting to the threat of another attack on Freetown, Britain began to offer financial and military support and allowed the UN forces to be bolstered. Public demonstrations were staged in Freetown, onto which Sankoh's bodyguards opened fire. Sankoh's compound was attacked and he was arrested.⁷⁸

As the intervention in Kosovo drew down and RUF troops again threatened Freetown, Britain became further involved. Operation Palliser was undertaken to evacuate expatriates. Next Britain moved from supporting the UN

⁷² Dorman, *Blair's Successful War*.

⁷³ Meredith, *The State of Africa*, p.571.

⁷⁴ Hirsch, *Sierra Leone*, pp.78-9.

⁷⁵ Dorman, *Blair's Successful War*, p.43.

⁷⁶ Ibid. p.48.

⁷⁷ Kampfner, *Blair's Wars*, pp.69-70.

⁷⁸ Meredith, *The State of Africa*, p.571.

to become the only stabilising force in the country.⁷⁹ Including a training program for the Sierra Leone military.⁸⁰ Britain's involvement deepened beyond the military support; by providing more money, aid and political support than any of the African states involved.⁸¹ A more robust response was required following the hostage taking of 11 British soldiers by a group called the West Side Boys. They were rescued, after some negotiations, by an attack on their camp by British forces. Interestingly - when it comes to looking at Blackwater employees being in the wrong place at the wrong time in Iraq - questions were raised as to what the captured troops had been doing.⁸² Following the British intervention the RUF fragmented and in November 2000 a ceasefire was signed.

In January 2002 Kabbah declared the war over. By that time 50,000 people had been killed, 20,000 maimed and 75% of the population had been displaced. Sierra Leone's had slipped to the bottom of the UN Human Development tables.⁸³ Elections were held on May 14th 2002 and nearly 2 million voted. With Sankoh in jail, disarmament was ongoing and there were expectations of peace..⁸⁴ In August 2003 Charles Taylor resigned and went to Nigeria. He was indicted for war crimes, and in 2012 at the Hague found guilty of being indirectly involved in the atrocities committed by the RUF. Though the judgement did not⁸⁵

As Sierra Leone now stands it is a poor, but improving country. Having been bypassed as the most failed state by the countries to be considered in the next two chapters. Its future is not certain, commentators continue to urge caution as the poor human development record persists,⁸⁶ but Sierra Leone is better placed for peace than at any time since 1991. Concerted efforts at disarming soldiers and militia on all sides have improved stability in the country, with the peaceful nature of the 2007 elections was taken as a positive development.⁸⁷ This does not mean that security companies have completely

⁷⁹ Kampfner, *Blair's Wars*, p.70.

⁸⁰ Drohan, *Making A Killing*, p.240.

⁸¹ Kampfner, *Blair's Wars*, p. 71.

⁸² Ibid, pp.71-2.

⁸³ Meredith, *The State of Africa*, p.572.

⁸⁴ The Economist, 'Soldiers of Mercy: Humanitarian Interventions can Work,' *The Economist*, 16th May 2002 <<http://www.economist.com/node/1131441>> [accessed 30 April 2008].

⁸⁵ Marlise Simmons, 'Ex-President of Liberia Aided War Crimes, Court Rules,' *New York Times*, 26 August 2012 <www.nytimes.com/2012/04/27/world/africa/charles-taylor-liberia-sierra-leone-war-crimes-court-verdict.html?_r=2&ref=global-home> [accessed 27 August 2012].

⁸⁶ Connaughton, *A Brief History of Modern Warfare*, p.291.

⁸⁷ Dorman, *Blair's Successful War*, p.32.

left the country. Their use has continued, though it is now smaller scale 'security' firms which are providing guards for mineral extractions companies.⁸⁸

5.3 Sources of Social Power across the Networks

The relationship between all four of the sources of social power led to the perpetuation of the civil war. However, political power sits at the centre.⁸⁹ Political corruption at the national level resulted in poor economic management that damaged the development of state institutions over several decades. Social alienation was an almost inevitable result of this mismanagement. The relationship between political and military groups within the state became dysfunctional with neither trusting the other. The short-term solution to the civil war was to stabilise the government by providing military support. While the long-term solution to the civil war lay in repairing the relationship between political-military and political-social. However, both were necessary, there were aspects to the war which required a military victory.

While division within the state formed a core part of the conflict, the war was exacerbated by transnational and international regional actors. The balance made between the capabilities of sub-regional peacekeeping, against the vested interests they bring.⁹⁰ Sub national actors took on some of the responsibilities that the state was no longer able to provide. These both contributed to security and aggravated tensions at a national level. Whereas, transnational actors across military, political and economic sources took power away from the state. The relationship with international actors was dependent upon the state involved. Some contributed to military, social and political power, while others sought to undermine them. Finally, at a global level some of the most constructive actions appeared, but often belatedly.

CMSPs therefore provided both a positive and negative contribution to the outcome of the war. They were able to provide effective military support, protecting the state from complete collapse at key moments. But, they exacerbated the longer term problems of the state, by further damaged the military-political relationship and removed the incentive to remedy the poor political-social relationship. Use of kamajors was an important part of EO's

⁸⁸ Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, *Security Beyond the State: Private Security in International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp.148-71

⁸⁹ Hirsh also places politics as the root cause of the conflict. Hirsch, *Sierra Leone*, p.18.

⁹⁰ Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau*, p.15.

strategy, each arguing that they would not have been successful without the other.⁹¹ Singer says the training of the kamajors created an independent force which complicated domestic politics.⁹² But this was a perpetuation of policies already pursued by the political elite.

5.3.1 National

At a national level it is difficult to look beyond the political misrule of the elected presidents as a source of instability. At independence Sierra Leone possessed a favourable political geography compared to many other African states, the relatively small size of the country suggested that the state would be able to maintain control.⁹³ However, the patrimonial system used by Stevens and Momoh and perpetuated by Kabbah and Strasser undermined this.⁹⁴ The outcome of their political misrule was poor economic development, a fractious relationship with the military and social alienation. The system of patronage led to a degree of ethnic tension as mistrust resulted from the favouring of different groups.⁹⁵

Easy access to a diamonds, along with metals such as bauxite and rutile, encouraged the reliance upon the few key natural resources.⁹⁶ Political elites allowed the decision to maintain a high value currency stifled the diversification of the economy. A 'shadow economy' emerged during Steven's rule and profits from diamonds helped to sustain the war.⁹⁷ The relationship between the poor economic conditions within the country and sympathy for the RUF cannot be ignored. Inequality between the elite of the country and the youth was fed by the way politics diverted revenue from diamonds into the hands of the elite.⁹⁸

The conduct of the war at a national level was overshadowed by the dysfunctional relationship between the SLA and the government. The SLA was to prove decisive at key points in the war, however for the wrong reasons. The military was prone to staging coups; Strasser, Bio and Momoh all came to power in this way. There were also numerous unsuccessful attempts; Kabbah survived

⁹¹ Shearer, *Private Armies and Military Intervention*, p.54.

⁹² Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p.113.

⁹³ Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp.154, 157.

⁹⁴ Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau*, p.79.

⁹⁵ Hirsch, *Sierra Leone*, p.28.

⁹⁶ Herbst, *States and Power in Africa*, p.159.

⁹⁷ Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau*, p.79

⁹⁸ Ibid. p.79.

three attempts in only the first 10 months after his election.⁹⁹ The military has also been accused of conspiring with the RUF. The alliance between the soldiers and rebels between 1997 and 1998 led to the coining of the term 'sobel'. Civilians were unable to distinguish between the two.¹⁰⁰ The military often proved to be just as hazardous to the local populous as the RUF and have been accused of various attacks on civilians and exploitation of the countries mineral resources. Danger that training the military would just make it more efficient at threatening the government.¹⁰¹

Due to the poor reputation of the military as being untrustworthy, the government and CMSPs preferred to use civil defence forces as the military. There is a strong argument that the use of CMSPs further alienated the military. Several of the coups started as protests over marginalisation as other military actors were used, poor equipment and low pay. This was a long running process of alienation which went back much further. The 1992 coup, long before the introduction of EO was the product of neglect felt by the military.¹⁰² The SLA struggled even after the dramatic expansion in 1992.¹⁰³ This is hardly surprising consider that they were recruited from prisons and the alienated youth.

How far did EO and Sandline interfere with the interaction between the sources of power at the national level? They propped up the elected governments, protected civilians in the areas they operated, and defended Freetown. The main element of the contract for EO was to defend Freetown, a task that was comfortably achieved. Sandline was employed to assist in the restoration of the Kabbah government and the recapture of Freetown. Retaining control of the administrative centre of the country was important as it was the basis for widening control.¹⁰⁴ Introducing a more reliable force into the country than the military strengthened the government against other political and military actors in the country. This was important as the weakness of the elected governments has been linked to brutalism to maintain their power.¹⁰⁵ However, it has been questioned how far the government was able to control EO,

⁹⁹ Ibid. p.85.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. p.79.

¹⁰¹ Connaughton, *A Brief History of Modern Warfare*, p.291.

¹⁰² Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau*, p.84.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Herbst, *States and Power in Africa*, p.159.

¹⁰⁵ Drohan, *Making A Killing*, p.219.

particularly when payment became problematic.¹⁰⁶ Their link to extraction companies meant that priority was towards their interests, rather than that of the government.¹⁰⁷ The use of EO resulted in the loss of some political power. When the links with extraction companies are assumed to be correct it meant a loss in control over economic entities.¹⁰⁸

5.3.2 Sub-National

At the sub-national level, the social and military sources of power influenced the course of the war. The failure of the government to either exercise control over, or secure the loyalty of the military led to the formation of the CDF. They were popular locally and used by the CMSPs because of the failures of the government troops. The kamajors were important to EO as they provided the bulk of the manpower.¹⁰⁹ But the use of CDFs by the state alienated the military, and has been directly attributed to several of the coups. There is also a question over the conduct of the CDF. EO claims credit for improving the conduct of the troops which came under their control, but this has been contested.¹¹⁰ The Kamajors have also been accused of acts of brutality.¹¹¹ The success of EO in the short term cannot be doubted. Supported by the kamajors and military, they were able to expel the RUF from key positions within the country. Arguably played an important role in bringing about the first set of peace talks in Abidjan. There was enough stability to allow the resettlement of a large number of refugees. EO proved to be popular on the whole, however their beneficial effects were geographically limited to the strategically important areas where they had been operating. However, it cannot be ignored that their use diffused the control of military power by the state.¹¹²

The second source of power, social, was directed against the government, the military, and the RUF. Civic society groups are credited with playing an important part in the civil war. Even going so far as to credit them with bringing about the end of the conflict, but their role should not be

¹⁰⁶ Avant, *The Market for Force*, p.90.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. p. 97.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. p.90.

¹⁰⁹ It has been argued that neither the Kamajors or EO could have registered such success without the help of each other.

¹¹⁰ Avant, *The Market for Force*, p.91.

¹¹¹ Kampfner, *Blair's Wars*, p.69.

¹¹² Abrahamsen and Williams, *Security Beyond the State*, p.171.

overstated.¹¹³ The Sierra Leone Women's Movement for Peace placed pressure on Bio to hold an election following the coup in 1996.¹¹⁴ However, the RUF failed to get support from the wider population within Sierra Leone, even in areas which had traditionally opposed the government.¹¹⁵ Following the attack on UN troops in 2000 civic groups came out to pose mass demonstrations involving 30,000 people. This led to the fleeing of Sankoh's bodyguards and the arrest of Sankoh.¹¹⁶ While there were some proactive elements to social activity, they function better as a barometer of the feelings of the general population towards other various groups within the country. This is a good indication of the relationship between social, and other sources of power, with the embeddness of the state in society important to long-term stability.

Sub-regional actors were reacting the failings of both the state and the RUF, and indicate the main issues which needed to be addressed to end the war. The military by increasing security, and social by improving the degree to which the state benefitted the population beyond the political elite. The use of power at a sub-state level moved power away from the national level. It is unfair to completely blame CMSPs. But the increased use of Kamajors by EO did further damage to relations between the government, and military and is cited as a reason for the 1997 coup which ousted Kabbah.¹¹⁷ The plans, which were being put in place before Abidjan, to implement security reforms and placed a heavy emphasis on the use of EO, were likely to lead to further alienation. But this was a policy which was also undertaken by the state, outside of contracts with CMSPs.

5.3.3 Transnational

The two main trans-national actors were the RUF and the network of private traders who facilitated the trade in diamonds. They worked within the military, economic and political sources of power, taking power away from the state. The private traders had worked on behalf of various parties since the British ran Sierra Leone as a colony and gave De Beers access to the mining areas. When these companies worked for the government they contributed to the political power of the government, but also to the shadow economy which facilitated the

¹¹³ Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau*, p.142-3.

¹¹⁴ Ibid. p.85.

¹¹⁵ Ibid. p.83.

¹¹⁶ Meredith, *The State of Africa*, p.571.

¹¹⁷ Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau*, p.87.

undermining the economic and social development of the state. These networks were displaced when the RUF took over the mining areas and traded them for arms from Liberia.

The characteristics of the RUF were mixed. A sympathetic interpretation of the RUF takes its rhetoric of disaffection with the government at face value. From this perspective the RUF was a form of opposition to the corruption in the Sierra Leone government. It claimed political aspirations, was comprised of personnel from Sierra Leone and acquired formal political power on several occasions. However, the actions of the RUF during the war undermine this claim. The RUF lacked a coherent ideology or political strategy, despite the anti-corruption rhetoric.¹¹⁸ Killings and mutilation of civilians meant that the RUF failed to mobilise popular support.¹¹⁹ It was also a military force that collaborated with Liberia to exploit Sierra Leone's natural resources and spread across a number of states causing wider problems for the region. Peace agreements were consistently ignored when they were no longer advantageous, the first subsequent acts were either atrocities against civilians or attacks on mining sites.

Although the RUF was not a coherent group,¹²⁰ which would have contributed to its mixed characteristics, the RUF should not be mistaken as a revolutionary movement with an extreme fringe. The organisation as a whole destabilised Sierra Leone and alienated any possible support by brutalising populations in RUF controlled areas. Even when given the opportunity to participate in government, and de facto control of the diamond mines, the RUF soon reverted back to arms. The conduct of the RUF during the war; with the use of mutilation, taking of slaves to mine for diamonds and 'recruitment' of child soldiers; gave them little popular appeal. The widespread civil protests at the behaviour of the RUF, which ultimately lead to the arrest of Sankoh, show how limited their wider support among the civilian population was. It is telling that in a country with such disaffection with the government the RUF failed to appeal to the wider population.

CMSPs were effective in displacing the RUF militarily. Where the RUF was more effective than EO and Sandline was in their political dealing with international and global actors. The RUF established themselves as more

¹¹⁸ Meredith, *The State of Africa*, p.564.

¹¹⁹ Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau*, p.83.

¹²⁰ Dorman, *Blair's Successful War*, p.55.

legitimate to a number of outside actors, thus they benefitted from political negotiations. Or, they were protected as a useful actor in keeping Sierra Leone weak, which benefitted several neighbouring states.

5.3.4 International

International actors affected the balance of power within the state by strengthening and weakening the military, political, economic and social sources of power. Although the root causes of the civil war originated from within Sierra Leone, it was another state which was responsible for initiating the bloodshed. During the war a number of regional and wider international states tried to manage the conflict, some to stabilise the conflict, others to exploit it in pursuit of their own interest political and economic interests. However, it was an international actor which took on a major role in bringing the conflict to an end.

Liberia, under Charles Taylor, was the primary negative external influence on the stability of Sierra Leone throughout the war. Herbst argues that the cause of Sierra Leone's degeneration 'into the category of failed state' resulted from the spread of the civil war from Liberia.¹²¹ Liberia did more than inadvertently spread conflict though, Charles Taylor is accused of using the RUF as a tool for his own pursuit of power in the region, with part of the initial invasion coming from Liberia. Taylor is alleged to have supported the RUF in order to have a friendly government in Sierra Leone.¹²² Taylor's support for the RUF stemmed from his own struggle for power in Liberia. He sought to exploit Sierra Leone's natural resources to fund his own regime, which facilitated the sale of diamonds and purchase of equipment by the RUF.¹²³ He also sought to punish Sierra Leone for allowing ECOMOG to base troops at Lungi airport, which had tried to prevent him from coming to power. To damage the work of ECOMOG in trying to resolve the Liberian civil war.¹²⁴

Nigeria took on the largest workload of the countries trying to stabilise Sierra Leone, with Nigerian troops forming the majority of the ECOMOG contingent. It was decision of Nigeria to withdraw these troops which forced the UN to increase its presence. Although Nigeria's involvement was primarily

¹²¹ Herbst, *States and Power in Africa*, p.159.

¹²² Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau*, p.82.

¹²³ Dorman, *Blair's Successful War*, p.38.

¹²⁴ *No War, No Peace: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts*, ed. by Paul Richards (Oxford: James Curry Ltd, 2005), p.4.

through ECOMOG, it is worth considering separately as a state-on-state relationship. There was mixed support for the contribution made by Nigerian troops; who were viewed either as heroes for fighting the RUF, or imperial occupiers.¹²⁵ Historically many Sierra Leoneans were suspicious of the reasons for Nigeria's intervention, which viewed itself as a regional hegemon.¹²⁶ Especially given the contradiction of a Nigerian dictator intervening to support a democracy.¹²⁷ Nigerian troops also seemed to fall into the trap of exploiting the Sierra Leone's natural resources and began illegal diamond mining by mid 1998.¹²⁸ Conversely, Nigeria felt that its role was under appreciated, especially compared to the credit Britain received.¹²⁹ They certainly made a major contribution to security in the country, protecting the government from the RUF and returning Kabbah to government, but this was on Nigeria's terms.

Apathy among the wider international community as to the plight of Sierra Leone has been blamed for prolonging the war. Especially compared to Kosovo, which prompted high profile airstrikes by NATO.¹³⁰ The US, often at the centre of major peacekeeping operations, only undertook limited military action in Sierra Leone. Following the overthrow of Kabbah in 1998 US forces intervened to evacuate ex-patriots from Freetown. However, following the experience of the US in Somalia there was no enthusiasm to offer military support to Kabbah's return. The US made some financial contribution towards the running costs of the UN missions, but there was a lack of self interest.¹³¹ This was certainly to the detriment of stability within Sierra Leone. The military capability which the US could have provided would have benefitted the government. Though the political implications for reaching a long-term settlement are less certain. An incident similar to that experienced by GSG may have prompted a Somalia like withdrawal. Either leaving the government suddenly lacking support, or being pressured into negotiations with the RUF. Neither outcome would have been helpful in the long-term.

Britain played the largest role of the non-ECOWAS states in ending the civil war. Using its position as a permanent member of the UN's Security

¹²⁵ Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau*, p. 95

¹²⁶ Ibid. p.24.

¹²⁷ Drohan, *Making A Killing*, p.221.

¹²⁸ Herbert Howe, *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Press, 2001), p.168.

¹²⁹ Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau*.

¹³⁰ Ibid, p.80.

¹³¹ Hirsch, *Sierra Leone*, p.102.

Council to pass resolution 1132 following Kabbah's overthrow. It was the unilateral military actions it undertook that were significant in stabilising the country. As the former colonial power Britain had the more interest in Sierra Leone than the US, or other EU states. However this intervention still followed almost a decade of inaction. It was only after Sandline's intervention had drawn the attention of the British public, and this inactivity was shown to contradict Blair's ethical foreign policy, that the government acted.¹³² There is a strong case that if this support had been given earlier then Sandline would not have been involved.¹³³

Blair, encouraged by the response of outgoing U.S President Bill Clinton, felt like he had singlehandedly stopped the civil war.¹³⁴ The early stages of Britain's intervention was not without problems, and lacked a coherent long-term strategy.¹³⁵ However, the overall outcome of the intervention has been described as Blair's most successful military intervention.¹³⁶ While Nigeria took on more commitments over a longer period of time, Britain's intervention was more proactive in bringing about an end to the conflict. Giving the UN a better foothold in the country than that left by the outgoing Nigerian forces. To the extent that some civilians would have liked Britain to return and run the country.¹³⁷

CMSPs gave the governments of Sierra Leone a way of moving away from the realist logic of international power politics, where the bonds created by social power were too weak to generate a response. They were able to resist Liberia's proxy attacks through the RUF and exploitation of economic resources. The companies were more representative of the interests of the governments who were paying them than some of the regional powers with vested interests, and they gave Sierra Leone an option when more impartial observers were unwilling to intervene. Britain came the closest to responding on social grounds, but this was only when Sandline's actions and confusion over approval contradicted Britain's ethical foreign policy. CMSPs were not as powerful as the other state actors they were leveraged out of the country by external actors exerting political power. Compared to the role of Nigeria in restoring however, Sandline's role was minor. Britain's military response has been credited with

¹³² Kampfner, *Blair's Wars*.

¹³³ Drohan, *Making A Killing*, p.240.

¹³⁴ Kampfner, *Blair's Wars*, p. 77.

¹³⁵ Dorman, *Blair's Successful War*, pp.84-5.

¹³⁶ Ibid, p.127.

¹³⁷ Connaughton, *A Brief History of Modern Warfare*, p.289.

providing the improvement in security, rather than CMSPs.¹³⁸ Though this only came after nearly a decade of disinterest.

5.3.5 Global

There are a limited number of truly global super-national organisations, of these the UN and IMF had a role in trying to stabilise Sierra Leone. This network will also include regional organisations which operated at a super-national level; in this case ECOWAS, and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).¹³⁹ These organisations altered the distribution of power during the civil war between political, military and most importantly social sources of power. However, divisions with these organisations, and the vested interests of some states undermined many of their efforts.

Looking first at the regional organisations, the AU took a role in negotiations, but was largely ineffective.¹⁴⁰ Whereas ECOWAS was much more involved at both a political and military level. This was inevitable considering the regional links to conflict which affected several states including Liberia and Guinea-Bissau. ECOWAS intervention had mixed results, although states like Nigeria brought specialist knowledge of the area they were also motivated by their own political self interest.¹⁴¹ As was covered above, Nigeria took on the majority of the military workload, but has faced criticism for bringing vested interests. As a whole, ECOMOG forces were poorly equipped, with a significant proportion of troops lacking the required equipment.¹⁴² To an extent military intervention helped, but it was imperfectly executed.

In trying to reach a political solution to the civil war, there were three main attempts at negotiated settlements; Abidjan, Conakry and Lome. All of which have been judged as failures.¹⁴³ Divisions within ECOWAS hampered efforts at making these peace agreements work.¹⁴⁴ The parties involved, even the supposedly impartial organisers, have been criticised for pursuing their own interests. The Ivory Coast had a substantial role in the Abidjan peace talks, but

¹³⁸ Avant, *The Market for Force*, p.98.

¹³⁹ The OAU was disbanded in 2002 and superseded by the African Union (AU).

¹⁴⁰ Hirsch, *Sierra Leone*, p.98.

¹⁴¹ Ibid. p.16.

¹⁴² Howe, *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States*, p.168.

¹⁴³ Ibid, p.80.

¹⁴⁴ Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau*, p.80.

was seen to favour the RUF.¹⁴⁵ As part of those peace talks the RUF was offered a political role. The support Sierra Leone received was as much part of quietening the region to the benefit of regional actors, as it was improving life for the people of Sierra Leone.

The IMF provided financial support to the government. However, this assistance came with political leverage which was used to pressure Kabbah into restructuring government spending. This did not meaningfully reform the economy, but it did remove the main source of security within the country. This demonstrated the danger of trying to reform the country when security was weak.

The UN was initially involved as a monitoring force, But poorly funded and ill equipped it did little to positively influence the course of the war. The UN presence in Sierra Leone was weakened by an ambivalent international reaction to the civil war among major states, caused by peacekeeping failures in Somalia and Rwanda.¹⁴⁶ Instead, the UN became reliant upon ECOMOG forces for security. This hampered UN efforts to enforce Lome following the withdrawal of Nigerian forces.¹⁴⁷ The UN presence was subsequently expanded to a full peacekeeping mission, though this was still of limited effectiveness compared to the short British military intervention. The disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation (DDR) camps, established after Lome, were initially ineffective.¹⁴⁸ UNAMSIL has been criticised at points for lacking urgency and having no 'endgame' plan.¹⁴⁹ However, when given the space granted by British military action; the long-term use of agencies to disarm and reintegrate the RUF, civil defence forces and Sobels it was more effective.

Global organisations were potentially able to exert power across all of the sources, with more resources than CMSPs. But in practice, internal divisions, self interest and poor planning limited their effectiveness. As with the international actors, there was a failure of cooperation, through social power. ECOMOG was militarily effective, but left the Sierra Leone government vulnerable. The IMF was trying to restructure the spending away from military expenditure, when the priority was military stability. Finally, the UN was well

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 86.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, p.16 and Shearer, *Private Armies and Military Intervention*, p.9.

¹⁴⁷ Dorman, *Blair's Successful War*, p.58.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Connaughton, *A Brief History of Modern Warfare*, p.259.

intentioned, but less effective than CMSPs in creating the short-term space for security. However, once there was a degree of security within the country the UN was able to effectively use the full array of social and economic agencies.

5.3.6 Crystallisation across the networks

Across the networks actors from above and below the state interacted with all four of the sources of social power. Some reinforced the power of the state, others undermined it. The origins of the war came from within the state, but the immediate cause and its perpetuation were exacerbated by outside actors. Because of this, although the root causes and long-term solution to the war were part of the breakdown of political-social, political-military relations, the social-economic. In the short-term the military and economic power of the state needed to be re-established to take control of the state from hostile external actors. In the medium term the political and military power of the country needed to be reinforced, re-establishing the infrastructural power of the state. Finally in the long-term, the relationship between political and social power needed to be repaired.

The first sources of power which the state needed to establish control over were military-economic. Freetown required protection and control over mining areas re-established. The importance of economics at this point was that the pursuit of economic power by military means, at a local, transnational and regional international level was central to the short-term perpetuation of the war. The military struggle for control of Sierra Leone's natural resources was one of the cornerstones of the war, which weakened the other sources of power. Without addressing this struggle the longer-term solutions to the war were irrelevant. The diamond and ore mines were attractive for their ease of exploitation, high value and potential fungability into military and political power. As a result the economic power of Sierra Leone was exploited and degraded by local, international and transnational actors.

The actors which had the most to gain from these resources were the most enthusiastic to become involved in the war. Liberia and the RUF were complicit in taking control of the diamond mines. The RUF, Liberia and Sierra Leone government all had infrastructure that relied on access to these resources. Regional actors who intervened to fight the RUF also found access to these resources too much of a temptation and were not above exploiting them

themselves. Conflict over these resources perpetuated the war. It was inevitable that the main focus of fighting outside of Freetown would be in the mining areas. The value of the diamond and ore mines was insufficient to override the lack of national interest of states in the wider international community. This delayed, or prevented some states from intervening. However, this meant that when they did become involved these actors were more interested in investing in the state and building it up in the long-term, rather than the short-term exploitation of economic resources.

CMSPs helped to enhance state control over both of these sources of power; they protected the capital and restored government control of the mines. The latter denied the RUF revenue from diamond sales was key to ending the war.¹⁵⁰ But in doing so they indirectly exploited them, by requiring revenue which allegedly was based on access to the mines. These terms were not unsustainable, and preferable to monopolisation by other actors, which perpetuated themselves by purchasing military power. From this perspective CMSPs should be viewed as a success. EO more so than Sandline. There is a question over the military significance of the role played by Sandline in the recapture of Freetown. Adebajo argues that Sandline played virtually no role, with the arms they imported into the country remaining in Lungi Airport. With Kabbah giving the credit for the defeat of the AFRC and RUF to Nigerian troops.¹⁵¹ However, Sandline still used their helicopters to provide air support, acting as a 'force multiplier'.¹⁵² EO offered good value, stopped the fight and cost only a third of the annual military budget.¹⁵³ The securing of military-economic power in Sierra Leone was only bettered by British troops.

The medium-term solution to ending the civil war was to reinforce the state institutions through military and political power. The problem lay in the weak military power of the state, caused by the ineffectiveness of the military and the dysfunctional relationship with the political elite. The government had been forced to turn away from the SLA which became as much as problem as the RUF. Security in Sierra Leone was left to the whims of the international community. International and global actors contributed troops, with different degrees of effectiveness. Regional organisations were often militarily

¹⁵⁰ Hirsch, *Sierra Leone*, p.15.

¹⁵¹ Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau*, p.89.

¹⁵² See chapter 3

¹⁵³ Ibid, p.114.

limited.¹⁵⁴ They also came with vested interests in the political outcome and forced the government to accept unfavourable political solutions. The role of Nigeria should be appreciated as Sierra Leone was reliant upon them at several points. But, the most positive application of military power came from Britain, who also worked with the government and military.

Although CMSPs allowed the government to secure itself in the short-term, their limitations appear at this point. The success of EO created a dependence for more support.¹⁵⁵ CMSPs were contracted to undertake some training of indigenous forces, but in doing so increased reliance upon the CDF which was detrimental to long-term state building. This is a difficult problem to resolve and in this case only occurred when effective international actors intervened. Ironically, without Sandline's actions bringing attention to the failings of British foreign policy. CMSPs also showed themselves to be politically weak, especially when employed by a weak entity. EO and Sandline were both defeated politically. They were leveraged out of the country. Whereas, EO was pushed out of the country by a combination of national, international, transnational and global actors. Sandline's involvement was ended by Britain.

The long-term solution to ending the civil war lies in resolving the issues which fermented it: the shadow economy which developed around the system of patrimony. Resolving the relationships between political and social power; political and economic power; and finally economic and social power. Investment from international and global actors has been necessary to address them, as the state was effectively bankrupt after years of exploitation by the political elite. There were some early attempts to resolve them, when the IMF contributed to government spending and tried to reform the public sector. But, the stipulations on how this was spent, it damaged the political and military power of the country. At that point EO had just been able to achieve short-term stability. But, by rushing the medium and long-term steps and removing the only credible military actor, this was doomed to failure. By investing heavily in Sierra Leone, Britain and the UN have helped to progress between these three stages. The more established contributors to peacekeeping operations were distracted

¹⁵⁴ Hirsch, *Sierra Leone*, p.14.

¹⁵⁵ Mandel, *Armies without States*, p.111.

by Kosovo.¹⁵⁶ These problems are yet to be fully resolved, but the most recent developments are positive.

It is this level of involvement which CMSPs are inappropriate. Yet, this step is vital for the long-term stability of Sierra Leone, rather than just freezing the conflict. Bigger questions over the role of CMSPs and their relationship with economic power and social power are relevant at this point. It has been questioned as to who the companies benefit; the government or society.¹⁵⁷ Singer questions the long-term implications of mortgaging access to minerals in return for security. Argues that the market value of the concessions granted in return for Sandline's intervention were \$200 million, compared to about \$10 million worth of services.¹⁵⁸ In the longer-term reliance upon CMSPs becomes truly counterproductive.

Through these short, medium and long-term stages, the state's control over the sources of power needed to be restored, and the relationships between them repaired. CMSPs were able to help restore economic and economic power to the state, and to a certain degree political independence. But, they weakened the relationships between the military and the political elite; and political elite and society. The result was that they could take provide a short-term solution to the war, but not medium or long-term. In this case, other actors finally took responsibility for ending the civil war and stabilising Sierra Leone. However, it was the inaction of these states which caused the government of Sierra Leone to use CMSPs. CMSPs also had a role in highlighting the failure of social power in the international and global networks to generate a timely response. Without the role of CMSPs in addressing the military and economic situations the country would have experienced greater hardships.

5.4 Impact of CMSP activity on the state

The impact of CMSPs on the state, as per the definition in chapter three, was mixed. CMSPs directly increased authoritative power by providing organised 'political force', improving control over the territorially demarcated area that was the state. But, they weakened the state by exacerbating tensions within the institutions of the state, which undermined the long-term capability of the state. perpetuating the alienation of the state. The short-term strengthening of some

¹⁵⁶ Dorman, *Blair's Successful War*, p.59.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, pp.114-5.

¹⁵⁸ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p.166-7.

state institutions and physical control over territory, came at the expense of the long-term institutional development and state embeddedness in society.

Herbst argues that Sierra Leone's geography at the time of independence was favourable for exercising political control. But the small size of the country made Freetown vulnerable to attacks. It was unable to defend itself properly when the civil spread from Liberia.¹⁵⁹ CMSPs were able to partially mitigate this weakness by enhancing the immediate power of the government to exert organised political force. EO and Sandline protected or recaptured Freetown and gained control over the diamond mines. In exerting military power CMSPs were as effective as any other actor, except perhaps Britain. Compared to other actors the provision of military power came with the least constraints on the agential power of the government. The only restriction was in prioritising targets which would facilitate the payment of the companies. This made sense for the state, and was better than the alternatives, They improved the military, authoritative power of the state over the country. Regaining it from the transnational actors.

The problems with CMSPs were that they aggravated relations between the institutions of the state and perpetuated the reliance of despotic power over society. The dysfunctional relationship between civilian government and military was exacerbated, which weakened the long-term stability of the state. The success of CMSPS which facilitated a perpetuation of the shadow state, which stabilised the immediate future of the state but undermined it in the long-term. They could improve the despotic power of the state over society, but not the embeddedness of the state within society. Thus in the short-term, power came from CMSPs to the state. But it did so by taking the place of states institutions. In the long-term it undermined the strength of the state.

5.5 Conclusion

The effect of CMSPs on the power of the state during the Sierra Leone civil war was mixed, they demonstrated some of their strengths and flaws. Their use has been described as a short term success, but a long-term failure as the government became dependent on them for security.¹⁶⁰ Given the analysis of the interaction of CMSPs with the sources of social power, this is an accurate

¹⁵⁹ Herbst, *States and Power in Africa*, p.159.

¹⁶⁰ Mandel, *Armies Without States*, pp.110-111.

appraisal of their role. They functioned well in the short-term, but were more limited, even counter-productive to the stability of the state in the medium and long-term. However, CMSPs played an important part in the conflict and compared to the other actors were among the more beneficial.

Given the poor reliability of the SLA, the political elite and general population were reliant upon external sources of security. Britain and the UN only intervened effectively after 1998. Nigerian troops helped to prop up the government, and played a major role in the reinstallation of Kabbah, but came with their own agenda which alienated the general population. The strength of EO was in providing effective military support for the benefit of the government, stabilising the country in the short-term. Where 'a rabble of drugged-up teenagers with Kalashnikovs were terrorising an entire country. A relatively small force of professional soldiers were able to stop them in a matter of months'¹⁶¹ EO and Sandline had important implications for the state in several of the key areas. Militarily they created a situation which allowed negotiation with the RUF. They helped to return control of important natural resources to government control. To both deny the RUF access to important revenue and The success of EO showed British forces how the RUF could be countered in the field.¹⁶² There is a convincing argument that Kabbah "made a fundamental mistake" in ceasing to use EO.¹⁶³

The impact of CMSPs on the economic power of the country was positive in the short-term. Before EO was employed the government had lost control over most of the country, including the valuable mining areas in the south east of the country. The role of CMSPs is interesting when the potential links with extraction companies are made. These allegations are strongly denied EO and Sandline, but they do open up an interesting question. Why should the government of Sierra Leone not have been able to use these resources to improve the military power? Much like the Italian city states, to an extent this relationship was sustainable. The security of the state was improved, outside influence removed and access to the mines, which had fallen out of government control anyway was restored. What right do other states have to criticise Sierra Leone for finding a way for convert a resource which was not even under their

¹⁶¹ The Economist, 'Soldiers of Mercy: Humanitarian Interventions can Work,' *The Economist*, 16th May 2002 <<http://www.economist.com/node/1131441>> [accessed 30 April 2008].

¹⁶² Dorman, *Blair's Successful War*, p.144.

¹⁶³ Hirsch, *Sierra Leone*, p.16.

direct control into security? Spicer denies the links, reasonably arguing that cash is far more useful to a CMSP than mining concessions. However when combined with parent companies such as the alleged links with the Branch Heritage Group,¹⁶⁴ such practice makes sense. Critics argue that by doing so a country's mortgaging out its future. But in a case such as Sierra Leone when outside assistance was not forthcoming and the assistance that was forthcoming tended to exploit the mines as well.

The weakness of CMSPs was that the long-term solution to the war required wider reforms. Despite the impact of CMSPs in reinforcing the state, the task of ending the wider conflict required the long-term support of the international community. The involvement of British troops in the final stages of the war was key to restructuring of the country and preservation of peace. The UN was initially weak in this role, but improved over time. The use of CMSPs created a shadow military, which perpetuated the shadow economy.

Connaughton describes Sierra Leone as the 'good', compared to the 'ugly' of Iraq and 'bad' of Croatia.¹⁶⁵ This distinction is rather simplistic. CMSPs in Sierra Leone would be more accurately called "the next best option". They were the best option available to Strasser and Kabbah when they were employed. Though behind a functional UN and Britain in winding down the conflict. Although Angola and Sierra Leone are the only examples of companies operating at this level.¹⁶⁶ These lessons are important as continuing instability, UN divisions and the reluctance of states to intervene where their national interests are not relevant means that that this type of company could appear again, in similar circumstances in the future. CMSPs had a positive effect on the state during the Sierra Leone. However, this was not without problems. Over time the problems of relying on an outside source of force would have become more acute. They fulfilled a specific role, at a specific time, in a specific set of circumstances, but outside of this were not a solution to ending the war.

¹⁶⁴ Spicer, *An Unorthodox Soldier, Peace War and the Sandline Affair*, p.115.

¹⁶⁵ Connaughton, *A Brief History of Modern Warfare*.

¹⁶⁶ Carlos Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security: A Guide to the Issues* (Oxford: Praeger, 2010), p.82.

Chapter 6

The Invasion and Reconstruction of Iraq

"The Iraq war was...(also)...a defining moment for the privatised military industry"

P W Singer¹

6.1 Introduction

No study of CMSP activity over the last ten years can overlook their use in Iraq since 2003. The U.S led invasion opened a new chapter in the post-Cold War use of CMSPs, which rapidly expanded the size and scope of the industry. Although, the heavily-equipped combat companies of the 1990s had become marginalised,² CMSPs still undertook a wide range of services, even expanding them further. From logistical support, intelligence and training, to guard and close protection work; demand for commercial enterprises to provide military services boomed. CMSPs worked for the coalition forces, multinational organisations, multinational corporations and the Iraqi government.³ It has been called 'the first contractor's war.'⁴ The use of the term 'first' is hyperbolic, but does reflect the sheer scale of outsourcing which reignited the debate over the use of CMSPs. Particularly in relation to the oversight and accountability of forces which were operating outside the traditional military chain of command. The question here is what were the implications for the Iraqi state with the coalition relying so heavily on CMSPs.

The invasion of Iraq was highly controversial, and provoked widespread opposition. Many of those who initially supported the decision to overthrow Hussein's regime have subsequently changed their minds. This chapter will not retread the general debate over the decision to invade Iraq, but focus on the part played by CMSPs once the invasion began. In particular how the use of

¹ Peter W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*, 2nd edn (London: Cornell, 2008), p.243.

² See chapter 3

³ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p.243.

⁴ Susan Stanger, *One Nation Under Contract* (London: Yale University Press, 2009), p.99.

CMSPs contributed, or was detrimental to the reconstruction of the state. This is not to say that the controversy is completely irrelevant. There were implications to the lack of support which affected the reconstruction process.

The use of CMSPs was necessary, but problematic, even more so than in Sierra Leone. Their role in direct combat was more controversial than that of the coalition troops, whose presence was already divisive. But, CMSPs were an important part of the reconstruction effort as in Sierra Leone, CMSPs were more reliable than domestic actors. They provided services to the military, or which the US military would otherwise have provided for other actors. Thereby increasing the military power of a number of actors; including, NGOs, the coalition forces and the fledgling Iraqi forces. There was a degree of economic trade off in the use of CMSPs. Money which had been designated for reconstruction was leaving the country, and problems with oversight have led to several examples of overcharging. However, this was more of a missed opportunity, caused partially by inefficiency and partially by a cost trade-off of looking for a more effective source of military power. The loss of economic power was reduced by reconstruction being largely funded by external actors, rather than leaching domestic revenue.

The biggest problems of CMSPs use was again the implications for the long-term building of state institutions. The coalition forces, and then the Iraqi state was forced to balance between increasing military power, and building political power which worked with the social power, embedding the state in society. The difference between Iraq and Sierra Leone is the attitudes of international actors to CMSPs, compared to national level political elites. The US government has been more supportive of the continued use of contractors. Whereas, the Iraqi government has preferred to regain control of military actors in the country, military power had become devolved across the networks. This can be seen in the changing implications for the impact of CMSPs on the state as responsibility passed from the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to the new Iraqi government. Despite the poor performance of domestic forces in establishing its own credibility and improving the embeddedness of state in society. These difficulties are important as the long-term goal of coalition forces, who employed the CMSPs, was to rebuild the state and withdraw.

This case study will again be divided into three sections. The first part of the chapter will be a chronology of the war, which is based around the phases of

coalition forces activity and divided into four parts. Beginning with the background and initial invasion. Next, the initial boom in the use of the contractors, which includes four major incidents that have punctuated the use of CMSPs. Third, the surge in US troop numbers which coincided with a consolidation of military companies. Finally, the drawdown of coalition forces as the burden of political and security responsibilities fell onto the Iraqi government. This will show how CMSPs interacted with the main phases of the coalition effort at rebuilding the state, as one regime was destroyed, another created and then power passed on.

The second section will look at how CMSPs interacted with other actors across the networks at local, national, trans-national, international, and global levels. And the sources of social power within them. Followed by the sources of social power and how they crystallised. It will be shown that CMSPs were imperfect, but necessary. None of the military actors were without fault, CMSPs were militarily more effective than the newly trained Iraqi security forces, supporting the military power of the coalition forces in rebuilding the state. But, this was detrimental to fostering a closer relationship between the state and society. In Iraq CMSPs were not used to influence the fundamental distribution of military power between actors. Coalition forces were more effective by being able to exert concentrated offensive military power. Although they were the weakest military actor, only the increased use of Iraqi forces could contribute to the long-term power of the state by strengthening the. It will be shown how the use of CMSPs, although with some detrimental side effects, was of a short-term military benefit to stability in Iraq, but they were mixed when it came to transferring power over to Iraqi forces. CMSPs numerous role did not end the war, the prospects the state faced without outsourcing some military functions would have been far bleaker.

Finally the third section of the chapter will consider the impact on the state as per the definition in chapter two. It will be argued that CMSPs contributed to the short-term strengthening of the state after the state institutions of the Ba'ath Party had been dissolved. But, this did not improve the long-term stability of the state. There has been increasing resistance from the new Iraqi government to the use of CMSPs. The long-term stability of the state lies in developing more reliable state institutions, which increase the power of the state by improving the embeddness of the state in society.




Figure 6.1⁵ Map of Iraq

⁵ United Nations, 'Iraq,' <<http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/iraq.pdf>> [accessed 11 May 2011].

6.2 Chronology

The chronology of this chapter is based around the main phases of the invasion and reconstruction of Iraq. First, a brief history of Iraq, focusing on factors which are relevant to the difficulties experienced during reconstruction. Up to the end of the 2003 invasion by coalition forces, taking the capture of Baghdad as the point at which invasion shifted towards reconstruction. CMSPs also took a role during this period, by supporting the 2003 invasion. Some of the reasons for the escalation of violence which broke out following the invasion can be traced back to this period.

Part two will address the phase of reconstruction between 2003 and 2007. From the capture of Baghdad up to the peak of the civil war. Once the invasion had been completed a civilian chain of command was established, with the CPA taking over the administration of Iraq until a new government was established. The CPA rapidly outsourced many elements of the reconstruction to commercial companies, including military services, which resulted in a boom for CMSPs. During this period the majority of major incidents involving CMSPs occurred, of these four will be covered by this chapter in more detail. The scandal at Abu Ghraib implicated contractors in the mistreatment of prisoners. The killing of Blackwater employees, which contributed to an assault on Fallujah by coalition forces. The role of contractors during the assault on Najef. Finally, the shooting of civilians in Nisur square by Blackwater employees. These were not the only incidents, but they are worthy of more detailed consideration. During this period the Iraqi government was created, but competition for political power led to a civil war between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims, and violence escalated.

Part three will address the US response to the escalation of violence. The 'Surge' not only increased troop numbers, but led to a change in tactics. US soldiers moved into the major urban centres and remained there. This was combined with a concerted effort to build-up and incorporate Iraqi forces into operations. CMSPs continued to be used, but the market underwent several changes as the Iraqi government became more vocal in its opposition to their use. Some of the smaller companies disappeared, merged, or were bought up by larger companies. Blackwater became a high profile casualty from the fallout of the earlier incidents. The company underwent two name changes to try and throw off the reputation it had gained.

Finally, the fourth part will look at the reduction in troop numbers as coalition forces sought withdrew from Iraq. Britain lessened its commitment and withdrew earlier in the conflict. The US was then caught between trying to reduce its role, and leaving Iraq in a state from which some form of success could be declared. Security responsibilities were passed on to the Iraqi government. However from this, arose the question of the role CMSPs would play. This section will bring the security situation in Iraq up to date, as violence has started to increase again.

6.2.1 Background and invasion

Iraq is located at the top of the Persian Gulf. Surrounded by Iran to the east, Turkey to the north, Syria and Jordan to the West, Saudi Arabia to the South West and Kuwait to the South. A small area of coast between Kuwait and Iran provides access to the Persian Gulf. Much of the country is desert, with urban centres focused around two major rivers; the Tigris and Euphrates. Iraq was the creation of the British and French when they divided up the region. As a result the ethnic makeup of the country is mixed. The three main groups are the Sunni and Shi'a Muslims, with Kurds in the North. Sunni Muslims make up 20% of the population, Shi'a 60% and Kurds 20%.⁶ Conflict between these three populations is a source of instability within the country. They are not necessarily homogenous groups; the Shi'a population has been divided between pursuing an Iraqi national identity, or wider Arab nationalism.⁷ Tripp argues that the history of Iraq is one of political domination.

Iraqi was an Ottoman province whose mandate was given to Britain after WWI. Independence was granted in 1932. After independence the country was run by a monarchy from 1932 to 1941 and 1941 to 1958. The Ba'ath Party took over the country in 1968. They took control of the army by separating it from politics and shaping it as a tool of the party.⁸ Tried to build up the national identity of the country. Used a system of patrimony to foster loyalty to the regime, which was helped by the nationalisation of the oil industry in 1972.⁹ Antagonistic relationship with neighbours, particularly Iran led to the Iran-Iraq

⁶ Richard Connaughton, *A Brief History of Modern Warfare: The True Story of Conflict from the Falklands to Afghanistan* (London: Constable & Robinson Ltd., 2008), p.293.

⁷ Charles Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, 3rd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.3.

⁸ Toby Dodge, 'Cake Walk, Coup Or Urban Warfare: The Battle for Iraq', in *Iraq at the Crossroads: State and Society in the Shadow of Regime Change*, ed. by Toby Dodge and Steven Simon, Adelphi Paper 354 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.60.

⁹ Ibid. p.66.

war. At this point the US saw Iraq as an ally during the Cold War, and lent support.

Iraq under Hussein had an acrimonious relationship with Iran. The two were at war between 1980 to 1991. Iraqi forces enjoyed early success, but the conflict soon ground down and forced Iraqi forces onto the defensive.¹⁰ During the Iran-Iraq War the regime pacified the Kurdish population using chemical weapons. In 1990 Iraq took centre stage when Hussein took the decision to invade Kuwait. Seizing control of important oil fields. The international community responded with a coalition which expelled Iraqi forces. Bombing of Iraqi military installations and infrastructure. The success of the coalition forces was taken as a positive indication of the superiority of western forces over the Republican guard when the 2003 invasion was being planned. Though in 1991 the core of the Republican Guard was withdrawn to protect Baghdad, leaving western forces to fight the remaining, poorly trained units.¹¹ Some attempts were made to incite groups in Iraq to overthrow Hussein. However this was not adequately supported and the decision was taken to stop with the liberation of Iraq, rather than follow up and attack Baghdad.

Following the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre, US foreign policy under the Bush administration became more aggressive. After the invasion of Afghanistan attention shifted to Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Several claims were made about the threat posed by Hussein's regime; of Iraq possessing weapons of mass destruction, harbouring terrorists including Al Qaeda. Although these have since been debunked, the case was made for invasion. Some close allies of the US lent their support, primarily Britain, though the wider international community ranged from scepticism to hostility. After a rapid build up and a nominal effort to get Hussein to cooperate with weapons inspectors,

The invasion began on 20th March 2003. Coalition forces rushed to Baghdad. In order to justify the invasion there was a preoccupation with finding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). There was a fear these would be evacuated out of the country. The speed meant that a more significant threat was overlooked. Stockpiles of conventional weapons were left unsecured in the rush. These were raided and helped to feed the subsequent insurgency and

¹⁰ Ibid, p.62.

¹¹ Ibid, p.64.

civil war.¹² CMSPs supported the invasion. Camp Doha in Kuwait was operated and guarded by contractors.¹³ CMSPs rearmed weapons platforms, including the F-17, Apaches, F-15 and U-2.¹⁴ Even operated UAVs.¹⁵

The end to conventional phase of the invasion occurred after three weeks, on 10th April, with the toppling of Saddam's statue in Baghdad. Bush declared that the invasion a success with his mission over speech on May 1 2003. Although US troops had displaced the Republican Guard and Hussein was captured soon after this was only the beginning. The task now faced the US and her allies of trying to rebuild the country.

6.2.2 Reconstruction

The invasion was followed by an occupation and reconstruction which shifted control over to civilian commanders. The chain of command was divided between military and civilian command with the establishment of the Green Zone in Baghdad. Ambassador Paul Bremer took command of the CPA in April 2003, which was established to run the country.¹⁶ A process of de-Ba'athification was undertaken in which members of the Ba'ath Party were removed from their political and military posts and refused further employment.¹⁷ The CPA seized Iraqi government assets and took control of the administration of the country. The privileging of US business interests in rebuilding led to the feeling among Iraqis that the US was taking control for its own economic purposes.¹⁸

The decision was taken to disband existing state security structures which had been run by the ruling Ba'ath Party. This led to the sacking of 7 million Sunnis who formed a disproportional portion of the political elite.¹⁹ Resistance by the Republican guard and an influx of foreign fighters.

¹² Connaughton, *A Brief History of Modern Warfare*, p.300.

¹³ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p.247.

¹⁴ Ibid, p.247.

¹⁵ David Isenberg, 'Private Military Companies in Iraq', in *From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies*, ed. by Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 82-93, p.83.

¹⁶ Carlos Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security: A Guide to the Issues* (Oxford: Praeger, 2010), p.156.

¹⁷ Robert Young Pelton, *Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2006), p.110.

¹⁸ Ibid, p.113.

¹⁹ Connaughton, *A Brief History of Modern Warfare*, p. 293.

Widespread looting. On 13th December 2003 another symbolic point was reached with the capture of Saddam Hussein south of Tikrit.

Part of the coalition strategy was to restore an infrastructure which in places was still damaged from the Iran-Iraq War, the US bombing in 1991 and a decade of economic sanctions.²⁰ The re-establishment of oil extraction was of particular interest, as it was key to providing the new regime with an income. However, this infrastructure was vulnerable to attacks, particularly pipelines. Despite the initial pledge, work progressed slowly, which stirred up resentment.

The task of reconstruction increased the reliance of the coalition upon CMSPs.²¹ Isenberg contractors used for the security of civilian personnel, and the security of non-military sites and convoys.²² While CMSPs were employed to train the new Iraqi forces. Vinnell Corporation had one such contract.²³ One contract to guard the excavation of a mass grave, \$2 million of the \$9 million budgeted was spent on security.²⁴

Over the summer of 2003 to 2004 there was an upsurge in violence. The result of which was CMSPs delaying, suspending or ending the contracts they had undertaken.²⁵ The US had failed to foresee that an insurgency would occur on such a scale, thus foreign actors became increasingly reliant upon CMSPs for security, expanding the roles which were undertaken.²⁶ The number of contractors expanded until they formed the second largest contingent, behind the US.²⁷ There were two stages to this initial employment of CMSPs. During the first stage established companies, including Blackwater and Triple Canopy, took advantage of the requirement for extra capacity by the coalition. However, the short-term contracts they signed meant that a second wave of companies appeared. These companies tried to undercut those more established, by dramatically underbidding them. The focus was on the profit they could make, rather than whether the services could actually be delivered.²⁸ Interestingly one

²⁰ Isenberg, *Private Military Companies in Iraq*, p. 82-93, p.83.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid, p.84.

²³ Susan Stanger, *One Nation Under Contract* (London: Yale University Press, 2009), p.99.

²⁴ Al Venter, *War Dog: Fighting Other People's Wars, the Modern Mercenary in Combat* (Philadelphia: Casemate, 2006), p.580.

²⁵ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p. 253.

²⁶ Isenberg, *Private Military Companies in Iraq*, p. 82-93, p.84.

²⁷ Deborah Avant, *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.8.

²⁸ Venter, *War Dog*, p.579-80.

of these, Blackwater, which Venter refers to as responsible was to crop up in several of the major controversial incidents which were to occur.

Insurgents began to equate contractors with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and used this to motivate attacks against them.²⁹ The most well known role of CMSPs was in providing close protection work, running VIPs from Baghdad airport to the Green Zone along 'Route Irish', which was to become the most dangerous stretch of road on the planet.³⁰ Contractors operating on this route were told to "Drive it like you stole it".³¹ Bounties were placed on the head of contractors. When Blackwater was protecting Paul Bremer this was said to be \$30,000.³²

Initial concern over the use of contractors led the CPA to set guidelines for minimum standards.³³ A Special Investigator General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) was established in 2004 to improve the oversight of the reconstruction effort, including running audits and inspections, with the power to begin criminal investigations into the conduct of contractors.³⁴ The US also responded by setting up a body to co-ordinate the activities of CMSPs with the coalition military forces. Controversially, not only was this role outsourced to a CMSP but the tender was won by Aegis, a new established company which involved Tim Spicer, which raised even more questions.³⁵ The industry itself responded with the foundation of the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) which acts to promote the interests of CMSPs. The IPOA expresses a desire to promote high standards of conduct and ethics.³⁶

The US and UK pursued differing strategies. The latter were more likely to pursue a 'hearts and minds' approach. The low level of violence which occurred in British areas gave more freedom to pursue these avenues. However, there was difficulty as the general population was unreceptive to the approach just following the invasion.³⁷

²⁹ Pelton, *Licensed to Kill*, p.107.

³⁰ Ibid, pp.108-9.

³¹ Venter, *War Dog*, p.583.

³² Pelton, *Licensed to Kill*, p.110.

³³ Isenberg, *Private Military Companies in Iraq*, p. 82-93, p.86.

³⁴ Renee de Nevers, 'Looking Beyond Iraq: Contractors in US Global Activities', in *Contractors & War: The Transformation of US Expeditionary Operations*, ed. by Christopher Kinsey and Malcolm Hugh Patterson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), p.61.

³⁵ Isenberg, *Private Military Companies in Iraq*, p. 82-93, pp.86-7.

³⁶ Venter, *War Dog*, p.590.

³⁷ Connaughton, *A Brief History of Modern Warfare*, p. 302-3.

The Iraqi interim Government led by Allawi, took over from the CPA in June 2004, which was recognised by the UN. Elections were held in 2005. In 2006 Hussein was tried for crimes committed by his regime and sentenced to death; executed by hanging. Following the formation of first government in 2006, Nouri al-Maliki was voted in as President. In July the same year Muthanna is the first province which is passed over to the new government.

6.2.2.1 Major Incidents

The four major incidents which occurred during this period will now be covered in more detail. The first was the scandal at Abu Ghriab, from April 2004, which implicated contractors in the mistreatment of prisoners. Followed by the assault on Fallujah, again in 2004, which was in part the result of the death of Blackwater employees, and the increase in tensions following Abu Ghraib. Next, a more positive role, with the effectiveness of contractors in the assault on Najef. Finally, the shooting of civilians in Nisur square by Blackwater employees. As stated above, these were not the only incidents, but they are worthy of more detailed consideration and contribute towards the interaction of the sources of social power.

6.2.2.2 Abu Ghraib

There have been several highly publicised incidents of the abuse of Iraqis taken prisoner following the invasion, including torture and murder. The biggest scandal, and one which had ramifications for the security situation in Iraq, was that of Abu Ghraib. Abu Ghraib was a correctional facility near to Baghdad, which had been built in the 1960s and was being used by the US to house prisoners. There had been concerns from the Red Cross that prisoners were disappearing for extended periods of time.³⁸ However in April 2004, CBS brought worldwide attention to the conditions in Abu Ghraib when it broadcast photos which showed evidence of the ill treatment of prisoners.³⁹

There were two issues of concern for the use of CMSPs. The first was that of the proven acts of abuse, one third had been committed by contractors working under contract with the Department of the Interior. Because they were

³⁸ Ibid, p. 307.

³⁹ David E. Price, 'Private Contractors, Public Consequences: The Need for an Effective Criminal Justice Framework', in *Contractors & War: The Transformation of US Expeditionary Operations*, ed. by Christopher Kinsey and Malcolm Hugh Patterson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), pp. 205-30; p.212.

working for the Department of the Interior, rather than the Department of Defence (DoD) their legal accountability was questionable. The CPA had secured coalition troops and contractors immunity from prosecution under Iraqi law. Because the contractors were working for the Department of the Interior neither were they accountable under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA). This meant that as of 2012, no contractors involved had been charged unlike members of US forces which had been involved.⁴⁰

The outcome of events was to exacerbate tensions between coalition forces and Iraqis, making soldiers and contractors the targets for revenge attacks.⁴¹ This led to pressure and the amendment of the MEJA to include all contractors.⁴²

7.2.2.2 Fallujah

The next major incident occurred soon after the invasion. Four employees from Blackwater were attacked and killed in Fallujah in March 2004. Coverage of the attack was widespread in the media. While the incident in itself was a tragedy, the ramifications of the incident were far worse. US forces were prompted to respond by attacking Fallujah in force, which led to the death of a number of civilians.

The attacks were preceded by a number of events.⁴³ Fallujah lay in the 'Sunni Triangle', and was the stronghold of the Ba'ath Party. The Imams were happy that Hussein had been overthrown, but not with the destruction of the Ba'ath Party, or the nature of the military defeat inflicted by US forces.⁴⁴ The local population had fled, but the presence of US forces attracted foreign fighters from neighbouring states.⁴⁵ An incident on 28th April 2004, led to the shooting of Iraqi civilians by US troops. US forces retreated from the city to a camp just outside, and insurgent forces responded by attacking and killing local security forces for working with US forces.⁴⁶ There was a change over to marines who tried to adopt a softer approach to working with the population, but the damage

⁴⁰ Ibid, p.212.

⁴¹ Connaughton, *A Brief History of Modern Warfare*, p. 308.

⁴² Price, *Private Contractors, Public Consequences*, p. 205-30, pp.214-220.

⁴³ Connaughton, *A Brief History of Modern Warfare*, p. 303.

⁴⁴ Ibid, p.299.

⁴⁵ Ibid, p.300.

⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 306.

had been done by the army. Around this time the Abu Ghraib scandal also came to light, which exacerbated tensions with the local population.⁴⁷

On the 31 March 2004 what occurred next was to be the tipping point, one which drew attention to the place of CMSPs and their implications of their use.⁴⁸ Four contractors travelling in two vehicles on Highway 10 in Fallujah. They were overexposed by travelling in such small numbers. They were killed, and the bodies of two contractors were burnt and strung up from a bridge. The resulting pictures were broadcast around the world, again drawing attention to the presence of contractors in Iraq. The US reaction to the attack was to have greater implication for the reconstruction process.

The response of the American military was to capture those responsible for the attack by an offensive on Fallujah. This included Iraqi troops. This was not the only city in which major fighting occurred at the time, but it was the most prominent. The offensive did much to damage the relationship between the US and the middle classes they hoped to court in order to install democracy.⁴⁹ There was a shared interest in driving US troops from Fallujah, even among groups the US thought to be friendly.⁵⁰ There was a pause in fighting, though insurgents continued to attack US troops. There were attempts to use Iraqi troops in order to run patrols, but they were afraid of being too closely associated with the US.⁵¹ Then in November 2004 there was a second offensive involving the marines and army, which effectively had to start the offensive again.

The operation resulted in the deaths of 2,300 Iraqis, along with 85 US and 11 Iraqi soldiers. CMSPs cannot be held responsible for the scale of the military reaction, especially as Fallujah was already increasingly hostile to coalition forces. However, CMSPs did play a role in the lead up to the operation, showing how they can shape the direction of the conflict.

7.2.2.3 Battle of Najaf

Not all of the incidents involving CMSPs were negative. They have also been able to display their military effectiveness. In 2004 Blackwater employees

⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 307.

⁴⁸ Ibid, p.309.

⁴⁹ Ibid, p.319.

⁵⁰ Ibid, p.325.

⁵¹ Ibid, p.322.

played a prominent role in protecting US forces during an attack in Najaf, a town located to the south of Baghdad which has a Shi'ite majority.⁵² During the engagement 8 Blackwater contractors, a US marine and four policemen protected a CPA Headquarters. They fought off an attack by hundreds of fighters which lasted three and a half hours, and came under fire from a sniper. During the attack a Blackwater helicopter helped to resupply the position and evacuate the wounded troops.⁵³ Relief by US forces only came after the attack had ended. It was remarked after the battle that the Blackwater employees, who had inflicted a large number of casualties on their attackers, had conducted themselves confidently.⁵⁴

7.2.2.4 Nisur Square

There was a pattern of aggressive behaviour towards Iraqi civilians while contractors carried out close protection work. There are several high profile examples of contractors opening fire on Iraqi civilians. Footage has been posted online showing contractors working for Aegis in such circumstances.⁵⁵ There is also evidence of incidents when CMSPs fired upon coalition troops. It is difficult to take individual incidents out of context given the nature of the security situation. CMSPs are not alone in their conduct being questioned. Coalition troops have also been accused, and found guilty of, aggressive conduct towards civilians, which led to deaths. The problems come because of the accountability of those involved. One incident in particular has attracted widespread condemnation and tested some of the legal mechanisms which had begun to be instituted - Nisur Square.

The shooting involved Blackwater. By this time the Iraqi government already had a problem with the company as a result of other incidents, including the shooting of civilians in 2006 and hostile confrontations with Iraq security forces.⁵⁶ In this case Blackwater employees claim to have come under fire. The result of their reaction was the death of fourteen civilians and the wounding of twenty more, all of which were unarmed. The Iraqi government responded by revoking Blackwater's license and banning it from the country.⁵⁷ There were two

⁵² Venter, *War Dog*.

⁵³ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p.253.

⁵⁴ Venter, *War Dog*, pp.556-7.

⁵⁵ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p.251.

⁵⁶ Ibid, p.253.

⁵⁷ Ibid, p.253.

problems with doing this: there was no license as these did not exist; and the U.S had become so reliant upon Blackwater, that without it security was compromised.⁵⁸

The initial prosecution began in 2008 and 2009, the FBI launched an investigation into the incident. But there were some problems in holding those involved to account through the MEJA, which resulted in the charges against those involved being dropped.⁵⁹ Although as of 2013 there was possibility of new charges being made against the Blackwater employees involved.⁶⁰

The incident at Nisur Square is an extreme example of a problem of the aggression towards other parties by CMSPs undertaking close protection work. When their priority lay in completing their current contract, rather than the overall mission of rebuilding and reconstruction. It also shows the difficulty of having competing institutions and authority in the state, none of which actually had effective control.

7.2.3 The 'Surge'

In order to address the worsening security situation, the US military undertook a concerted effort to quell the violence that has taken hold of the country. The surge began in Al Anbar in 2006 and spread to Baghdad. The process involved the steady increase in the number of troops in the country throughout 2007, peaking in June.⁶¹ Along with the increase in troops the US undertook a change in tactics. US troops moved out of their bases into the city, taking a much higher profile and focusing on the areas of biggest problem. Around this time there occurred the tribal awakening, when it is argued that the US moved from being a 'despised occupier' to being seen as an 'impartial party'.⁶²

By 2008 the ratio of contractors to military personnel was 1:1. According to the DoD there were 148,050 contractors in Iraq.⁶³ However, in 2007 there

⁵⁸ Ibid, p.253.

⁵⁹ de Nevers, *Looking Beyond Iraq*, p. 60-82, p.63.

⁶⁰ Horwitz, Sari, 'New Charges Brought Against Former Blackwater Guards in Baghdad Shooting,' *The Washington Post*, 18 October 2013
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/new-charges-brought-against-former-blackwater-guards-in-baghdad-shooting/2013/10/17/9307b562-3759-11e3-8a0e-4e2cf80831fc_story.html> [accessed 19 October 2013].

⁶¹ Interview with Col. Peter Mansoor in *The Surge: The Whole Story* [Film], Dir. Bruce Van Dusen, (USA: Institute for the Study of War, 2009)

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security*, p.5, p.146.

had occurred a change in the accountability of CMSPs, when the Iraqi government ended the immunity of contractors from prosecution. Immunity continued for coalition troops.⁶⁴ Around this period the market for military services began to dry up as the boom came to an end as the money which had funded this boom began to dry up. The security situation deteriorated, during this time, as sectarian violence plunged the country into civil war.⁶⁵

Following the boom there was a consolidation in the market. There was still a large market for military services, in 2009 it was estimated there were 100,000 contractors in the country, with about 10% of these providing frontline security services.⁶⁶ Much like other industries, companies began to fold into each other. Some closed, and others were purchased. Blackwater changed its owner and its name - first to Academi, then Xe. Halliburton remained strong, but KBR became independent again. The largest security company G4S emerged from the consolidation of several companies, including Armor Group.⁶⁷

The military began to question the degree to which CMSPs should be involved in operations. Particularly if the actions of firms outside the chain of command were undermining efforts at mobilising popular support.⁶⁸ In 2007 the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) was changed to incorporate CMSPs into the chain of command.⁶⁹ By 2008, 50 cases featuring contractors were ongoing.⁷⁰

7.2.4 After withdrawal

The growing domestic pressure in the US and UK eroded support for an already unpopular war. The focus shifted to finding a way to draw an end to western involvement, by handing over responsibility for security to the Iraqi police and army. The Bush presidency came to an end in 2008, and the election victory of

⁶⁴ Colvin, Ross, 'Iraq Cabinet Okays Law to End Contractor Immunity,' *Reuters*, 30 October 2007 <<http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/10/30/uk-iraq-contractors-idUKL3020512720071030>> [accessed 2 November 2007].

⁶⁵ MacAskill, Ewen and Richard Norton-Taylor, 'Iraq's Hired Hands Under Fire as the Pot of Gold Starts to Run Low,' *The Guardian*, 22 September 2007 <<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/sep/22/iraq.ewenmacaskill>> [accessed 23 September 2007].

⁶⁶ de Nevers, *Looking Beyond Iraq*, p.60-82, p.63.

⁶⁷ Siddique, Haroon, 'Private Security Firms Face Tough Times in Iraq,' *The Guardian*, 10 August 2009 <<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/aug/10/iraq-murder-security-firms>> [accessed 10 August 2009].

⁶⁸ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p.258.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security*, p.145.

Barak Obama changed control of the US presidency to the Democratic Party. Attention also began to shift back to Afghanistan.

Some of the coalition had already left, notably Spain which had withdrawn support in 2004. But, it was the handover of security responsibility in its areas by Britain in April 2009 that marked the beginning of a new phase. The US ended combat missions in 2010, although there were still large numbers of troops in the country. The breakdown of talks over extending the immunity of US troops from prosecution led to the October 2011 announcement that US troops would cease their involvement. The withdrawal of US forces marked a new phase in the reconstruction of Iraq. This did not mean the end of the US presence. There occurred the continued use of contractors to cover the defensive roles of exiting troops.⁷¹ However, the Iraqi government remains hostile to the use of contractors.⁷²

The deterioration of the security situation since 2012 is a concern for the long-term stability of the Iraqi state. Violence has increased, reaching its highest levels since 2008, with 7,000 deaths in the year up to October 2013. The escalation in violence has been blamed on a combination of the civil war in Syria spilling over into Iraq, and the weakness of Iraqi security forces. Al-Maliki has requested Drones and F-16 planes from the US, though it has been argued that this will only solve part of the problem.⁷³ Given the deteriorating security situation the future of Iraq remains uncertain.

7.3 Sources of Social Power across the Networks

At the heart of the insecurity in Iraq sits the exposure of the social divisions within the country. The coalition invasion destroyed a brutal, but effective set of political and military institutions which had repressed the country since the late 1960s. The objective of the coalition was to build a state which used institutions based on a western understanding of the liberal democratic state. The CPA formed part of an initial attempt to do this, power was subsequently transferred over time on to the Iraqi government. The problem was that the state was weak,

⁷¹ Gordon, Michael R., 'Civilians to Take U.S. Lead as Military Leaves Iraq,' *New York Times*, 18 August 2010 <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/19/world/middleeast/19withdrawal.html?_r=2&ref=private_military_companies&> [accessed 21 August 2010].

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⁷³ Kareem Rasheem and Ahmed Rasheed, 'As Iraq Seeks US Arms, Bombs Kill another 55,' *Reuters*, 27 October 2013 <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/27/us-iraq-violence-idUSBRE99Q01C20131027>> [accessed 30 October 2013].

and a power struggle developed. Initial gratitude for the removal of Hussein and Baath Party was replaced by resentment at the presence of foreign troops and security decreased. Other actors came into Iraq and CMSPs formed part of the short-term search for improved security, compensating for the limited resources of the coalition forces. However, they complicated the institutional control over the use of force and had a mixed impact on the long-term pursuit for stability.

7.3.1 Sub-National

As with many ex-colonial states Iraq consisted of a number of groups which were held together during Saddam Hussein's time in power. His removal and the dissolution of the Ba'ath Party resulted in a political-military-economic squabble for control of the country. Iraq threatened to break down along sectional lines, with groups fighting for power as the old security apparatus broke down and democratic institutions were created. At a sub-national level there were a number of groups which emerged during the civil war. As the country fragmented security became diffuse and community based groups began to provide security. Militias emerged which were affiliated with the main ethnic groups within the country.⁷⁴

The former members of the Ba'ath Party formed one part of the insurgency which developed.⁷⁵ Home grown insurgents also formed in response to the presence of the U.S and the weakness of the Iraqi government.⁷⁶ The sectarian groups within Iraq formed militias, which fought against each other and coalition forces.⁷⁷ Hussein had created a show state within the country. After his arrest this lost its association with the Ba'ath Party and facilitated the Islamic and nationalist insurgency which resulted.⁷⁸

7.3.2 National

At a national level the government was disbanded, dispersing ex-members of the Ba'ath party into the population. The destruction of the existing state

⁷⁴ Toby Dodge, *Iraq's Future: The Aftermath of Regime Change*, Adelphi Paper, 372 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.20.

⁷⁵ Kateri Carmola, 'PMSCs and Risk in Counter Insurgency Warfare', in *Contractors & War: The Transformation of US Expeditionary Operations*, ed. by Christopher Kinsey and Malcolm Hugh Patterson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), pp. 134-154, p.139.

⁷⁶ Ibid, p.139.

⁷⁷ Dodge, *Iraq's Future*, p.9-12.

⁷⁸ Ibid, p.16.

structures in Iraq weakened the military political power of the fledgling state.⁷⁹ The CPA was initially established to run the country, then power passed over to the new Iraqi government. However, this was a protracted process, with the new government competing for sovereignty with sub-national groups, transnational and international actors. Early on in the occupation organised crime became a problem and was responsible for much of the early violence within the country.⁸⁰ One of the main tasks has been to develop an effective set of security forces, but this has proved difficult.⁸¹

7.3.3 Transnational

Complicating the contest for political, economic and military power within Iraq is the fact that the three main groups involved are effectively transnational, rather than sub-national. The Kurds which occupied the north of the country spread across neighbouring states including Iran, Turkey and Syria. They had been fighting for independence for years and had been persecuted by Hussein's regime. Sunni and Shi'ia Muslims which make up the majority of the rest of the population are groups which are spread across the region. The Sunni minority which had benefitted from the previous regime were most threatened by the change in government, losing the domination they had over political, economic and military power.⁸²

The unpopularity of the invasion attracted transnational actors who sought to oppose the US. The US presence in Fallujah attracted fighters from neighbouring states, but also as far away as Chechnya.⁸³ The presence of Al Qaeda in Iraq, which had been used as one of the possible justifications for the war, was unlikely. However, the weakness of the state and the attraction of war against US forces resulted in the formation of Al Qaeda in Iraq, which recruited locally.⁸⁴

7.3.4 International

The main international states involved were those of the initial coalition. The coalition forces destabilised the country, then placed themselves at the centre of

⁷⁹ de Nevers, *Looking Beyond Iraq*, p.60-82, p.65.

⁸⁰ Dodge, *Iraq's Future*, pp.14-5.

⁸¹ Ibid. p.21.

⁸² Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, p.281.

⁸³ Connaughton, *A Brief History of Modern Warfare*, p.300.

⁸⁴ Carmola, 'PMSCs and Risk in Counter Insurgency Warfare,' p.134-154, p.139.

rebuilding the state with liberal democratic principles. Spain left in 2004, Britain reduced its commitments in 2009 and the US officially withdrew in 2011, though it continues to be involved. The political influence of the US has subsequently waned as al-Maliki has strengthened the relationship between Iran and Iraq.⁸⁵

7.3.5 Global

Iraq was rather isolated at a global level prior to and following 2003. Iraq's main involvement with the UN in the decade prior to the 2003 invasion was to be the subject of security council resolutions, weapons inspections and an embargo. The lack of support from the wider international community in the 2003 invasion marginalised the role of the UN. The US was also reluctant to relinquish power to actors at this level.⁸⁶ The UN did have some presence in Iraq following the initial invasion. However, after the bombing of the Canal Hotel and the death of Sergio Vieira de Mello, the UN's senior official, the UN withdrew to Jordan. This again demonstrates the weakness of the UN in situations of great military instability.⁸⁷ This was part of a concerted plan by insurgent forces to isolate Iraq from the international community.⁸⁸ As the US withdrew the UN has become more involved in the country.

7.4 Crystallisation

The war was a military-political struggle to remove the existing regime, institute a new government that would operate more 'responsibly' along the lines of political and social ideas of the international community. In order to do so the infrastructure of the country was effectively destroyed, then rebuilt. The challenge was in establishing political and military institutions that were socially embedded.

The first priority was the security of the country. CMSPs made a significant contribution to the military capabilities of the coalition forces. The Bush administration's approach to the invasion was short sighted. They have been criticised for neglecting to plan for the reconstruction. The administration was reluctant to commit further troops following the invasion due to

⁸⁵ Rasheem and Rasheed, 'As Iraq Seeks US Arms, Bombs Kill another 55.'

⁸⁶ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p.244.

⁸⁷ Bill Varner, 'UN's Mission Poised for Larger Role as U.S. Forces Withdraw,' *Bloomberg*, 28 July 2011 <<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-28/un-s-iraq-mission-poised-for-larger-role-as-u-s-forces-withdraw.html>> [accessed 30 July 2011].

⁸⁸ Dodge, *Iraq's Future*, p.13.

commitments in Afghanistan and fears of the political implications for the 2004 election.⁸⁹ The controversial nature of the invasion meant that the UN and NATO were not options.⁹⁰ A coalition of more than forty countries lent their support to the invasion. However, only 20,000 of the 300,000 troops mobilised came from states other than the US or UK.⁹¹ Some use was made of local militias by the CPA, but this was inconsistent and stirred up resentment.⁹²

There was no grand plan to use commercial firms, instead the expansion of services crept over time.⁹³ There are difficulties in establishing the number of contractors involved. Some counts excluded those providing support services.⁹⁴ Estimates place contractors in 2006-8 as being over 100% of the coalition force numbers. The size of this contribution led to the coining of the phrase "coalition of the billing" by Singer.⁹⁵ Contractors came from over 30 countries.⁹⁶ The outsourcing of functions was uneven across the members of the coalition. The US embracing it the most, followed by the UK, whereas German forces were more reluctant to use commercial firms to support their forces.⁹⁷ CMSPs reduced the political cost for the US.⁹⁸

The US had tended to view the main problems with CMSPs as administrative, particularly how to ensure coordination and common standards.⁹⁹ The military effectiveness of CMSPs, however, has been questioned. There were difficulties with military coordination.¹⁰⁰ Working for commercial firms led to better pay and more relaxed working conditions. The outcome of which was some animosity between contractors and coalition troops.¹⁰¹ Relying on CMSPs for security could also be problematic given the absence of long-term responsibility to the task of reconstruction. For example, following the deaths and hostage taking of contractors in 2003-4, contracts were suspended, delayed

⁸⁹ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p.243.

⁹⁰ Ibid, p.244.

⁹¹ Elke Krahman, *States, Citizens and the Privatization of Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.199.

⁹² Dodge, *Iraq's Future*, p.19.

⁹³ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p.245.

⁹⁴ Ibid, p.245.

⁹⁵ Ibid, p.247.

⁹⁶ Ibid, p. 246.

⁹⁷ Krahman, *States, Citizens and the Privatization of Security*, p.238.

⁹⁸ Ibid, p.245.

⁹⁹ Isenberg, *Private Military Companies in Iraq*, p. 82-93, p.85.

¹⁰⁰ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p.254.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, p.254.

or cancelled.¹⁰² Moreover, there was a lack of oversight as to the qualifications and training of contractors, particularly early on. Those accused over Abu Ghraib lacked formal training, for example.¹⁰³ CMSPs were keen to assure of their own self policing, in which contractors would be sent home and could face a civil law suit.¹⁰⁴ However, this also proved to be insufficient. Ineffective regulation has contributed to the failure to institutionalise CMSPs in the rebuilding of the political, economic and social structures of the country.

Given the capability of the coalition forces CMSPs were necessary. Control of the borders had been lost for nine months following the destruction of the Ba'ath Party, which allowed foreign fighters into Iraq.¹⁰⁵ Although Hussein distributed arms around the country, the decision to leave arms depots unprotected was a mistake.¹⁰⁶ There was a balance between the coalition losing troops to CMSPs, and their expertise being retained when they would otherwise have retired. Though there is a danger in the former creating a self-sustaining cycle.¹⁰⁷ Difference between "professional" companies and "cowboy" firms. Avant argued that the US tended favour "cowboy" firms such as Aegis Defence Services, in part because of their reputation.¹⁰⁸ The author refers to Aegis as a "cowboy" firm because its owner is Tim Spicer, citing the role of Sandline in Papua New Guinea and Sierra Leone. It is difficult to make a clear distinction between these categories.

Training of Iraqi forces by CMSPs is an area where they could have made a more substantial contribution to long-term military power. Contractors undertook training of the military and police.¹⁰⁹ But, this was cut short when in 2004 the US took control of training, following the poor performance of the contractor trained troops.¹¹⁰ There had also been drawbacks to this approach as the outsourcing of training of Iraqi forces meant that they lacked a rapport with coalition forces when they started to work alongside them post 2004.¹¹¹

¹⁰² Ibid, p.253.

¹⁰³ Ibid, p.255.

¹⁰⁴ Venter, *War Dog*, p.589.

¹⁰⁵ Connaughton, *A Brief History of Modern Warfare*, p.300.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, p.300.

¹⁰⁷ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, pp.256-7.

¹⁰⁸ Avant, *The Market for Force*, p.227.

¹⁰⁹ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p.248.

¹¹⁰ Krahman, *States, Citizens and the Privatization of Security*.

¹¹¹ Stanger, *One Nation Under Contract*, p.100.

Coalition forces were not without fault, they were also responsible for acts which alienated the population. Concerted efforts in addressing the security situation came from the proactive use of coalition forces. The degree to which the surge was actually responsible for the decrease in violence has been debated, however, at this time there occurred a definite drop in violence down to nearer the 2004 levels.¹¹²

Funding for the war came from the governments of the coalition forces. A significant amount of money was put aside for the invasion and rebuilding of Iraq. Using companies from the coalition countries so that the money was directed straight back out of the country, rather than into Iraq was criticised. And there was further criticism for the amount of money spent on security. \$2 billion was initially earmarked, but this was quickly expanded. Contracts with CMSPs totalled \$151 billion in 2006.¹¹³ The damaging costs of expenditure was compounded by corruption. Singer argues that it is not just lost money, but money that was redirected from reconstruction.¹¹⁴ A lack of oversight had contributed to this corruption. While the number of contractors was increasing, the number of those overseeing it had shrunk.¹¹⁵ Despite the establishment of the SIGIR the lack of personnel meant that oversight remained problematic.¹¹⁶ There was a danger of bad money being spent by utilising contractors who were aggressively undercutting the more established firms.¹¹⁷ It was better to spend more money and actually have the services delivered effectively.

Political and military power came into conflict from the beginning of reconstruction. Difficulties arose from the multiple chains of command which were established, particularly the separation of military and civilian operations in the country. This occurred following the appointment of Bremer.¹¹⁸ Iraqis were keen to become involved in the building of the state. However, it was difficult to govern the plurality of ideas which emerged following the removal of the Ba'ath Party.¹¹⁹ Social differences were exposed, making it difficult to reach a trusted political consensus. Sunni and Shia Muslims struggled with each other for

¹¹² James Jay Carafano, *Private Sector, Public Wars: Contractors in Combat - Afghanistan, Iraq and Future Conflicts* (London: Praeger Security International, 2008).

¹¹³ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p.246.

¹¹⁴ Ibid, p.252.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, p.252.

¹¹⁶ de Nevers, *Looking Beyond Iraq*, p.60-82, p.62.

¹¹⁷ Venter, *War Dog*, p.581-3.

¹¹⁸ Ibid, p.297.

¹¹⁹ Dodge, *Iraq's Future*, p.26.

control of the government. This was again undermined by the failure of the government to provide security. The lack of overall coherency to the insurgency emphasised the importance of a political solution involving Sunni and Shia Muslims.¹²⁰ However, security encouraged political cooperation. Petraeus credits the Surge with allowing major political breakthroughs in the formation of the state.¹²¹

The CPA and new Iraqi government also faced social challenges in building the state, particularly in relation to developing the relationships between political and social sources of power. The secularisation of the country under Hussein retreated. Iraqis began to identify with their religion over the tribal and ethnic affiliations.¹²² The conduct of the military was detrimental to the longer-term stability of the state. The failure to provide adequate security in the first few weeks after the invasion eroded the confidence of the population.¹²³ Conduct by coalition troops, particularly raids on homes, provoked hostility. Even those within the coalition recognised that they were alienating the civilian population.¹²⁴

7.4 Impact of CMSPs activity on the state

The theoretical implications for the use of CMSPs on the state are interesting. This is a result of the interaction of the coalition forces, CPA and new Iraqi government. As a set of differentiated institutions the Iraqi state was destroyed, rebuilt and then power transferred back. The coalition, supported by CMSPs initially served to destroy the Iraq state as it existed in 2003. There is a strong argument that without the support of CMSPs the invasion could not have gone ahead.¹²⁵ CMSPs therefore played a key role in weakening the state. The CPA was subsequently created as a custodian for the state while new institutions were established. During this period power rested with the CPA. The purpose of CMSPs was to increase the power of the state, by providing military power and facilitating the construction of economic infrastructure. CMSPs contributed to the execution of organised political force by the CPA. But at this point oversight and regulation of the companies was at its weakest.

¹²⁰ Ibid, p.23.

¹²¹ Interview with Petraeus in *The Surge: The Whole Story* [Film], Dir. Bruce Van Dusen, (USA: Institute for the Study of War, 2009)

¹²² Dodge, *Iraq's Future*, p.55.

¹²³ Ibid, p.9.

¹²⁴ Connaughton, *A Brief History of Modern Warfare*, p.304.

¹²⁵ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p 248.

The establishment of the Iraqi government and the transfer of power complicated the relationship between CMSPs and the state. In theory the CPA improved the control of CMSPs, though in practice this was less effective. CMSPs continued to supplement the physical protection of state institutions against sub-national, and transnational threats to security. However, CMSPs were not institutionalised within the new state. They became a source of force which operated outside of the control of the new Iraqi institutions. In doing so they weakened the Iraqi control of organised military force. This was also challenged by the presence of regular coalition forces. The longer the coalition forces remained in the country, the more resentment built against their presence, CMSPs were part of this presence, undermining the social power of both the CPA and Iraqi government and embeddedness of the state in society. This resentment stimulated the military threat that military forces were trying to suppress.

This situation again changed as the Iraqi government took on more responsibility for security. The most important point being when contractors lost immunity from prosecution under Iraqi law. Although CMSPs were unpopular with the government they became more accountable than coalition troops which still had immunity from prosecution. The Iraqi state has repeatedly threatened to end the presence of contractors. Though contractors have remained, the Iraqi government did have enough leverage for Blackwater to cease operating in Iraq. The withdrawal of the coalition forces from Iraq, and the passing of responsibility for security to the Iraq government, has placed more emphasis on the role of CMSPs in protecting US interests. A more positive role for CMSPs could have resulted from the contribution made by training Iraqi forces, so indirectly contributing to the capacity of the state to control of the execution of political violence. But this was cut short by the US taking control of training following the poor performance of the troops they trained.¹²⁶

7.5 Conclusion

The invasion and rebuilding of Iraq was fraught with problems. The rushed approach to the war and inadequate access to military resources with troops also tied up in Afghanistan made the use of CMSPs appealing. These problems were compounded by the destruction of existing state structures. By eliminating

¹²⁶ Krahman, *States, Citizens and the Privatization of Security*.

the Ba'ath Party the coalition quickly lost military-political control at a time they had aggravated social-political relations. This could have occurred over time, rather than being a rushed process. There would still have likely been problems, but continuity could have reduced the scale of the chaos which occurred after the initial invasion.

The companies in the short-term had some positive influence. By providing military support they helped to bring some security and allow the initial rebuilding effort. However, the companies also caused some aggravation when given roles which involved direct. They complicated the battle space and became involved in a number of incidents which damaged the relationship with Iraqi civilians. Accountability and control proved to be a problem with so many different bodies claiming authority, and working with different sets of rules. The power of the Iraqi state was weakened by the transfer of power away from the Iraqi state to the CPA. Especially as the CPA proved to be ineffective in pursuing the effective oversight of the use of contractors. Given this, and the number of other bodies using military force in the country it is unsurprising that the Iraqi government has been keen to bring CMSPs under tight control. Particularly by ending contractor immunity.

CMSPs contributed to the undermining of interaction with social power at a domestic level by aggravating relations with the Iraqi population. This was initially most problematic for the CPA, but became an issue for the Iraqi government as it took more control of security. Economically, they defended infrastructure which was key to rebuilding the country and fostering good relations with the general population. But, at the same time a money was being diverted out of the country rather than being invested into rebuilding Iraq. Evidence of overcharging has been used to question the value for money of their use. Their use can be considered in the context of Mann's assertion that historically mercenaries were most effective when they became institutionalised.¹²⁷ The bubbles that emerged were unsustainable from an economic perspective as they relied out outside funds, and they operated outside of the institutions of the state. The boom was too much, too soon and unsustainable this is where the damage of poor oversight and corruption come to damage state building. Where in Sierra Leone CMSPs gave the government power against the influence of international actors, in this case they lost power.

¹²⁷ See chapter 4

In the longer-term, CMSPs were an external, and temporary patch, for the weakness of the state's own forces. The move from a dictatorship to a democracy was going to cause a radical change in the social-political relationship within the country.¹²⁸ Part of improving the stability of the state was in the viability of its security forces. The army and police had been unreliable and prone to infiltration, as much a threat to coalition troops as insurgents. However, for the Iraqi state to become viable they needed to be established and used. There was an increase in the use of Iraqi security forces following the surge. As coalition forces began to withdraw they were required to pass responsibility on to these forces CMSPs did play a positive part in this process by undertaking some of the responsibility for training forces to work within the institutions of the state. The long-term impact of this process remains unclear however, given the recent increase in violence.

It is important that Iraq serve as a learning experience. It is too simplistic to condemn an entire sector, especially given that firms directly executing military force make up a small part. Although the invasion created a boom which was unsustainable, the industry itself has remained strong.¹²⁹ Given the historical precedent for the use of CMSPs it seems inevitable that they will be required in some form in the future. The danger of negative attention focused on the companies providing security work, is in making it difficult for national governments to employ the support services they have come to rely upon.¹³⁰ The blame for the way the companies operated must lie with the CPA, the organisation which had stripped power from the Iraqi state in the first instance, for its failure to undertake adequate oversight. It was inevitable that some companies would be good and others bad, which was exacerbated by the tendering process used by the CPA. However, CMSPs were a preferable alternative to relying on ad hoc groups which were prone to engaging in vendettas with each other. However, ultimately the most effective use of CMSPs is in training indigenous forces and building up state capacity, reducing the reliance on CMSPs to provide direct security.

¹²⁸ Connaughton, *A Brief History of Modern Warfare*, p.293.

¹²⁹ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p.258.

¹³⁰ de Nevers, *Looking Beyond Iraq*, p.60-82, p.63.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

"No principality is secure without having its own forces."

Machiavelli¹

7.1 Introduction - Opening Pandora's Box?

The increasing use of Commercial Military Service Providers since the end of the Cold War has resulted in many debates over their conduct and the ethics of their use. This thesis has built upon existing knowledge by theorising the implications of CMSPs use on the state. The interaction between CMSPs and the relationship between the sources of social power within the state. The question posed by the title of the thesis is whether this trend has opened Pandora's Box? There are problems with the use of CMSPs, they can destabilise the states which they are employed to strengthen; however, to take such a negative approach to their use is to overstate these problems. Although international regimes are weak, at the level of domestic even the weakest states have proved themselves too capable of controlling the use of the companies. CMSPs are not a direct existential threat to the state. Other state actors, or state sponsored non-state actors, which the companies are often employed to combat, are more of a threat. The companies themselves have limited political leverage and are subject to the political power of other actors.

This does not mean they are a panacea either. By looking at the two case studies, Sierra Leone and Iraq, it has been shown that the answer is far more complicated. Some elements of the state are strengthened, while others are weakened. CMSPs can increase the short-term military power of the state. However, the weakness of CMSP use is in its impact on the relationship between the other sources of power, particularly when used for an extended period. In each case the use of CMSPs complicated the relationship between political, military and social sources of power. The biggest problem is with the relationship between the state and society. Rather than seeking to address the social, political and economic weaknesses of the state and embedding itself in

¹ Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. by Peter Bondella and Mark Musa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

society, the political elite merely increases its authoritative military power. This is what happened in Sierra Leone, but the government of Iraq has been trying to avoid.

An analogy of the relationship between CMSPs and the state is that of a drug on the human body. By increasing military power, CMSPs act as a stimulant. The political elite are able to boost the military power of the state, compensating for a weakness. However, as with a drug, CMSPs can cause side effects. These are not always easy to predict, however the long term use of CMSPs, as with the prolonged use of drugs can damage the state. The threat to the relationship between political, military and social power can undermine the health of the state. There is also the danger of dependency, the state therefore needs to consider that much like a drug addict going cold turkey the short to medium term can be painful, if not fatal, even if the long term objects are reached. This thesis argues like drugs, CMSPs are a short-term solution that allow more fundamental problems to be addressed. Careful consideration needs to be taken by political elites in balancing military weakness with effective building of institutions. CMSPs are most effective when they support this process, not merely serve to patch up the state while political, military, economic and social institutions continue unreformed.

7.2 Research Objective

This thesis set out to look at the implications of CMSP on the state. Chapter two established how the term CMSP would be understood for the purposes of this thesis. By engaging with the debate on how to define and label the commercialisation of military services several decisions were taken. The first was to focus on the provision of military services, rather than an all encompassing look at security firms. It is the outsourcing of the state's ability to fight wars that is of greatest interest here. The second decision was to use the term commercial, rather than private. The distinction between public and private becomes blurred when firms are working so closely with the public sector, instead the companies are characterised as commercial enterprises, which are working for profit, with a shifting relationship between public and private spheres.

The research questions, as outlined in chapter one, were placed in the context of existing literature on the subject which had begun to look at more conceptual issues, but in which there are still gaps in the use of security theory. The thesis therefore set out to answer four main questions.

- What is the impact of CMSP use on the relationship between the sources of social power in the different networks?
- Do CMSPs undermine the power and/or the legitimacy of the institutions that comprise the state?
- Does the existence of a body, possessing the quasi-legal ability to exercise force, compromise the relationship of the state with other actors within and outside the state?
- Therefore, how effective are CMSPs in building a sustainable security environment within the state?

7.3 Approach adopted

In order to answer these research questions it was argued in chapters one and two that traditional approaches to security are inappropriate. Instead, a different approach was required, one which could open up the state, while retaining a focus on power a recognised the continuing relevance of the state as a security actor. As such realist, liberal, constructivist and critical approaches to security were rejected as they either lack the complexity required, or moved far from realism and its focus on power and the state. It was argued that Historical Sociology was the solution to this. Historical Sociology itself is a complex group of theorists who are each pulling in different directions. The work of Michael Mann most closely reflects the theory required, in particular his IEMP model which was developed to look at the interaction of the sources of social power through history, their impact on the state and society. The IEMP model focused on power and the state while being complex enough.

Mann's division of military and political power is particularly important as it allows the two to be abstracted from each other and their relationship with the other sources of power to be considered separately. There was one problem with the IEMP model when used to answer the research questions. Mann considered ideology as a separate source of social power. This was problematic as ideology can be found across all of the sources of social power. Instead, social power took the place of ideology as a source of power. This was combined with Mann's work on globalisation and the interaction of power across and between five networks. sub-national, national, transnational, international and global. The sources of power interacting between each other and across different levels of network. Finally, Mann's approach is also one which does not overemphasise theory. The 'zigzagging' between theory and historical narrative

recognises the unique historical contingency behind each case.

7.4 The Case Studies

In chapter one, two case studies were selected for a comparative analysis with this theoretical approach. These were Sierra Leone and Iraq. They were chosen as they are well suited to answering the research questions. The cases represent a range of CMSP activity; covering several geographical areas, and spanned the whole of the time period, rather than privileging either the role of the companies in the 1990s or since 2001. In each of these cases CMSPs were employed to stabilise the state. Given the difficulty of accessing information on commercial enterprises, which seek to protect their reputations and the privacy of their customers. They are also cases in which there is sufficient material in order use the theoretical model to make suitable conclusions.

Security firms were a constant feature of the civil war in Sierra Leone between 1991 and 2002. However, the war was punctuated by the use of two companies - Executive Outcomes and Sandline International - to provide significant military services. Chapter five applied the modified IEMP model to place the role played by these companies in context. Following the invasion of Sierra Leone from Liberia by the RUF EO was contracted by the government, led by Valentine Strasser. The Sierra Leone Army was ineffective and trustworthy, ECOMOG forces of questionable capability and with vested interests, and the international community reluctant to become involved. EO was employed to regain control of mineral extraction areas, and combat the RUF. This was militarily successful, but EO was asked to leave and the military and RUF seized control of Freetown. Following another military coup and destabilisation of Sandline was invited to help restore the exiled Kabbah. The civil war was brought to an end in 2002 after involvement by the British resulted in a concerted effort at rebuilding the state.

CMSPs were used in Iraq during and following the 2003 invasion. The use of CMSPs has shaped the way they have been understood over the past ten years. CMSPs were used by a number of actors, but the use of commercial enterprises by coalition forces, particularly the CPA stimulated much of the boom. During this initial period several incidents led to the questioning of the conduct of contractors. Abu Ghraib, Fallujah, Nisur Square and the battle of Najef. From by 2007-8 the market in Iraq had tightened and military firms consolidated. The US and Iraqi government, for different reasons, tightened

control over the companies. At this time the US responded to increasing violence by undertaking a major change in its approach to the occupation. The 'surge' increased troop numbers and moved them into troubled neighbourhoods, the result was a reduction in the violence. The final stages of the war have been about US attempts to extricate itself from the country. CMSPs have continued to play an important role as they have allowed troop numbers to be reduced, but the Iraqi government has opposed their use as it seeks to gain control over the country.

7.5 CMSPs and the sources of social power

The implications of CMSP activity on the sources of social power across the case studies can be generalised. On the whole the primary purpose of increasing military power was achieved, though there were also problems. Political and economic power of the state both increased and decreased. Significant changes occurred to the relationship between the sources of social power. Economic power was transferred to military power. Military power both increased and weakened political power. The relationship between military and political, political and social sources of power is the most problematic. In returning authoritative power back to the state, CMSPs damaged the long-term embeddedness of the state in society. The use of CMSPs also affected the distribution and relationship of power across the networks, some power was returned to the state. Though when not working directly for the state CMSPs challenge the institutional power of the state through both military and political power. The use of CMSPs remains subject to the power stronger states can exert over weaker states, either independently or through global organisations.

In each of the cases CMSPs demonstrated the ability to positively increase the military power of the state. In Sierra Leone the other military actors were weak, unreliable, initially absent, or came with vested interests. CMSPs were successful in defeating the RUF in targeted areas, including strategically important natural resources and the politically important capital centre. They worked with local defence forces to train them and were more effective than most other military forces. In Iraq CMSPs made up for a shortfall in the numbers of coalition troops by providing a substantial number of personnel which provided a range of services. CMSPs were important given the decision to purge the Ba'ath Party from power, by disbanding the police and military. The speed of the invasion resulted in a failure to secure Republican Guard weapons

depots which were looted and fed the resulting civil war and insurgency. CMSPs in Iraq were less instrumental in shaping the course of the war than in Sierra Leone. The roles they undertook were to support and guard, even though this regularly led to the use of force. It took the 'Surge' of US troops to change the course of the war. There were incidents of confusion with coalition troops, and issues of abuse. Oversight remained weak in practice, despite efforts to improve it. But, on the whole CMSPs were more reliable and effective than Iraqi forces. They began to take a role in long-term state building by training coalition and Iraqi forces, but this was cut short.

CMSPs strengthened the authoritative political power of the Strasser regime in Sierra Leone and the CPA in Iraq. In Sierra Leone, Freetown was defended by EO and Sandline took a contested role in liberating it. Weakness was shown by CMSPs as internal and external political pressure on the government led to the cancellation of the contracts with both Executive Outcomes and Sandline International. EO, victorious on the battlefield, was effectively defeated by the RUF in negotiations. The situation was rather more complicated in Iraq. In Iraq, CMSPs were under the employment of coalition forces, primarily the military and CPA. While Iraq was under the control of the CPA, CMSPs helped to protect the administrative centre of the Green Zone and moved civilian officials around the country. CMSPs themselves are able to exert some political influence, though they are not strong political actors. There was weakness in oversight and control, which improved over time. The Iraqi government had less control over the use of CMSPs. This became more of a problem as power was passed to the Iraqi government, but CMSPs remained under the control of the CPA. This was a result of the greater relative power of the US compared to Iraq, rather than the CMSPs themselves. However, as time progressed CMSPs came under the control of the Iraqi government, more so than US troops. In both Iraq and Sierra Leone the use of CMSPs was to at least some degree dictated by other international and global actors. Although CMSPs could isolate the state from some actors, both were susceptible to stronger political actors.

The impact on the economic power of the state was a trade-off in each of the case studies, both within economic power, and with the other sources of social power. In Sierra Leone CMSPs increased the access to the diamond and metal mines which had been lost to other actors, allegedly in return for concessions. In Iraq, the cost was money which had been allocated by the US government for reconstruction. Money which was spent on CMSPs effectively

left the country to the profits of the companies, or the pay of their employees. Though, CMSPs were used to support reconstruction which facilitated the rebuilding and the protection of infrastructure such as pipelines. As a result there was a positive economic gain from their use, increasing the long-term economic power of the country. There were problems of overcharging and wastage which has led to their value being questioned, though these affected the US rather than Iraq.

Of the relationship between the sources of power the most obvious, and beneficial trade off, was that of economic to military power. This is commonly mentioned use of CMSPs, allowing the fungibility of economic power into military power. For a country like Sierra Leone with access to natural resources, but a weak military, it proved to be effective. In Iraq it also allowed the vast quantity of money allocated for reconstruction to be used when coalition military capacity was insufficient and domestic actors were also weak.

The purchase of military power also increased the political power of the state by isolating and marginalising the potentially unreliable military forces. This could be a short-term positive for the state. By providing an independent source of military force CMSPs can reduce the political leverage of some actors on the state. In Sierra Leone the army was a weak force which in frequently staged coups and was more of a danger to the state than the RUF. In Iraq the fledgling military and police forces were formed from inexperienced volunteers and were susceptible to infiltration. The political influence of other internal and external actors was also reduced. The transfer of power from military to political institutions of the state was also problematic though. By marginalising the military there is a danger it can become even more of a threat to the state. At least one of the coups in Sierra Leone was a result of resentment against the marginalisation of the military. The same reaction was induced in Papua New Guinea. Before Sandline International could even start their contract the military staged a coup, arrested Spicer and threw the company out of the country.² The implications for the CMSPs on the relationship between the political and social sources of power are one of the most problematic in the short-term.

The relationship between societal and the other sources of power is the most problematic in the longer-term. Increasing security in Iraq and Sierra Leone was important to improving confidence of the population in the state. However, the way this was undertaken led to alienation, covering up longer-term

² Lt. Col. Tim Spicer, *An Unorthodox Soldier, Peace War and the Sandline Affair* (London: Mainstream Publishing, 1999).

problems rather than forcing the state to address them. In Sierra Leone the populations in the areas CMSPs operated were happy for the improvement in security. However, there were large portions of the country which were ignored. As soon as CMSPs were withdrawn the military weakness exposed the underlying problems in the country. The distribution of military power also affected societal relations by granting extra power to groups. The use of CMSPs did privilege the Kamajors who formed part of the civil defence forces. By increasing the authoritative power of the state the government was able to ignore the need for more fundamental reforms in the country. In Iraq the presence of CMSPs was viewed as, if not more so, negatively than the presence of coalition troops. The lack of control over the companies, both real and perceived, and their conduct towards the wider population contributed towards tensions. In trying to build the legitimacy of the Iraqi state al-Maliki has been keen bring CMSPs under control, leading to their ultimate removal along with coalition forces.

The implications for the interaction between the sources of social power are mixed. Some are strengthened in the short-term, though there is a threat of immediate alienation. In the longer-term the state is at risk of damaging the relationship between the sources of power. Particularly the relationship between the military-political elements of the state and wider society.

7.6 CMSPs and the State

The interaction between the sources of social power therefore has implications for the state, as understood in chapter three. In this definition the state was understood as:

- a differentiated set of institutions and personnel
- embodying centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate to and from a centre, to cover a
- territorially demarcated area over which it exercises
- some degree of authoritative, binding rule making, backed up by some organised political force.³

In both case studies the use of CMSPs had implications for the state as understood by this definition. They protected state infrastructure, helped to improve control over territory and altered the way in which the institutions of the

³ Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.55.

government were able to execute political force. There was a difference between the case studies. Because the companies were working directly for the government in Sierra Leone, the state was strengthened in the short terms as military power improved the effectiveness of institutions. Control of important infrastructural parts of the country was re-established or protected. This lessened the impact of other actors across the networks to influence the state. But, as the use of the companies persisted the long-term embeddedness of the institutions in society was undermined, damaging the state.

In the Iraq case study the implications of CMSP activity were more complicated. CMSPs provided some short-term control, with weak infrastructural control by the CPA. As responsibility for running Iraq shifted to the Iraqi government the coalition CPA increased control over the companies, but the Iraqi government lacked control. This was remedied over time as the contractors lost immunity from prosecution. CMSPs, reinforced, undermined and then started to reinforce the state institutions. In this case, although the power of some sub-state and transnational actors was reduced; power was lost to the coalition states.

7.7 CMSPs and the Research Questions

Having considered the implications of the use of CMSPs in the case studies, on the sources of social power and of the state, it is now possible to answer the research questions.

- What is the impact of CMSP use on the relationship between the sources of social power in the different networks?

When the state is in effective control of the CMSPs that are working within the state, the military power of the state is increased, particularly over sub-state and transnational actors. This embodies the state with greater economic and political power, as control of resources is secured from other actors. But, both Iraq and Sierra Leone show how militarily and politically weak states are still susceptible to the power of the strong states, militarily, politically and economically.

- Do CMSPs undermine the power and/or the legitimacy of the institutions that comprise the state?

In the short-term CMSPs increase the authoritative power of the state by

increasing military power, and strengthening institutions. The short-term boost in security can help the legitimacy of the state. But, in the longer-term the legitimacy of the state is undermined. The use of CMSPs hampers the state by weakening the relationship between social-political-and military sources of power. The overall effect is to reduce the embeddness of state in society and the legitimacy of the state, creating more opposition.

- Does the existence of a body, possessing the quasi-legal ability to exercise force, compromise the relationship of the state with other actors within and outside the state?

The presence of CMSPs could result in some isolation of military and social actors from within the state. In the short term there is a danger of alienating state military actors and in the long term of alienating social actors.

- Therefore, how effective are CMSPs in building a sustainable security environment within the state?

By improving the military power of the state the use of CMSPs in the case studies contributed towards a temporary increase in the security of the state. But their long-term use weakens the state by aggravating the relationship between state institutions, actors and the relationship between state and society

7.8 Conclusion

This thesis has argued that the impact of the use of CMSPs lies between those who condemn their use, and those who perceive them to be a panacea to the military weakness of the state. CMSPs have a role in supporting weak states, particularly when other actors are either absent, or further destabilising the state. By taking a theoretical approach which has looked at the use of CMSPs in the context of power it is possible to take a nuanced approach. Control over CMSPs is a particularly contentious issue, particularly in war zones. The lack of oversight and regulation has led to the questioning of the effectiveness and value of the services provided. There are of course good companies and bad companies, but this is an area of improvement. Increasing control of CMSPs could improve the institutionalisation of their use, making it more sustainable.

In terms of international security CMSPs are a comparatively weak actor, especially in relation to the state. If weak states like Sierra Leone and Iraq can exercise control at a domestic level and remove the companies when required,

there is little direct existential threat to the state. In Iraq the problem with the companies was their backing by the US, which increased their power within the state. The problems which do arise from the use of CMSPs are indirect, in propping up a state the balance between the sources of social power can be altered, potentially destabilising the state.

Returning to the analogy for the use of CMSPs by the state with that of a drug on the human body. When used carefully CMSPs can act as stimulant which temporarily rebalances the sources of power within the state and its relationship with other actors. The state then has the freedom to address the underlying problems. There is a danger of immediately upsetting this balance, between military and political, with potentially dramatic results. But this is a risk that the political elite of a state may be prepared to take to prevent the state succumbing to a greater existential threat. The greatest danger is of dependency, and the political elite relying on CMSPs to prop up the authoritarian power of the state. This is a decision which lies with the political elite of the country - whether they prefer long-term stability over-medium term authoritative power. Equally, ending the use of the companies early can be equally problematic for the state. In Sierra Leone the outcome was the overthrow of the government, the fall of Freetown and the collapse of effective power. Hence why the removal of Blackwater was so problematic to the U.S. in Iraq. This thesis therefore argues that CMSPs are a short-term solution, that allow more fundamental problems to be addressed. Careful consideration needs to be taken by political elites in balancing military weakness with effective building of institutions. CMSPs are most effective when they support this process, not merely serve to patch up the state while political, military, economic and social institutions continue unreformed.

Much reference is made to Machiavelli and his writing on mercenaries. His analysis of the use has rightly come under much criticism.⁴ However, he was right about the importance of national forces, though for the wrong reasons. In creating a state which has strong institutions which are embedded in society, an institutionalised military force is necessary. Going back to the assertion by Mann that historically mercenaries functioned most effectively when they became institutionalised within the state.⁵ In regards to weak states CMSPs do

⁴ See for example James Jay Carafano, *Private Sector, Public Wars: Contractors in Combat - Afghanistan, Iraq and Future Conflicts* (London: Praeger Security International, 2008), pp.14-19.

⁵ See chapter 4

not currently fulfil this role. They can provide a stop gap and play a role in building these forces.

7.9 Place in the Literature

In the writing on CMSPs this thesis joins those studies which have sought to move beyond the descriptive reporting of much of the early writing on the subject. In particular those who have sought to understand CMSPs activity using theoretical frameworks, such as Krahmann, Percy, Avant, Pattison and Ortiz.⁶ In doing so this thesis has built upon those studies which raised the possible implications of CMSPs on the state. Taking the questions raised by writers like Peter Singer, who did not pursue the issue in depth.⁷

This thesis takes place alongside more recent writing on CMSPs which has focused on a number of complementary issues. Regulation has been a fertile ground for research, with Percy, Singer and Krahmann all looking at the issue.⁸ There has been a move in the recent literature to consider 'lower end' security companies.⁹ Though this thesis chose to focus on the military side of the industry. Others have looked at the home states of the companies, including the US, UK, and South Africa, and their role in regulation.¹⁰ Again, the focus here differs by considering the states in which the companies are used.

There is some overlap with the work of Bruneau who looked at civil-military relations in the context of the US military.¹¹ But, who looked at the use of contractors, balancing their military effectiveness with the implications for the democratic deficit of the state. Stanger is another who has looked at the power of the state and the use of contractors, but with a focus on the US.¹² Some elements of this thesis coincide with the work of Dunnigan who looks at the military effectiveness of CMSPs.

The conclusions of this thesis are situated alongside those writers who

⁶ See chapter one.

⁷ Peter W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*, 2nd edn (London: Cornell, 2008).

⁸ Elke Krahmann, 'Regulating Private Military Companies: What Role for the EU?', *Contemporary Security Policy*, 26 (1) (2005), pp.103-125, Sarah Percy, *Regulating the Private Security Industry*, Adelphi Paper, 384 vols (Oxon: Routledge, 2006).

⁹ Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, *Security Beyond the State: Private Security in International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

¹⁰ Christopher Kinsey, *Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies* (London: Routledge, 2006), ., Elke Krahmann, 'From 'Mercenaries' to 'Private Security Contractors': The (Re)Construction of Armed Security Providers in International Legal Discourses', *Millennium*, 40 (2) (2012), pp.343-363.

¹¹ Thomas C. Bruneau, *Patriots for Profit: Contractors and the Military in U.S. National Security* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).

¹² Susan Stanger, *One Nation Under Contract* (London: Yale University Press, 2009).

have argued for the utility of the companies, particularly given their attractiveness for isolated governments. Arguing that they have short-term utility.¹³ It disagrees with those who have taken a strong opposition to the use of CMSPs.¹⁴ However, it also joins those commentators who have concerns over the long-term use of security firms to prop up a state.

This thesis also contributes to wider literature on both international security and historical sociology. The search for alternative approaches to security which account for changes in actors and the structure of the international system build on the work of Buzan and Lipschutz.¹⁵ The continued relevance of these questions can be seen in Krahmann's edited volume.¹⁶ It has also joined those who have used historical sociology in international relations. And those who have been influenced by the work of Michael Mann in pursuing this avenue of research.¹⁷

7.10 Further Study

The study of CMSPs remains a fascinating and relevant issue in the study of international security. Particularly as the industry continues to increase in size despite the wind down of Iraq and Afghanistan.¹⁸ As such there are plenty of options available for further study. The theoretical model used here could be expanded to other cases which occurred during this period, such as Papua New Guinea, Angola, Afghanistan, the Balkans and Columbia. The modified IEMP model could be used to look at the role of commercial enterprises which are fulfilling services at the lower end of security spectrum where commercial security companies are prolific, such as in South Africa. Several new cases have also arisen, and will continue to do so, such as Somalia. There has also been a growth in the number of domestically produced firms.¹⁹

The modified IEMP model could also be used in theorising other issues.

¹³ David Shearer, *Private Armies and Military Intervention*, Adelphi Paper, 316 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

¹⁴ Abdel-Fatau Musah and Kayode J. Fayemi, *Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma* (London: Pluto Press, 2000).

¹⁵ *On Security*, ed. by Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

¹⁶ *New Threats and New Actors in International Security*, ed. by Elke Krahmann (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

¹⁷ *An Anatomy of Power: The Social Theory of Michael Mann*, ed. by John A. Hall and Ralph Schroeder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

¹⁸ Associated Press, 'UN Mercenary Report: Private Security on Track to be a \$244 Billion Growth Business by 2016,' *The Washington Post*, 4th November 2013 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/un-mercenary-report-private-security-on-track-to-be-244-billion-growth-business-by-2016/2013/11/04/b925ef6a-4597-11e3-95a9-3f15b5618ba8_story.html> [accessed 4th November 2013].

¹⁹ The Economist, 'Private Military Contractors', *The Economist*, 409 (8863) (2013), p.73.

Either to focus on non-state actors, transnational actors, or international organisations and their impact on state power. Much writing on historical sociology, such as Mann, Tilley and Skocpol has focused on revolution and change. The modified model could also be used more generally in considering the failure of weak states and their relationship with other non-state and state actors across the networks. Particularly as so many areas of the globe remain unstable.

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